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ABSTRACT 
The beginning of 195ns witnessed an era 
whereby both the United states and United Nations 
deeply involved in promotion of international peace 
and security as an agenda of post-Cold war besides 
ensuring to expedite the process of decolonization 
and thus big or small nations to have equal rights 
in international affairs with a particular emphasis 
on the right of self-determination and assertion of 
newly independent nations. The task, however , had 
been difficult yet, the United States and United 
Nations authorities resolutely carried out the set 
objectives to a successful conclusion by venturing 
into two major intractable cases like the Korean 
and Congo crises in 1950s and 1960s. The two 
crises have taken as a test case in the thesis to 
arrive at exact and accurate results as wai 
anticipated *by the United States and United 
Nations. 
The clash of interests of the United 
2 
States and former Soviet Union was over the US 
controlled South-Korea and Soviet Union controlled 
North-Korea indicating infact the ideological 
warfare which ultimately resulted on June 25,1950. 
The Congo case was more complex as it got formal 
independence on June 30,1960 but the political 
control was still in the hands of Belgians. The 
United States under the aegis of United Nations 
could able to defuse tensions both in Korean 
peninsula and Congo and eventually restored the 
confidence of member states in the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
With the post world war II division between 
the communist bloe and the West, the United States 
quickly emerged in the security Council as a leader 
of the democratic nations in the UN and Fought the 
diplomatic battle to promote the right of 
self-determination of every nation and determined to 
stop the communism by every means not only in Europe 
but in Asia and Africa well. A large majority of the 
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US public was in favour of the general support to the 
United Nations for achieving these goals. The former 
Senator Barry Goldwater eloquently once expressed the 
Americans willingness to support the functioning of 
the United Nations in these words : "The United 
Nations —is at best an instrument of international 
accord. It is useful to the West now for a special 
reason; it provides a forum in which to discuss 
communist violation of the Charter." 
Controversies arising in the Cold War 
situation had been dominated by direct and serious 
conflict between the major communist and non 
communist powers because the interest of the United 
States had been adversely affected by such disputes. 
The United States was compelled to move to the United 
Nations. Wherever feasible to maximize support for 
its own strategy and to confound the communist enemy. 
But because of the intense hostility and massive 
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power involved, it became difficult for the United 
States to mobilise strong support for its position in 
these cases within the United Nations. Despite the 
difficulties, the United States and its allies 
considered advantageous to use the United Nations as 
a major instrument for dealing with some of the most 
dangerous Cold Mar conflicts . The study is concerned 
with two major cases of international crises in 
Korean and Congo. During the intense Cold war period 
of first two decades of the formation of the United 
Nations the Korean crisis (1950-53) and Congo crisis 
(1960-64) lingered for very long duration. Congo was 
the largest military operation which the UN had been 
involved, not only the largest militury operation, 
but the largest financial operation as well. The UN 
maintained a force of some 2 0,000 (ONUC) at the cost 
of over $ 1000,000,000 a year. The budget for 
maintaining the UN forces in the Congo had been 
greater than the total normal budget of the UN prior 
to that activities. In the operation in Korea, it was 
involved with a larger number of forces. But it was 
somewhat questionable whether it could be called a UN 
operation. The UN had delegated authority in the 
Korean matter to the United States and the forces 
were in large measure from the United States forces 
and the forces from the South Korea. Infact the 
United Nations came nearest to establishing a 
fighting force. It did create a United Nations 
Command and requested members to make forces 
available to it. But this was a mere an extension of 
existing command of the United States in ^ar Eastern 
military operation under the command of General Mac 
Arthur. The action taken by the Arthur and his forces 
was in fact United Nations action and of course 
justified norms of international law. 
The Secretariate of the UN had no part in 
operation or even deployment of troops. By the end of 
1950, the only foreign ground troops fighting by the 
American side were from the United Kingdom, 
Australia, France, Greece, Turkey, the Netherland, 
the philipines, Thailand and Turkey . The Unified 
Command in Korea consisted of about a quarter of 
million American compared with only about 36/000 
troops from all other Member States combined. 
Korean crisis had got special significance as 
it had extended the dimension of the moral authority 
of the General Assembly. The General Assembly became 
a definite alternative to the Security Council for the 
first time in Korean crisis. The United States was 
successful in shifting the discussion from the 
Security Council to the General Assembly which was 
dominated by Anglo-American majority in 1950s and 
60s. It was noticiable through Uniting for Peace 
Resolution of 1950 which demonstrated for the 
empowerment of General Assembly as the generation of 
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international peace and security in case the 
consensus fail in the security Control. The Security 
Council had been unable to act owing to acute 
differences among its permanent members. The Assembly 
was able to play a complementary role by endorsing 
the resolution of the Security Council . The lesson 
learnt from the Korean experienced proved fruitful in 
resolving the Congo crisis. When the then secretary 
General proceeded to recruit forces he emphasised the 
need that the conditions for the forces to be sent 
should be that they should include no forces from any 
of the great powers. It was realised that to have a 
genuine UN forces it ought to be recruited from a 
good many of the smaller countries or from countries 
at least which were not the major protogonists in the 
Cold war. It was also recognized that it would be 
desirable to have a large number of forces from Africa 
and this was one of the provisions made in the 
recruitment of froces. At the same time it was also 
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provided that there should be some troops from 
outside Africa, so that it could be regarded, as 
United Nations universal operation . This shows a 
tremendous influence in strengthening the UN against 
the opinion of one protogonist or other in the Cold 
War, could be exercised by the uncommitted states. 
The uncommitted-tatesconsisted a large proportion of 
the members of the General Assembly and it appeared 
that these states had expressed their solidarty with 
the UN mission in Korea as they felt that United 
Nations also could protect their interests in the 
World. 
US officials, who frequently 
offered technical, military and political advice, as 
did the officials of other interested states. The 
United States acted as a balance wheel between the 
sometimes irreconcilable positions of the militant 
Afro-Asian leaders and more conservative European 
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Spokesmen. Tt was precisely this mediating role that 
drew criticism from both sides. Nevertheless, the 
United States and the United Nations established the 
credibility of ensuring peace and security whenever 
and wherever threatened. Both Korean and Congo 
crises gave a new impetus to the American policy 
makers in the Ptate Department that the United 
States had responsibility towards the world 
community to promote the rights of 
self-determination and self-assertion either be in 
political/ social, cultural or economic spheres of 
any nation in any parts of the world. 
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PREFACE 
The hpcjinning of 1950s witnessed an era 
whereby both the United States and United Nations 
deeply involved in promotion of international peace 
and security as an agenda of post-cold war besides 
ensuring to expedite the process of decolonization 
and thus big or small nations to have equal rights 
in international affairs with a particular emphasis 
on the right of self-determination and assertion of 
newly independent nations. The task, however , had 
been difficult yet, the United States and United 
Nations authorities resolutely carried out the set 
objectives to a successful conclusion by venturing 
into two major intractable cases like the Korean 
and Congo crises in 1950s and 1960s. The two 
crises have taken as a test case in the thesis to 
arrive at exact and accurate results as was 
anticipated by the United States and United 
Nations. 
The clash of interests of the United 
States and former Soviet Union was over the US 
controlled South-Korea and Soviet Union controlled 
North-Korea indicating infact the ideological 
warfare which ultimately resulted on June 2 5,1950. 
The Congo case was more complex as it got formal 
independence on June 30,1960 but the political 
control was still in the hands of Belgians. The 
United States under the aegis of United Nations 
could able to defuse tensions both in Korean 
peninsula and Congo and eventually restored the 
confidence of member states in the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Seven chapters, four appendices, select 
bibliography and analytical methodology constitute 
as an important segment of the thesis. Chapter I 
deals with the historical background of the 
US-Korean relations. The official diplomatic and 
commercial relations have been traced back to the 
signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce on May 
22, 1882. Initially, American government shoved 
only a causal interest in Korea. The United States, 
however, became increasingly involved in the affairs 
of the Korea following the termination of world war 
vi 
T. The United states and its allies fought the 
North Korean and Chinese communists and preserved 
the Republic of Korea. 
Chapter II examines the role of the United 
Nations in acordance with the provisions of the 
Charter with referenceto collective, security. 
Chapter III highlights the United States 
strategy during the Korean crisis. Strategies kept 
changing and finally USA decided to intervene 
militarily to prevent communists takeover of 
peninsula and administration reversed early policy 
decisions that accorded low priority to Korea in 
its defence calculations. 
Chapter IV analyses the historical 
background of the .Co-n-v3 crisis including the 
Belgian colonialism and the factors leading to 
independence. 
Chapter V attempts to explain the 
involvement of United States in 'Ory^5 crisis, which 
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ultimately resulted in granting independence to 
Congo. The role of super-powers during the crisis 
are adequately dealt. 
In Chapter VI the position of the United 
States taken in the United Nations are fully 
discussed and the circumstances concerning the post 
independence turmoil and the role of Eisenhower 
administration are presented. The kennedy 
administration and its anti-colonial bent is further 
assessed. 
Chapter VII draws the conclusion of the 
thesis which adequately focussed the joint roles of 
the United States and United Nations in preservation 
of international peace and security not only for the 
Korean and Congo people but for the entire humanity 
as well. 
"Our American Policy is a policy of friendly 
partnership with all peaceful nations and of full 
support for the Dnited Nations Organization. It is a 
policy that has the strong backing of the American 
people.. It is a policy around which we can rally 
without fear or misgiving". 
President Harry S.Trueman 
Navy Day Address 
(October 2 7, 1945) 
CHAPTER-! 
AMERICAN-KOREAN RELATIONS: 
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
official diplomatic and commercial relations 
between America and Korea began with the signing of 
the Treaty of Amity and commerce in spring of 1882. 
1. The treaty was signed at Inch on 22 May, 1882. 
The US Senate advice and consent to ratification 
with an understanding, came on 9 January, 1883. It 
was ratified by the President of the United 
States, with an understanding, 13 February, 1883. 
The US "understanding" reads as follows. "It is 
the understanding of the Senate in agreeing to 
foregoing resolution, that the clause, Nor are 
they permitted to transport nature produce from 
one open port to another open port in Article VI 
of said treaty, is not intended to prohibit and 
does not prohibited American ships from going 
from one open port to another open port in Korea 
to receive Korean cargo for exportation, or to 
discharge foreign cargo". 
The treaty was ratified by Korea on 18 May, 
18R3 and the ratifications were exchanged at Seoul 
19 May 1883. Tt entered into force the same day. 
it was proclaimed by the President of the United 
States 4 June, 1883. The treaty was terminated on 
2 9 August, 1910, the date of the Japanese 
annexation of Korea. 
See, Spencer , J.Palmer, Korean-American 
Relations; Documents pertaining to the Far-
Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, Vol. 
(Rerkelay and los Angels, 1963) p.l. 
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However, the hard-won diplomatic and commercial 
relationship between the two countries was abruptly 
terminated in November 1905. Korea quickly became a 
forgotten nation sc far as the vast majority of 
Americans were concerned, and its cry for help was 
ignored by the American government for nearly a 
half century. Ironically, the United States fouyht 
a costly war to free the Korean people from 
Japanese colonial rule, and restored new relations 
with the people of Korea. 
The Early Relationship 
As early as 1834, Edmund Roberts who visited 
Japan in 1832 to open trade was convinced that the 
relationship between Korea and the United States 
would be established soon or later. Efforts made by 
the American government to open relations brought 
about a more or less satisfactory result in 1854, 
but Korea remained the "hermit kingdom". Meanwhile, 
Congressman Zedoc Pratt introduced, and the House 
adopted a resolution on February 15, 1845 calling 
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for the extension of American commerce to the Far 
East because it was important "to the general 
interests of the United States" to establish 
diplomatic and commercial relations with Korea and 
Japan. 
Although a treaty was signed with Japan 
March 1854, opening two Japanese ports for American 
ships in distress, no overtures were made to Korea 
at that time to open the "hermit kingdom" . It was 
not until Secretary of State William H.Seward, who 
was convinced that "the Pacific Ocean, its shores, 
its islands, and the vast region beyond (would) 
become the chief theater of events in the world's 
great hereafter", took the initiative to open Korea 
in 1867 in cooperation with France following the 
occurance of the case of the General Sherman in the 
summer of 1866. 
While a bloody anti-Christian persecution 
was in progress, the persecution which caused the 
death of nine French Catholic priests and several 
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thousand Korean converts in 1866, an American 
merchant ship named the General Sherman, sailed up 
the Taedong River toward Pyongyang in defiance of 
Korean officials, and grounded near Yanggak Island. 
Ostensively it came to trade, but the Koreans were 
suspicious that the real objective of the trip was 
to rob the tombs of their ancient kings. Moreover, 
the General Sherman' crew (mainly Malays and 
Chinese) probably provoked the local inhabitants. 
In any case, the Korean inhabitants attacked the 
ship, burned her, and massacred her crew. The 
dispatch of a point force of Americans and French 
to Korea was contemplated by Secretary Seward. 
No joint expedition of American and French 
forces was sent to Korea, but Secretary Seward's 
nephew George F.Seward, who was U.S. Consul at 
Shanghai, was instructed to proceed to Korea to 
secure a treaty in 1867. Secretary Seward wrote to 
his nephew stating that his mission was to be a 
friendly one, "reserving the question of force, if 
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found necessary, for ultimate consideration". 
"You will however give notice to the Korean 
government," Secretary Seward instructed, "if you 
find it expedient, that this government cannot 
condone the outrage committed in the case of the 
General Sherman to remain indefinitely without 
receiving proper guaranty of adequate and ample 
2 
redress. 
Seward' expedition to Korea was not 
undertaken when it became clear that it was not 
likely to be a successful mission. The case of the 
General Sherman, however, had to be settled. As a 
result, in 1868 Secretary Seward launched a 
diplomatic move while preparing to dispatch an 
American search party to Korea. At the same time, 
he sought Japanese assistance in settling the case 
of the General Sherman and establishing proper 
2. Quoted in Dennett, Tyler, Americans in Eastern 
Asia, (New York: Barnes and Noble. 1963),p.420. 
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diplomatic and commercial relations with Korea • 
When the Japanese were unable to achieve their 
objectives in Korea, the United States decided to 
settle the Korean question alone, and instructed 
its minister to China, Frederick F.Low and Admiral 
John Rogers to undertake the mission. 
The American expeditionary force consistiny 
of five warships proceeded to Korea in May 1871, 
and in the words of the New York herald Tribune 
"Our Little War with the Heathen" began. The 
American expedition, like that of the French in 
1866, failed to achieve its objectives and withdrew 
from Korean waters in July after demolishing Korean 
forts on and around the island of Kanghwa and the 
3. US,House Executive Documents, 28th Congress, 2nd 
Session., no.138, "Extensions of American 
Commerce-Proposed Mission to Japan and Korea" 
(Washington, 1845) as quoted in M.Fedrick 
Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia 
(New York, 1967), P.111. On 17 April 1878, 
Senator Aaron A.Sargent of California purposed 
sending a US mission to Korea to initiate 
diplomatic relations.The resolution never 
reached the main floor of the senate. See Chong 
Yong-Suk, Muguk is fachan chongch'ack, (American 
Policy towards Korea, 1845-1980.(Seoul, 
Chogak,1981). pp.33-35. 
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Han River . The American expeditionary force, while 
accomplishing nothing positive, led the Korean 
government to adopt an official anti-Western policy 
in 1871. 
Following the conclusion of the Korean-
Japanese treaty in 1876, American interest in the 
opening of Korea revived. As a result, in 1878, 
Secretary of State William M.Everts and Secretary 
of the Navy R.W.Thompson instructed Commodore 
Robert W.Shufeldt, who had been sent to Korea in 
1866-67 to investigate the General Sherman affair, 
to make efforts to open Korea by peaceful means. He 
was assured that "a moderate and conciliatory 
course toward (Korea) would result in opening the 
ports of that country to American commerce" with 
the help of the Japanese. 
4. For details, see "Our Little War with the Nahm, 
American Heritage, XIX, 3 (April, 1968),pp. 
18-2 3, 72-75. 
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The efforts made by the Japanese, however, 
brought about no satisfctory results for the 
Americans. The timely incitation extended to 
Commodore Shufeldt by Li Hung-chang, one of the 
most prominent officials of the Peking government, 
prepared the way for the establishment of 
diplomatic and commercial relations between the 
United States and Korea on May 22 , 1882 . 
Ironically, Secretary of State James G. Blaine had 
said in his instruction to Shufeldt dated November 
14, 1881, that the United States had "no political 
or commercial interest" in Korea,but he hoped that 
"the advantages resulting from the growing and 
friendly relations between (China, Japan) and the 
United States will have attracted the attention and 
awakened the interest of the Korean government". Be 
that as it may, the Korean government signed the 
first diplomatic and commercial treaty with a 
Western nation, a treaty which professor Tyler 
Dennett pointed out to have "set Korea adrift on an 
ocean of intrigue which it was quite helpless to 
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control." 
Cordial relations between the United States 
and Korea were cultivated despite the reluctance 
and disinterest displayed by the State Department. 
The first American Minister to Korea, General 
Lucius H.Foote, the Naval Attache, Ensign George C. 
Foulke, Dr. Horace N. Allen, a Presbyterian medical 
missionary, and otehrs who arrived in Korea shortly 
after the signing of the 1882 treaty contributed 
much to the growth of friendly attitudes on the 
part of the Korean government toward the United 
States. The first Korean diplomatic mission was 
dispatched to the United States in September 1883, 
and a Korean diplomatic office was established in 
Washington in 1887 despite strong Chinese 
objections. 
In a sense, the relationship between the two 
countries may be viewed as a one-sided affair of 
Korea for the United States, the reluctant partner. 
5. Dennett, n. 2 pp. 461-462. 
in 
By and large, the Korean leaders displayed their 
romantic view in American-Korean relations. Many 
official and unofficial writings of American 
diplomatic personnel to Korea offer certain clues 
for us to detect Korean attitudes toward the United 
States. On the whole, Korea expected much more from 
the United States than the latter was willing or 
able to offer, resulting in extreme disappointment, 
disillusionment, or even anger on the part of the 
Korean government. 
Some Koreans viewed the Shufeldt treaty as a 
wedge to free Korea from Chinese domination. and 
when General Foote arrived in Korea in May 1883 as 
the fifth American minister to Korea, the Korean 
6. McCune, George M.and John A. Harrison, ed. , 
Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining 
to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United 
States. Vol. I: The Initial Period, 1883-1886, 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
ofCalifornia Press, 1951) p.3. 
11 
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king "danced with joy, " for he along with others 
regarded the United States as the "symbol of a 
beneficient power that would indisputably guarantee 
the integrity of the Korean nation". Believing that 
the United States was a friendly and beneficient 
power capable of protecting Korea's independence, 
the Korean king took positive steps to promote close 
ties with the United States: he promoted 
confidential relationship with American ministers, 
he sought American drill masters for his army, he 
employed American teachers for the school for the 
o 
children of the nobility , he employed Americans in 
7. Foulk to Secretary of the Navy, enclosure to No. 
12 8, Foots to Frelynghysen, December 17,184. 
8. They wre Reverends Dr.H.Bunker. Homer B.Hulbert, 
and George W.Gilmore. 
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v e ry important government positions, he 
made special grants to American-sponsored 
educational institutions, and he stood firm on his 
decision to establish diplomatic offices in the 
United States despite the strong Chinese 
opposition. 
On the other hand, the American government 
showed only casual interest in Korea at best, 
despite the fact that Minister Foote felt that 
tHe influence of the United States should become a 
permanent factor in the progress of Korea. Neither 
the U.S. government, nor the American people knew 
much, or cared to know about Korea, her culture, 
history and people. Even the usual colleye graduate 
9. Among them were: Drs. William B.Scranton, John 
W.Heron, Horace N.Allen, horace, G.Underwood, and 
Henry G. Appenzeller, a nurse Annie Ellers, 
H.F.Merrill, O.N. Denny, William M.Dye, and 
William F.Sands. General Charles W.LeGendre and 
Clarence R.Greathouse were employed as foreign 
affairs advisers. 
13 
knew more about the moon than he did about Korea. 
Meanwhile, the casual interests of the Americans in 
Korea turned into indifference. Occasionally, some 
Americans reacted intensely and emotionally to 
developments in Korea, with sudden fluctuation of 
feelings ranging from sympathy to contempt. 
The Korean policy of the United States was to 
maintain a position of impartial neutrality towards 
the international disputes evolving around the 
peninsula kingdom and its neighbouring countries 
while securing special rights and privileges for the 
Americans in Korea. In reality, the role of the 
United States was "little more than a sympathetic 
and detached on-looker". All American 
representatives in Korea were opposed to Chinese 
domination over Korea, while some of them showed 
their preference of the Japanese over the Chinese, 
nearly all of them were mainly concerned with the 
securing of special concessions for American 
missionaries and businessmen in Korea. Some, like 
Minister John M. B.Sill, misread the intentions of 
] 4 
the Japanese and Russians, while others, like Durham 
White Stevens, actively promoted Japanese interests 
and domination in Korea. Some, such as Drs. Allen 
and Underwood, say the steadily growing Japense 
influence and domination in Korea, and made attempts 
to strengthen the cause of the Korean nationalistic 
reformers Dr.Allen, who went to Korea as a medical 
missionary, and later became in 1890 Secretary of 
the American Legation, and then the U.S. Minister to 
Korea in 1897, wrote in 1899 that "Japanese have 
become aggressive here until they now seem to regard 
Korea as their own peculiar sphere of action and all 
others to be more interlopers." Meanwhile, he 
endeavored industriously to secure electric, pearl 
and timber concessions for American firms, and made 
successful efforts to secure gold mine and railroad 
concessions for an American promoter Janes R.Morse. 
10. Quoted in Harrington, Fred H., God Mammon and 
the Japanese. (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1944)p.302. 
15 
Korea received little political assistance 
from the United States. The United States maintained 
its strict neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-9?, and in 1899 when the Korean emperor asked 
the American Minister Allen to solicit his 
government's aid to establish Korea's political 
neutrality to protect its independence, President 
McKinley refused to act.When the Russo-Japanese War 
came in 1904 over the Korean and Manchurian issues, 
the United States, not only refused to help Korea, 
but actually approved the Japanese actions in Korea. 
Korea became a Japanese protectorate in November 
1905. 
Neither Minister Allen, nor William Sands, 
an American adviser to the Korean emperor, had any 
love for the Korean emperor or the Koreans. Sands 
saw the Korean emperor as "confused politically, 
weak in personality", and was obsessed by his 
"life-long and well-grounded fear of personal 
lfi 
violence." Korea was "so corrupt, and the country 
is in such a state of misrule and disrule", wrote 
Minister Allen, "that it seems necessary at times to 
speak of practices while will, if unchecked, become 
beyond control to the severe detriment of interests 
12 purely American." Allen even complained that "The 
Koreans have the idea that we don't count any 
,,13 
more. ' 
While the Americans in Korea were expressing 
negative and unfavourable views about the Korean 
government and the state of the Kingdom, policy 
makers in the United States showed their preference 
for Japanese control in Korea over either that of 
Russia, or "a state of misrule and disrule" under 
the Koreans themselves. As early as 1900, president 
11. Sands, William, F., "Korea and the Korean 
Emperor", Century LXIX (1905), p. 581; Sands, 
William F., Undiplomatic Memoires. (New York: 
Whittlesey House, 1930), pp. 54-56. 
12. Quoted in Harrington, n. ]0 ., p. 308. 
13. Ibid., p. 309. 
17 
Theodore Roosevelt favoured Japanese control over 
Korea. He wrote to a German friend of his, Speck von 
Sternburg, that he would "like to see Japan have 
Korea", because Japan deserved it in order to check 
Russia.14 When, in 1903 Minister Allen expressed his 
view that the United States should help Russia 
against Japan, William W. Rock-hill, the author of 
American "Open Door" policy in China, told Allen that 
the Japanese should not only be supported, but also 
should be allowed to swallow Korea and should be 
helped to check the Tsarist drive to get 
Manchuria.15 Rockhill, who was director of the 
International Bureau of American Republics, was 
regarded as the Far Eastern expert of the State 
Department. Roosevelt called him "the author of and 
sponsor of our Asiatic policy." Soon after the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt told 
14. Beale, Howard K., Theodore Roosevelt and the 
Rise of America to World Power.(Baltimore : The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) p. 314. 
15. Quoted in Harrington, n.. 10 . ,p.314. 
16. Ibid. 
lfi 
Sternburg to inform the Kaiser that the United 
17 States was willing to see japan take Korea. 
Shortly before the Japanese launched a war 
against the Russian empire, the Japanese minister to 
the United States communicated Japan's wish to 
provide "protection, supervision, and guidance" to 
1 o 
Korea.The American president fully concurred. 
Roosevelt justified the American policy on the 
ground that the United States "cannot possibly 
interfere for the Koreans against Japan when the 
Koreans could not strike on blow in their own 
17. Beale, n- 14 ., p. 314. 
18. See Japanese foreign Minister Komura's 
instruction to Minister Takahira in Washington, 
January 22, 1905, and a record of Takahira's 
conversation with Roosevelt on January 2 4, 
1905, in Japan. Gaimusho„ Nihon gaiko bunsho 
(hereafter cited as NGB), XXXVII, Part I, 
216-217. 
19 
defence." 
Witnessing the gathering war clouds over 
Korea, and being uninformed of American attitudes 
toward Korea, the Korean emperor sought American 
assistance in maintaining the independence of 
Korea.AlTen wrote: "the Emperor always turns to me 
and the more they (Japan and Russia) scare him the 
more eager he is to turn everything over to the 
2 0 Americans." But, Allen was powerless to help him, 
for his voice meant nothing to the policy-makers in 
Washington. 
In February 1904, the Russo-Japanese War 
broke out, and when the Japanese carried out their 
military occupation of Korea, neither Great Britain 
19. Dennett, Tyler, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese 
War. (Gloucester, Mass., peter Smith, 1925) p.110 
See also Komura to Takahira, January 8, in NGB, 
XXXVII, Supplement on the Russo-Japanese War. 
V, 203-204, 206-207. 
2 0. Quoted in Harrington, it. 10 ., p.309; Sands, 
n. 11 p. 48. 
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which had concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902), 
nor the United States lodged any protest against 
such a gross violation of international law. What was 
more, in July, Secretary of War William Howard Taft 
negotiated with the Japanese in Tokyo a secret 
agreement which sealed the fate of Korea. In Tokyo, 
Taft talked with Prime Minister Katsura Taro of 
Japan and exchanged views, and in a secret "agreed 
memorandum" the United States approved Japan's 
suzerainty over Korea in return for Japanese 
disavowal of any aggressive intentions toward the 
21 Philippines. . Roosevelt approved the action taken 
22 by Taft. It was a typical diplomatic quid pro quo 
21. The secret agreement was concluded without the 
knowledge of Lloyd C, Griscom, American Minister 
to Japan. For text of the agreement, see 
Dennett, Roosevelt, pp.112-114; NGB, XXXVIII, 
part I, 450-451. 
22. Roosevelt wired Taft on July 31, and said: "Your 
conversation with Count Katsura absolutely 
correct in every respect. Wish you would state 
to Katsura and I confirm every word you have 
said". Beale, n. 14- , p. 157. 
21 
arrangement between two imperialist powers, a 
Japanese Korea for an American Philippines. 
Ironically, the United States had to fight a costly 
war to free Korea, as well as the Philippines from 
the Japanese who had taken it over in the early 
stage of World War II. 
As Korea encountered critical problems in the 
midst of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States 
showed no intention of becoming her guardian. "Our 
interests (in Korea were, "said Secretary of State 
John Hay to the Korean envoy in 1905, "rather 
commercial than political" when the Korean envoy 
sought American aid to protect Korea's sovereign 
2 3 
rights and independence. A similar statement was 
made by William W. Rockhill, who had been charge 
d'affaire in Korea, in his letter to Minister 
Allen. "I cannot see any possibility of this 
government using its influence 'to bolster up the 
Empire of Korea in its independence," 
2 3. Rockhill to Allen, February 2 0, 1904, Quoted in 
Harrington, n. 10., p.324. 
22 
"I fancy that the Japanese will settle this question 
when the present war is finished. The annexation of 
Korea to Japan seems to be absolutely indicated as 
the one great and final step westward of the 
extension of the Japanese Empire. I think when this 
comes about it will be better for the Korean people 
2 4 
and also for the peace in the Far East." 
The policy makers in Washington knew that it 
was the Japanese intention to establish a 
protectorateship of Japan over Korea, and eventually 
to annexure. Early in November 1905 Katsura informed 
Roosevelt through Takahira Kogoro in Washington in 
strict confidence that Japan planned to take charge 
of Korea's external affairs, and received American 
2 5 
approval . This was not necessary, for Roosevelt 
had not only realized that such a step would be 
taken by the Japanese earlier, but also encouraged 
the Japanese to do so. During the peace negotiations 
at Portsmouth, Roosevelt said to Baron Kaneko 
Kentaro, one of his close friends and a member of 
24. Ibid., 
2 5. Katsura to Takahira, November 6,1905, NGB, 
XXXVII, Part I, 52 9. 
23 
the Japanese delegation, "sooner or later it will be 
better for Japan to take-over Korea. I rather think 
that Japan should take-over Korea for the sake of 
2 6 the Koreans and for Asia. Not now, but soon." "I 
was pro- Japanese before," wrote Roosevelt to Rock-
hill in August 1905, "but after my experience with 
the peace commissioners I am far stronger 
27 pro-Japanese than before." 
2 6. Unpublished secret memoirs of Kaneko Kentaro: 
"My Activities in the United States Related to 
the Japanese-Russian Peace Negotiations." Japan. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Research Division. 
First Section.January 1934. Special Edition, 
No.5. The Japanese title of Kaneko's memoir is: 
Nichi-Ro kowa ni kanshi Beikoku ni koeru yo no 
katsudo ni tsuite. Roosevelt believed that 
"Japanese suzerainty in Korea would...be best 
for the Koreans as well as Japanese." Esthus, 
Raymond A., Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 
(Seattle: university of Washington Press, 
1967 )pp. 110-111. 
2 7. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 2 9, 1905, quoted 
in Griswold, A. Whitney, The Far-Eastern Policy 
of the United States. (New Haven, and London: 
Yale University Press, 1938) p.120. 
2 4 
With the signing of the Treaty of Protection 
dated November 17, 1905, Japan forced Korea to 
accept its guardianship. The United States was the 
first Western power to withdraw their legation from 
Korea. Korea mourned along. Following the 
establishment of the Residency-General of Japan in 
Korea, the Japanese step by step took away the 
sovereign rights of the Korean monarch as they 
tightened their grip, and they reduced the Korean 
emperor to a protesting but powerless figurehead. 
The unhappy Korean emperor made fruitless 
efforts to protect his sovereign rights and the 
independence of his empire. In October 1905 when the 
intentions of the Japanese had been clearly shown, 
the Korean emperor sent Dr. Homer B.Hulbert to 
Washington to seek American help. But he was unable 
to see Roosevelt who "completely ignored the appeal" 
of the Korean emperor. In December Min Young-ch'an, 
a special envoy of the Korean emperor, arrived in 
Washington to make a plea for American support in 
26 
The Liberation and Allied Occupation of Korea 
In constrast to the period between 1910 and 
1945, during which the United States paid scant 
attention to the difficult situation of the Korean 
people under Japanese colonial control, the United 
States became increasingly involved in the affairs 
of the Korea following the termination of World VJar 
II. The decision made by the Allied Powers at Cairo, 
Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam between 1943 and 194 5, 
thrust the United States into a dominant role in Far 
East affairs. The development and application of 
American foreign policy for Asia fundamentally 
changed by the antecedents, the circumstances, and 
the results of World War II.As for American policy 
towards Korea, the United States which had been 
either unable or unwilling to render assistance to 
the Korean Rationalists who were fighting at hone 
and abroad for Korea's freedom and independence, at 
last officially declared in the Cairo Declaration of 
December 1, 1943, which was cosigned by Great 
27 
Britain and the Republic of China, that it was 
"mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people" by 
the Japanese and it was "determined that in due 
29 
course Korea shall become free and independent." 
Certainly, the Koreans viewed the United 
States in August 1945 as their friend and liberator, 
and the regenerator of their hopes and aspirations. 
However, they were destined to drink bitter cups 
once again. Their friend and liberator came as 
conqueror, their "libberated" land became 
partitioned and occupied by foreign troops, and the 
southern half of Korea was put under an alien 
military rule again. They narrowly escaped the 
five-year trusteeship of the Allied Powers, but they 
witnessed the growth of the Cold War in Korea and 
the emergence of two states in their land, each 
claiming legitimacy and jurisdiction over the entire 
29. For a full text of the Cairo Declaration of 
December 1, 1943, See U.S.Department of State, 
In Quest of Peace and Securi ty: Selected 
Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951. 
(Washington: 1951,) p.10. 
28 
i 3 0 peninsula. 
The partition of Korea brought about many 
tragic consequences, including the Korean War and 
subsequent problems related to the relaxation of 
tension of the peninsula and the growth of 
autocratic rule associated with the national 
security question. Well documented studies showed 
that it was the opinion of President Roosevelt that 
the liberated Asian colonial people would not be 
ready to enjoy their freedom and national 
independence at the end of World War II. 
Consequently, he insisted that they "should be put 
under the tutelage of the Great Powers and be 
educated in democratic institutions. In other 
words, the colonial peoples, such as Korean should 
enjoy their freedom and independence only after "a 
30. Cho,Soon Sung,Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: 
An Evaluation of American Responsibility. 
(Berkeley and Los Angeless: University of 
California Press, 1967)p.l7. 
31. Franklin D.Roosevelt' speech on November 15, 
1942 in Samuel I.Rosenman, ed.,The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D.Roosevelt.(New York: 
Harper and Brothers,1950J194 volume*pp.473-376. 
29 
period of training as the 38th parallel line which 
had been established as a "temporary military 
demarcation line" between the two Allied Powers 
became a political boundary of two Korean states. 
Under the decision made by the United Nations 
General Assembly in November 1947, the first 
democratic and free elections were carried out only 
in the south in order to establish a government of 
32 Korea. Following the May elections of 1948, the 
National Assembly of Korea was established, and the 
Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15,1948, 
33 
ending American military rule in the south. 
32. U.S.Department of State.Foreign Relations of the 
United States: Diplomatic Paper, Conference at 
Malta and Yalta, 1945, hereafter cited as 
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, (Washington, 
1945.)p. 770. 
33. Hull, Cordell The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 
Vols, (new York: The Macmillan Co., 1948.) II, 
1984; Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 360. 
For details on U.S. policy toward Korea, see 
Cho, n. 30. ., pp. 29-55. 
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The American occupation of South Korea 
accomplished little, except that it prevented mass 
starvation and total collapse of public order. The 
American occupation of South Korea was destined to 
be a failure. There were many reasons. For one 
thing, as an authority on Korea pointed out, "Aside 
from an expressed intention to further the 
establishment of a Korean government, there seemed 
to be little underlying continuity in American 
34 policy during the three-year period." As a matter 
of fact, there was no American policy toward Korea 
with the exception of that which aimed at the 
removal of the Japanese from their colony. The 
United States was destined to confront in Korea 
immense problems, but "the almost impromtu way in 
which the occupation was undertaken with very little 
prior preparation' made the failure of the American 
occupation virtually inevitable. George McCune 
34. McCune, George M.and Arthur L. Grey Jr., Korea 
Today. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1950]p. 269. 
31 
remarked. 
The production of a viable democracy in a 
country which had been politically dead for thirty-
five years demanded more positive encouragement than 
the occupation force was prepared to give. In the 
absence of uninterrupted and definitive guidance 
upon matters of policy by Washington, the occuption 
authorities were often so uncertain and cautious 
about inaugurating definite policies as to appear 
dominated by the situation. 
Be that as it may, with the establishment of 
the Republic of Korea in the south, a new 
relationship between the United States and the newly 
created republic developed. 
Relations During the Crisis 
After a brief period of uncertainties from 
1948 to 1950, cordial relations developed between 
the United States and the Republic of Korea despite 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
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many problems which caused difficulties on both 
sides. Unlike in the 19th century, the United States 
demonstrated its positive interest in domestic and 
foreign affairs of Korea, while the Korean 
government and people displayed their traditional 
pro- American sentiments. The United States and its 
allies fought the North Korean and Chinese 
Communists and preserved the Republic. The American 
commitment to South Korea' national security after 
1953, and U.S. economic and other forms of aid not 
only sustained the life of the nation, but also 
helped South Korea to achieve what it calls "the 
Miracle on the Han River" during the past decade . 
The American contribution to cultural and 
educational development in South Korea was 
incalculable. 
Close cooperation between the two countries, 
while promoting the national strength of South 
Korea, maintained a stable international situation 
in East Asia. Strong economic ties between South 
33 
Korea and the United States also developed. Such 
close ties not only benefited the two countries, but 
may have prevented another war in Korea while 
enhancing the security of Japan. The recent problems 
related to the Korean attempts to buy Congressional 
influence notwithstanding, the American-Korean 
relationship is likely to take deeper roots. 
Following their issuance of a statement on 
August 12 in which the United States government 
stated the Korean government which was established 
under the United Nations sponsorship was the 
Government of Korea, Washington named John J. Muccio 
as its first ambassador to the Korean republic, and 
with the inauguration of the Republic of Korea on 
August 15,1948, the American military rule was 
37 terminated. The United Nations General Assembly 
recognized the Republic of Korea on December 12, and 
the United States accorded de jure recognition of 
37. McCune George M. Korea Today (Cambridge, 1950), 
p. 3 . 
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the Republic on January 1, 1949. 
An American spokesman stated in 1948 that the 
inauguration of the Korean republic was not a final 
step in the execution of American commitments to 
establish a "free and independent Korea", but would 
have to be followed by economic assistance of a 
character which would enable the Republic to become 
a "solvent trading partner in the world economy and 
to withstand communist ideological penetration from 
within as well as attack from without." But/ in 
reality the United States had no Korean policy other 
than the prevention of a collapse of the Korean 
economy. The United States seemed to withdraw 
completely its political and military commitments 
from Korea as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had resolved 
that "under no circumstances would the United States 
engage in the military defence of the Korean 
38 peninsula. Undoubtedly, the fall of the 
38. Koo Youngnok, "The Conduct of Foreign Affairs", 
Korean Politics in Transition, (London,1975), 
pp.211, 213. 
35 
Nationalists in China had a direct impact on 
American policy towrd Korea. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson told a Congressional committee that the 
American line of defence in the Far East extends 
from Alaska through the Aleutian chain, Japan, and 
Okinawa to the Philippines and made no mention of 
Korea. In his remarks of January 12, 1950 in a 
speech before the National Press Club, he reiterated 
that the United States defense perimeter runs along 
the Aleutian islands to Japan, and from Japan to the 
Philippines, and again he made no reference to 
Korea. 
The United States signed on December 10, 1948 
an economic aid agreement with the Republic of 
Korea, and in June 1949 President Trunan requested 
the sum of $150 million for Korea for the 1949-50 
fiscal year.His message to Congress reflected the 
fear of Acheson that if no new economic aid was 
provided to Korea, the Republic would fall "within 
three months." But it was not until December 19 that 
an amount if $30 million for the period ending 
36 
February 15,1950 was voted in the House, and in 
February 1950 the House approved a $60 million 
appropriation extending economic aid for Korea until 
June 30, 1950. 
Despite strong objections of the South Korean 
government, the United States withdrew its troops 
from Korea by the end of June 1949, leaving behind 
poorly indoctrinated, trained, and supplied soldiers 
of the newly created Korean army and a small United 
39 States Military Advisory Group (KMAG) . However, 
a bilateral agreement was concluded between the 
United States and Korea on January 2 6,1950 so that 
Korea could receive United States Military aid under 
the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of October 6, 
1949. Under this agreement, South Korea received $10 
million out of the total of $1,314 million (or 
eight-tenth of one percent) which was appropriated 
to implement the Mutual Defence Assistance Act. The 
39. Truman, Harry S., Years of Trial and Hope, 
3946-1952, Vol.2 (Garden City, 1956) P.333. 
37 
American military aid was mostly for maintenance 
material and spare parts for American military 
equipment left behind in Korea. KMAG repeatedly 
warned that "Korea is threatened with the same 
40 disaster that befell China." 
South Korea, which seemed to have been 
abandoned by the United States, was invaded by the 
North Korean Communist troops of June 2 5, 1950. As 
many had feared, the Korean War finally came. The 
general concensus of opinion was that the North 
Korean Communists had miscalculated American 
intentions when they launched the war. "The Korean 
war began in a way in which wars often begin," said 
Secretary of State John Foster Fulles in 1953, "a 
41 potential aggressor miscalculated." 
The devastating war in Korea was brought to 
an end, thanks to a high price paid by the United 
40. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, 
Hearings on the Mutual Defence Treaty with 
Korea, 83rd Cong, 2nd Session, 1954, p. 52 . 
41. Dulles, John Foster, "Korean Problems," 
Department of State Publication, 19 50. Far 
Eastern Series, 62,1953, p.l. 
38 
States and other nations which repelled the 
aggressors, with the signing of the Korean armistics 
on July 27, 1953. The sixteen nations which had 
fought in Korea signed a Joint Policy Declaration 
concerning the Korean Armistice in which they 
pledged that if there were a renewal of the armed 
attack, they would be prompt again in resisting 
aggressors. On August 7, 1953 the United States 
initiated a draft of the mutual security pact with 
the Republic of Korea and guaranteed the security of 
South Korea which refused to become a signator in 
the Korean armistice. 
Following the signing of the armistice, a 
joint statement was issued by the United States and 
Korea in which they pledged continued cooperation 
and agreed that in the political conference of the 
signatures of the Armistice which was to follow 
within three months, according to the terms in the 
Korean armistice, they would "seek to achieve the 
peaceful unification of historic Koreaas a free and 
39 
independent nation." They added that if it appeared, 
after ninety days, that attempts to achieve mutual 
objectives were fruitless, both countries would make 
"a concurrent withdrawal from the conference" and 
then would "consult further regardiny the 
attainment of a unified, free and independent 
Korea..." 
42. Press release. Joint Statement of President 
Syng-man Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles, 
August 7, 1953. 
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CHAPTER - II 
UNITED NATIONS IN KOREAN WAR 
Background of the Crisis 
Korea since long has been the centre of 
power politics because of two important reasons — 
its strategic location and commercial viability 
which often led involvement of the powers like 
Japan, Tsarist Russia, China in different degree at 
different time. 
The Korean war that erupted on June 25, 1950 
was not a matter of surprise rather the first 
onslaught of a storm which had long been 
gathering. The tension between the U S -controlled 
South Korea and the Soviet-controlled North Korea 
had been acute ever since the Cold War began. In 
the summer of 1948, the United Nations Temporary 
Commission on Korea, (UNTCOK) had stressed the 
dangers to peace from the divided Korea. A year 
1. GOAR, Third Session, Supplement No. 9, Second 
Part of the Report of the United nations 
Temporary Commission on Korea, vol. 1 (A/57 5/Add 
3) pp. 131-14. 
The Report of the UNTCOK, which contains 
fairly exhaustive study of the Korean problem 
Contd.. 
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later, the UN Commission on Korea reported 
"military posturings" on both sides of the 38th 
2 Parallel with repeated border incidents. On both 
sides of the frontier there had been official 
threats that force would be used to unify the whole 
country. 
The dangerous situation within Korea was not 
primarily Korean in origin. Ever since the later 
part of the 19th century the helpless country had 
been the victim of Great Power Conflicts and 
ambitions. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 settled 
the issue in japan's favour and with the American 
and English concurrency Korea had passed into 
3 
Japanese control in 1910. 
Contd..1 
was issued in two parts. The first part issued 
in three volumes (Doc. A/575 and add. 1 and 2) 
in two volumes (Doc. A/575/Add. 3 and 4), from 
May 25 to October 14, 1948. 
2. G.A.O.R., Fourth Session, Supplement No. 9, 
Report of the UNTCOK (Doc. A/9 36), vol. 1, pp. 
33-34. 
3. For historical background to the ambitions and 
conflicts of major powers which engulfed this 
unhappy country, See, M. Frederick Nelson, Korea 
and the Old Order in Eastern Asia (Louisiana, 
1946). 
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From 1910 down to Pearl Harbour, there was 
no inclination on the part of other Great Powers to 
challenge Japan's position in Korea. A challenge 
came, however once Japan became an active 
belligerent on the side of Germany and other Axis 
powers. By the Cairo Declaration of December, 1943 
the United States, the United Kingdom and China 
pledged their determination that Korea would, "in 
due course become free and independent". The pledge 
was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 
26, 19 45, and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union 
when it declared war against Japan on August 8, 
1945.4 
When Japan went down under, the Russians 
occupied the northern part of Korea-north of 
latitude 38 and American forces the Southern part. 
4. For a detailed and documented account on the 
war-time and post-war commitments of the major 
powers. See Korea's Independence, Department of 
State Publication 2933 (Washington DC, 1947). 
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Although agreement was reached at the Moscow 
conferences of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, 
on a procedure to be followed for achieving an 
independent and democratic Korea, subsequent 
negotiations between the United States and Soviet 
military commands brokedown. In fact, the course 
of these negotiations strongly suggested that as 
world relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union deteriorated, each government became 
more insistent on a solution of the Korean problem 
which would prevent the other from bringing the 
whole territory with it phase of dominant 
influence. The crux of the disagreement stemmed 
from the fact that for both Russia and the USA, 
Korea was of vital strategic importance. The Soviet 
Union wanted to ensure that no hostile power should 
5. See the text of notes exchanged between the two 
controlling powers reproduced in Ibid., pp. 
20-41 and 50-59; also, Korea 1945 to 1948, A 
Report on Political Development and economic 
Resources with Selected Documents (Washington 
DC, 1948), pp. 43-48. 
44 
had invasion bases within the reach of the 
Russian soil. As Japan was already in American 
possession, Soviet strategy was guided to mark 
Japan with a line of Russian held bases. This 
already included the military air bases in 
Siberia, the Kurila Islands and Sakhalin. To 
complete the circle and to consolidate her hold on 
the Asian mainland, Korea was essential. On the 
other hand, Korea for the USA, was of great 
strategic value, if it wanted to keep its hold in 
the pacific, and to carry out its policy of 
containment against the Soviet bloc. When Soviet 
American negotiations on Korea were deadlocked, 
the United States, on September 17, f947, referred 
the Korean problem to the UN General Assembly. In 
6. UN Doc., A/BUR/85, September 17, 1947; also, 
see the address delivered by US. Secretary of 
State, George C. Marshall on September 17 
before the General Assembly, GAOR, Plenary, 
82nd Meeting, September 17, 1947, vol. I, pp. 
21-22. 
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the debate that ensued both the contending parties 
7 
reiterated their respective positions. The United 
States proposed that the occupying powers should 
hold elections in their respective zones under the 
observation of the United Nations, "as the initial 
steps reading to the creation of a National 
Assembly and the establishment of a National 
government of Korea", and the Korean Government, 
thus elected, should take over the administration 
from the controlling power should withdraw and 
that thereafter it should be left to the Korean 
people themselve to establish a national 
government of Korea. The Soviet Union further 
proposed that a representatives supporting him, 
maintained that consultation with representatives 
of the Korean people should take place in Korea 
itself and notably by the United Nations Korean 
7. See the Summary of the General Assembly 
discussion in Yearbook of the United Nations 
1947-48, pp. 81-88. 
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Commission. The United States point of view was 
upheld by the majority in the firslt committee as 
well as in the plenary of the General assembly. 
On November 14, 1947, by a vote of 40 to 0 
with 6 absentions, the General Assembly adopted a 
US sponsored resolution creating a temporary 
commission on Korea to facilitate establishment of 
a Korean national government, through nation-wide 
elections, which were to be followed by withdrawal 
of all occupation forces. The Soviet resolution 
concerning simultaneous evacuation of the US and 
Soviet troops from Korea at the beginning of 1948, 
failed of adoption, having obtained 7 votes to 34, 
9 
with 16 abstention. 
8. General Assembly Resolution 112 (II), November 
14, 1947. 
9. GAOR, Second Session, Plenary, 112th Meeting, 
vol. II, p. 856. 
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The Soviet Union adopted a "negative 
attitude" towards the temporary commission and 
refused it permission even to enter North Korea. 
Consequently the commission was authorized to 
implement the original resolution "in such parts 
of Korea as are accessible to the commission". 
10. See the Soviet Union's Representative, Mr. 
Gromyko's Statement before the General 
Assembly, Ibid, 111th Meeting, pp. 823-32. 
11. See the Resolution of the Interim Committee of 
the General Assembly adopted on February 26, 
1948 (UN Doc. A/583, July 22, 1948). 
It should be noted that the Interim 
Committee was established on November 13, 
1947, by the General Assembly as a subsidiary 
organ which would function between the 
Assembly's regular sessions. The problem of 
Korea was the first case that it handled. It 
was composed of all members of the United 
Nations, but the Soviet Union and other 
socialist states regarded the creation of the 
interim Committee as contrary to the Charter 
and never attended its meetings. 
The committee could not function as a 
real interim Assembly, though renewed at 
intervals, it was given less and less to do, 
and since 1955 has been adjourned sine die. 
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In South Korea, in May 1948, elections were 
organized and conducted by the United States Army 
Military Government in Korea under the observance 
of the UN Commission. In the elections, which were 
boycotted by quite a number of political 
groupings, there were as many as 134 parties 
12 participating. Out of 200 deputies elected to 
the National Assembly, 170 were supporters of 
Syugman Rhee "favoured by landowners, police force 
and the USA". On the basis of commissions report 
to the effect that elections were held in "a 
reasonable degree of free atmosphere" and the 
results were "a valid expression of the free will 
of the electorate", the newly elected Government 
with Syngman Rhee as president, was recognized by 
UN General Assembly as the lawful Government, 
having effective control and jurisdiction over 
12. Second part of the Report of the UNTCOK 
(A/575/Add. 4) pp. 22-23; Also See, Korea : 
1945-48, US Department of State Publication 
3305 (Washington DC, 1948). 
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that part of Korea, in which temporary commission 
13 
observed elections. Since the unification all 
Korea had not been attained, the Assembly 
established a United Nations Commission of Korea 
of seven member-states to lend its good offices to 
14 that end. 
Meanwhile, in the North, the Soviet Union 
got established a government with Kim II Sung as 
Prime Minister and on September 18, 1948, informed 
the Uniteld Nations that it would withdraw troops 
by the end of the year. Soviet troops left by 
December, except for a military training mission. 
On the other side, the United States withdrew its 
troops by July, 1949, except for a military 
training mission. 
13. General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), 
December 12, 1948. 
14. The Commission consisted of Australia, China, 
el Salvador, France, India, the Philipinese 
and Syria. 
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The establishment of new governments 
representing conflicting ideologies only 
aggravated the ready existing, tension between two 
parts. Each of the two governments laid claim not 
only to being the only lawful government in Korea, 
but also to being the lawful government of "all" 
Korea Border Skirmishes, Sabotage and riots in 
both parts were frequent. 
From 1948 to June, 1950, the efforts of the 
United Nations through the General Assembly and 
the UN Commission on Korea were directed towards 
alleviating this conflict and paving the way for 
unification. However, these efforts were thwarted 
by the growing seriousness of the world-wide 
struggle between the West and the Soviet Union. 
Recognizing the danger to peace, the General 
Assembly, in October 19 49, assigned to the UN 
Commission on Korea the additional task of 
observing and reporting developments which might 
lead a military conflict in Korea. 
15. UN DOC., S/1505, June 27, 1950. The documents 
initially reproduced in S/PV. 474 was 
superseded by Doc. 1505/Rev. of august 21, 
1950. See SCOR, Fifth year, Supplement for 
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United Nations' Involvement 
In the afternoon of June 27, when the 
Security Council met, it had before it four 
cablegrams from the United Nations commission on 
Korea. In sum, these cablegrams stated that the 
Commission had no evidence to justify in any 
respect the North Korean allegations that South 
Korea had precipitated the conflict by launching 
an invasion across the 38th parallel; all the 
evidence continued to point to a calculated, 
coordinated attack prepared and launched in 
Secrecy, and that, judging from the military 
operations in progress, "the northern regime is 
carrying out full-scale invasion of South Korea. 
In all the messages received to date, the only 
suggestion for action made by the Commission was 
that the Security Council give consideration to 
unifying both parties to agree on a neutral 
mediator or member governments undertake immediate 
16. UN Doc., S/1507, June 27, 1950. 
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17 
mediation". 
The Security Council, however went along 
with the United States' plea that the situation 
required military action by the United Nations. It 
adopted a US draft resolution by a vote of 7 to 1 
(Yugoslavia), with one Member absent (USSR), and 
two members (Egypt and India) not participating in 
the voting. By the same margine of vote, it 
rejected a Yugolav draft resolution for a renewal 
of the cease-fire call and mediatory efforts by 
18 the Council. 
The resolution adopted declared that urgent 
military measures are required to restore 
international peace and security" and recommended 
17. UN DOC., 3/1503, June 26, 1950. 
This is not said here by way of belittling 
the seriousness of North Korean attack. The 
point in emphasis is that council's 
resolutions were not so much based on the 
report of the on-the-spot Commission of the 
United nations as or the information conveyed 
and the pressure exercised by the United 
States. 
18. SCOR, Fifth year, No. 16, p. 14. 
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that Member-states, "furnish such assistance to 
the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to 
repel the armed attack and to restore 
19 international peace and security in area" . 
Consequently, the unilateral action of the 
United States to give military aid to South Korea 
was turned into a UN Coercive action. Ten days 
later, the Council completed the formality by 
requesting that military assistance by Member 
States be "made available to a unified command 
under the United States", and that "the United 
20 States designated the commander of such forces". 
The Soviet Union and the other four 
communist Members of the United Nations denounced 
21 the action of the Security Council as "illegal". 
19. UN Doc., S/1511, June 27, 1950. 
20. UN Doc., S/1598, July 7, 1950. 
21. See the note from the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to the Secretary 
General. UN Doc. S/1517, June 29, 1950. 
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Other Member nations - 51 out of 59 - supported 
the Council's resolution. However, only 15, 
besides the USA, sent their combat forces to 
Korea. The burden of resisting the North Korean 
attack was mainly borne by the United States which 
supplied equipments and suffered nine-tenths of the 
22 
casualities. 
Consequently, the United States, without 
the effcetive participation by other Member 
States, did all the military planning, took 
political decisions armistic negotiations. It is 
difficult to say whether the United States would 
22. For tables of individual contribution of 
Member States, See Yearbook of the United 
nations 1950, pp. 226-28. 
It may be noted that the United States did 
not notify the United Nations of the nature 
and size of its assistance until June 8, 1957. 
The US government, in response to the 
Secretary-General's note communicating the 
Council's resolution of June 27, only informed 
the Secretary General that the US forces were 
already giving cover and support to the Korean 
Government troops. 
55 
have permitted substitution of its own leadership 
by a collective leadership. In the first week of 
July, 1955, the Secretary General took the 
initiative of instituting a committee on 
co-ordination with the purpose of keeping the 
United Nations "in the picture to promote 
continuing United Nations participation in, and 
supervision of, the military security action in 
Korea" 
The Korean military enterprise under the UN 
flag was generally hailed in the western world "as 
the first enforcement action against an aggressor 
that the organized community of nations had taken 
in accordance with the principles of collective 
23 
security. An objective analysis, however, would 
show that such a characterization was somewhat 
conceited. (The military action was taken not by 
23. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 
Seventh Report, Collective Security under the 
United Nations, New York, July, 1957, p. 7. 
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the organized community of nations but in the name 
of that organized community. The direction and 
control of the military measures was not 
undertaken by an international military staff but 
by one-member nation alone. It will be truism to 
say that the UN force, as it was constituted and 
as identified by the right to use the UN flag and 
other devices was not in fact a UN force, but 
rather a US force with other national units placed 
at its disposal. 
2 4. Military situation in the Far East : Hearings 
Before the Committee on Armed Forces and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington 
D.C. : 1951, Part 3, p. 2075. 
It should be noted that the United Nations 
command for the Korean operations, that was 
set up in Tokyo under General Mac Arthur, was 
practically identical with Far Fast Command of 
the United States. General MacArthur was in 
charge of both. It is chain of command was 
through the chief of Staff of the Army to the 
joint chiefs of staff, to the Secretary of 
Defence, to the President of the United 
States. 
The responsibility of making decisions 
as implementing them naturally rested with the 
Contd.. 
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Again the Korean action was not in 
conformity with the Charter theory of collective 
security. The framers of the Charter had spelt 
out a system for collective measures which 
envisaged the availability of armed forces under 
Article 43, and adoption and coordination and 
direction of such armed forces by the military 
staff committee. Since Article 4 3 had not been 
implemented, the Council could not act under the 
system. 
In the case of Korea, faced with a 
situation of a breach of the peace and unable to 
act under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Members 
of the Security Council, led by the United States, 
Contd...24 
US government. At the weekly conference in 
Washington DC, of representative of those 
United Nations Member governments who had 
their armed forces in Korea, was usually 
provided over by the US Assistant Secretary of 
State. The Members were briefed on the 
military and political developments. Little 
information regarding plans for future 
military action was given out. This was 
largely because of security reasons. 
5R 
took recourse to what may be termed the League 
theory of collective security. The Council 
established the fact of a breach of the peace 
without making reference to Article 39, and 
recommended (not ordered) to Member themselves 
wide discretion in determining the nature and 
extent of their participation. 
The Charter lays down that any decision 
for enforcement action by the Security Council is 
binding on all Members of the United Nations. In 
the case of Korea, none of the Security Councils 
resolutions of June 25, 27 or July 7, 1950, appear 
by their terms to be such decisions for 
enforcement action as impose obligations on 
Members under the Charter to carry them out or 
even to afford mutual assistance. 
It may, however be noted that the mere 
fact that the Security Council's recommendations 
for enforcement action in Korea were not actions 
under chapter VII does not mean that such actions 
were lawful. Indeed, the Korean action may be 
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described as action which the Members of the 
United Nations as individual states are permitted 
to take, as distinct from either obliged to take 
or prohibited from taking under the Charter. The 
"permission" or "licence" or "liberty" to use 
force has its base in inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence against attack (Article 
51). A guideline to Member States is found in 
Article 19(i), which declares a purpose of the 
United Nations to be "to take effective collective 
measures - for suppression of acts of aggression 
or other breaches of peace". 
As such, the military action taken in 
pursuance of the Council's revolutions of June 25 
and 27 was adequately in keeping with the 
purposes of the United Nations, although it could 
be criticized on the ground that the revolutions 
leading to the action were adopted when the Soviet 
Union was absent from the meetings and China was 
60 
25 
not properly represented. 
25. See, in particular, Hans Kelsen, The Law of 
the United Nations (London : Stevens, 1950) p. 
239 and Leo Gross "Voting in the Security 
Council : Abstention from voting and Absence 
from Meetings". Yale Law Journal, LX (1951), 
p. 209. 
The opinion of the most of the 
commentators and the previous UN practice, 
however,inadequate that neither abstention nor 
absence of a Permanent Member of the Security 
Council constitutes a veto. 
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CHAPTER-III 
UNITED STATES' PEACE STRATEGY IN KOREAN PENINSULA 
Soviet moves in Furope in the aftermath of 
the Second World ffer created apprehension anon^ 
American policy makers about its design in Asia. 
Communist victory in China was construed by 
Washington as an event of far reaching significance 
portending an extension of Soviet influence in that 
region. US policy of containment, designed 
initially to check perceived Soviet expansion in 
Europe was pursued in Asia too in the 1950s. The 
physical proximity of two giants communist powers 
to Korea, Japan, Taiwan and their offshore Islands, 
made American policy planners believed that these 
countries were vulnerable to communist attack. As a 
consequence, with the outbreak of the Korean war in 
June 1950 the policy of containment was extended to 
China as well. From then , American policy became 
one of the preserving a balance of power in 
East-Asia by supporting an independent Korea, free 
from the control of China or Russia. 
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Prior to the outbreak of hostilities Korea 
was considered as a strategic liability by the 
State Department. In a policy statement made before 
the National Press riub on 12 Jan, 19,50, Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson excluded Taiwan and Korea 
from the American defence perimetre in the 
... 1 pacific. 
Dealing more specifically with Korea, he 
stated : 
"We have given that nation great help in getting 
itself established. We are asking the congress 
to continue that help untiTl it is firnly 
established, and that legislation is now 
pending before the congress. The idea that we 
should scrap all of that we should stop half 
way through the achievement of the 
establishment of this country, seems to me to 
be the most utt£r defeatism and utter madness 
. 2 in our interest in Asia. 
1. Department of State Buletin (Washington DC, 2 3 
Jan 1950) Vol.2, p.116. 
2. Ibid, p. 117 
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The Secretary's statement was infact a plea 
to win support for a $60 million economic aid bill 
for South Korea which was held back by the lower 
House. The measure, however, was defeated, the same 
month as a reaction to the Administrations failure 
3 
to aid the Nationalist Government of China. 
Clearly it was an indication of the Low 
Strategic importance accorded to Korea, for the US 
was concerned more in safeguarding its interests in 
Japan and Europe. The limited build up of the 
South-Korean Army trained by the US Military 
Advisory Group was designed essentially to maintain 
internal order than to fight a war. Again the $10.2 
million committed to Korea for the year 1950 was 
not intended for rearmament rather it was for the 
maintenance of the equipment left behind by the US 
forces following their withdrawal from Korea in mid 
1949. 
3. See Glenn D.Paige, The Korean Decision: June 
24-30,1950 (New York, 1968), p.68. 
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Dnited States* Initial Response: 
Within a year of US troops withdrawal, Korea 
became an area of intense super power rivalry with 
war breaking out between the North and South. For, 
on June 1950, the North Korean Forces crossed the 
38th parallel and advanced to the South, capturing 
Seoul within a few days. 
North Korea action left the US with two 
alternatives - either to withdraw its military 
mission from South Korea or else, intervene, 
militarily to prevent communist takeover of the 
Peninsula. Under the circumstances, the US opted 
for the Second and declared to intervene. And thus, 
the Administration reversed its early policy 
decisions that accorded low priority to Korea in 
its defence calculations. Both Presidjeit Truman and 
Secretary, Acheson have remarked in their memories 
that the North Korean offensive was "insighted by 
4 
the Soviet Union . According to President Truman 
4. Harry S.Truman Memoirs; Years of Trialand Hope 
(New York, 1956), p.335, Dean G.Acheson, Present 
at the creation: My Year in the State Department 
(London, 1969) P.405. 
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Korean offensive was launched by the Soviet Union 
to test US capacity to resist communist forces . 
Upon that premise he has argued that if communism 
was not checked in Korea, then Japan, Okinawa and 
Formose could have been the next targets of 
communist attack . in Order to protect US interest, 
5. Some of the Scholars who hold this view are Tony 
Tsou, American's Failure in China, 1941-50 
(Chicago, 1963), P.555: Allein S.Whiting, China 
Crosses the Yalu; The Decision to enter the 
Korean war, (New York, 1960) pp. 37-40 : Adam 
B.Ulam, Expansion and Co-existence; The History 
of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (London, 
1968), pp. 514, 578: Care Berger, The Korean 
Knot: A Military Political History 
(Philadelphia, 1957), p.183: Alexander L.George. 
"American Policy making and the North Korean 
Aggression" World Politico (Prinecton), Vol.7, 
January 1955.pp. 2 09-3 ; Robert T.Oliver", Why 
war came to Korea", Current History 
(Philadelphia) vol.19, September 1950, pp. 
139-43. 
6. Truman, n.4, p.335. 
6f. 
the defence of South Korea and Taiwan he says was 
imperative. 
Some analysts arguec that Russia's Premier, Joseph 
Stalin, Started the war in Korea with the object of 
engaging the US and the Peoples Republic of China in 
7 
a long conflict, leaving him free in Europe . Yet, 
another hypothesis claims that it was South Korea 
that attacked first. Since establishment of the 
7. John Gunther, The Riddle of Mc? Arthur: Japan 
Korea and Far East (New York, 1957), P.172 For a 
contrary vice see, wilbur H.Hitech Cock, "North 
Korea Jumps the Gun" Current History, Vol.2 0, 
March, 1957, pp. 136-44, The writer is of the 
view that invasion of South Korea was planed by 
Premier Kin II Sung, not only without 
instructions from Mosion, but without its 
•knowledge as well. The Korean war has also been 
characterised as a Civil War. See Robert 
R.Sumon, The Strained Alliance: Peking, 
P.Yonaqyanq; Mosion and the Politics of the 
Korean civil War, (New York, 1975). 
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Republic of Korea, President Syngman Rhee in his 
eagerness to attain a forcible unification of Korea 
resorted to an attack on North Korea . 
It appears that the US though aware probably 
of an attack from North Korea, failed to prepare 
9 
South Korea to face such an eventuality . 
In Tokyo, General Dougles Mac Arthur's Chief 
of intelligence, Major General, Charles wiloughby 
wececonvinced that Korean communists were engaged 
in a massive build up across the 38th parallel. He 
was sure that they would be prepared to strike by 
the beginning of the summer of 1950. His warninys 
however, were ignored both by his own headquarter 
and the authorities in Washington as well 
Similarly Admiral Roscos H.Hillenkoetter, Director 
8. Karunakar Gupta, "How did the Korean war Begin"? 
China Quarterly (London). No.52 October-
December 1972, p. 5. 
9. Gunther, n.7, p.166. 
10. S.L.Murshall, The Military History of the 
Korean War, (New York, 1963) p.14. 
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of Central Intelligence Agency told the press on 
the eve of the attack that the Agency was awarded 
that "Conditions existed in Korea that could have 
meant an invasion this weak or next". 
On 2 7 June, the Senate Apropriation 
Committee, called Hillenkoetter to hear his opinion 
regarding the North Korean attack. Prior to his 
hearings, he was summuned by President Truman. The 
statement he gave before the Committee was 
different from the one given to the press. He said 
that "the North Korean forces have had the 
capability of invading the South force year but 
that it had been impossible to prpdict the time 
12 
table under which they would march if at all 
Dse of United Nations for Collective Action 
The United States was successful in invoking 
the collective provisions of the Security Council 
under the Charter, it has been remarked by some 
11. As quoted in I.F Stone, The Hidden History of 
the Korean War (New York, 1952) P.-?0 
12 . Ibid.pp . 2-3. 
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that American SuppDtton behalf of South, Korea in 
the United Nations" was a part of a bolder 
13 
conceptualization of US global geopolitics 
An emergency meeting was convened on the 
same day of the North Korean offensive, 25 June 
1950, passed a resolution which condemned the North 
14 Korean attack at called for a ceasefire . On 2 7 
June President Truman ordered the dispatch of 
Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait . He 
declared that the Seventh Fleet would repel an 
attack of Taiwan and also instructed chiang-Kai 
Shek not to attack the mainland. Me also declared 
the strengthening of American forces in the 
Phillipmes 
13. Samuel S.Kim "Korea: The last Frontline 
Damino", Asia and US Foreign Policy, (New York, 
1981), p.51. 
14. UN, Document S/1501, 25 June, 1950. 
15. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23,3 July. 
1980, 8.5. 
16. Ibid. 
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Thus, the Korean war set off series of 
defence measures by the US on its Far East 
outposts. 
The same day of second resolution of the 
Security Council on the Korean Crisis, called on 
all members of the United Nations to help South 
Korea repel the attack 
Closely following the President Truman's 
orders, commanding US ground, air and naval forces 
into action in Korea, the Security Council adopted 
its third resolution on 7 July.It called for a 
Unified Military Command in the Korea, under the 
18 . President Truman appointed 
command of US 
General Douglas to move further,, as the Commander in 
19 
Chief of the UN forces. 
One authoritative assessment had attributed 
the policy reversal to Washington's awareness of 
the political as against the strategic importance 
17. UN Document, S/15iJ.,27 June, 1950. 
18. Ibid, S/1588, 7 July, 1950. 
19. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, 17 July, 
1950, p.83. 
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of South Korea 
President Truman ordered General Mac Arthur 
2 1 
to proceed north of the 38th parrales . On 1st 
October the South Korea Forces crossed the 
parallel. In the meantirie Chou En-Lai issued his 
strongest Warriing of the intention of the peoples 
Republic to enter the war if this UN forces other 
than the South Korean troops crossed into North 
22 Korea . These were apparently not taken seriously. 
On 7 October, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution endorsing President Trumon's proposal to 
cross the 38th parallel to achieve the unification 
2 3 
of Korea . It also set up a new commission for the 
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to 
carry out relief and reconstruction work in 
24 Korea. 
20. Alexander L.George and Richard M.Smoke, 
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; Theory 
and Practice (New York, 1974), pp.146,148, 
21. Truman, n.4, p.36 3. 
22. Ibid, pp.363-64, Also See K.M.Panikar In Two 
China; Memoirs of a Diplomat, (London 1955). 
23. UNGAOR, Fifth Session, Resolution 376, 7 
October, 1980, Supplement 20, pp.9 n.10. 
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On 9 October, General Mac Arthur in a radio 
broadcast called upon the North Korean troops to 
surrender and cooperate with the United Nations in 
setting up a Unified and democratic government in 
Korea. Receiving no response, the UN forces crossed 
the thirty-eight parallel into North Korea. Thus 
with the help of the United Nations, the United 
States mobilized world openion in support of US 
2 5 
"Police action" in Korea . It is significant to 
note that the UN resolutions became possible only 
because the Soviet delegate was boycotting all the 
2 6 
meetings of the Security Council 
2 5. Also see articles by Arnold Wolfers, Collective 
Security and the war in Korea "in young Hum Km, 
Twenty Years of Crisis: The Cold War Era (New 
Jersey, 1968), pp.78-81. The authors expla-
nations showed. American intervention in Korea 
through the UN served Washington's security 
interest. 
26. For a detailed study of the Korean problem in 
the UN See, Leland M.Goodrich, Korea A study of 
US policy in UN (New York, 1956). 
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On 15 October, President Truman conferred 
with General Mac Arthur on wake Island in the 
Pacific, when asked about the possibility of 
Chinese or Soviet intervention in the war, Mac 
Arthur replied that there was very little chance of 
2 7 
the two intervening at that stage. He may have 
been right about the Soviets but very wrong about 
the Chinese who struck with full force against the 
Eight Army of the US on 25 November. 
According to the intelligence reports of the 
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency the Chinese 
communist troops popularly known as "volunteers" 
had moved into North Korea in mid. October. Towards 
the end of October the presence of Chinese 
communist troops on a large scale was reported 
2 8 
among the North Koreans 
With the entry of Peoples Republic of China, 
the Korean war assumed the shape of a Sino American 
27. Truman, n. 4, pp. 365-66. 
28. Ibid. p. 372. 
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conflict. Earlier General Mac Authur had suggested 
an all out war with China, which included bombing 
2 9 
Chinese bases on Yalu and elsewhere 
However, President Truman and the chief of 
Staff favoured in settlemnt of the question of 
Chinese intervention in Korea through political 
measures. Washington apparently had to wish to 
reenter the Chinese civil war from which it had 
extricted itself after much difficulty. It favoured 
a limited war without appeasement and was opposed 
to carrying the war to the Chinese territory. 
Some of the policy decisions gave the 
republicans in the Congress an opportunity to 
criticize the Truman. Administration. They urged 
the President to adopt a tougher attitude towards 
peking and give more aid to Taiwan.The war also 
aided and abetted Senator Joseph Mc Carthy's attack 
on communism sympathizers within the Government. 
Many important officials in the State Department 
29. For the text of this statement see, Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. 2 3, Oct<5rJeT T75TT7 
pp.643-44, Also see, Allen S.Whilting, China 
Crosses the Yaln; The Decision to Enter the 
Korean War, (N.Y., 1960) .pp. 15-162. 
30. Truman, n.4, pp.378-79. 
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were dismissed from their jobs as bad security 
risks. Over and above the Congressional elections 
of November 1950 showed a marked cb cline in the 
number of Democrats in the Congress. 
The European allies of the US also express 
their grave concern over the developments in Korea. 
Great Britain was alarmed over President Truman's 
press comments of 30 November on the possible use 
32 
of the atom bombs . By that time the communists 
had recovered major parts of North Korea. It appear 
that this threat was used more to deter further 
Chinese Communist attack. 
The US would not have used such a device 
without obtaining prior concurrence from its 
European allies.Their support was a considerable 
importance because of their help and effort in 
containing communism on global level. Priority was 
given to Great Britain and France because they held 
the second and third position in the NATO, on 
31. Richard Rovers, Senators Joe Mc. Carthy (N.Y, 
1959). 
32. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.23, 18, 
Dec.1950 pp. 959-61. 
If, 
account of the military and political status in 
Europe. They also controlled all the American bases 
from which attack could be launched at the Soviet 
Union and other places.As such it was decided that 
the war in Korea be localised and ended by means of 
a negotiated settlement. 
US decision to abondon its objectives of 
Uniting Korea by force was largely influenced by 
the Course of war itself. In a meeting of the 
material Security Council it was pointed out that 
an extension of the war to Manchuria as proposed by 
Mac Arthur might prompt the Soviet Union to 
intervene either in Korea or Europe and that would 
33 
certainly be determinated to America interests 
Moreover, public openion at home was 
sufficiently alarmed over the extent of American 
involvement in the Korean war and heavy loss it 
caused on American lives. Again there was a yeneral 
desire among the members of the UN toresojlve the 
33. Trumai, n.4, pp. 385-88. 
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crisis peacefully. Thus in view of these factors, 
America policy shifted from a confrontation with 
the Chinese Communists and North Korea to that of 
stabilizing its line of military enforcement and 
from these negotiating for the cessation of 
hostilities. 
Following the adoption of a resolution by 
the General Assembly on 14 December, 1950, a ^eace 
34 proposal was drafted . However, Peking turned it 
down and on 17 Jan 1951, but forth a ceasefire. 
Important among these were the expulsion of 
Nationalist China from the UN and the administration 
of Peoples Republic as well as evaluation of all 
35 American personnel from Taiwan. When initial 
attempts armstice failed, the US urged the UN to 
condemn peoples Republic as a aggressor on the 
place that it refused to come to terns with the UN 
3 6 
and continued its attack on South Korea. 
34. For details fee, Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. 24,15 Jan. 1951, p.113. 
35. Ibid, vol .2 4,2 9 Jan, 1951, p; 167^ :777""" -. 
36. Ibid, pp. 166-69. J_ /'
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On 1 February 1951, the General Assembly 
passed a resolution "branding the people's Republic 
37 
as an aggressor. This percipitated a large-scale 
attack on Chinese Communist forces on the UN 
troops. They not only crossed the 38 parallel, but 
also recaptured Seoul. Through the UN forces 
recovered the capital of South Korea and pushed 
back the Chinese forces, the prospects of a 
armistice seemed rather break. 
The dramatic dismissal of General MacAthur 
on 15 April, 1951, was a pointer to the fact that 
the US favoured a cautious approach to the 
settlement of the Korean question and wanted to 
38 localise the Korean war . Truce negotiation began 
again on 10 July 1951, first at Kaesong and later 
at Panmunjon. The UN command delegation was headed 
by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, while the North 
Korea side was led by Nam II.Agreement was reached 
37. UN, GAOR, Fifth Session, Resolution 498, 1 
January, 1957, Supplement 20,A. 
38. Mathew B.Ridgway, The Kore<m- War (New York, 
1967), Chapter 6. 
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on the agenda on 26 July 1951 
Negotiations soon got stalled over issues 
like determination of the demarcation line and the 
exchange of prisioners of war. The latter seemed to 
be the most different issue. The UN command took 
the position that personnel should not be forced to 
return to the communist side. While the communist 
side the stand that all Chinese and North Korean 
Sodiers in UN custody be repatriated. 
The period from July 1951, to 1952 was spent 
in fruitless negotiation over the issue. Proposals 
and counter proposals were presented but without 
any positive agreements. Meenwhile fighting 
continued throughout the remaining months of the 
Trumans Presidency. 
The deadlock was finally broken with 
election of President Dwight D.Eisenhower to the 
white House. The new President and his Secretary of 
39. Department States Bulletin, Vol.25, 6 August, 
1951, pp.231-32. 
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State John Foster Dulles had commitment to briny 
the Korehn War to an end and also to extend the 
containment policy to the Peoples Republic. Third 
policy with regard to Korea did not differ much 
from that of the previous administration. To yet 
the truce talks moving against President Eisenhower 
threatened to use nuclear weapons. This policy 
later came to be known as the "massive retaliation" 
40 
strategy . As a display of its intention the US 
dispatched nuclear weapons to Okinawa. Dulles 
informed Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 
that the war would be extended to Chinese unless 
Korean armstice was signed. This information was 
duly passed to peking. 
According to President Eisenhower, the 
threat to use nuclear weapons was largely response 
for the breakthrough in negotiation which finally 
resulted in the agreement of exchange of sick and 
41 
wounded prisoners on 11 April 1955 
40. Dright D.Eisenhower, The Mandate for Change, 
(New York, 1963) p.181. 
41. Ibid. 
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There were other strategic reasons apart 
from the one given above for a resumption of truce 
negotiation. The Death of Stalin, the leader of 
Communist world in March 1953, coupled with heavy 
losses incurred by Chinese Communists eventually 
led the later to recommend negotiations. 
On 8 June 1953, the final agreement 
regarding the exchange of prisoners of war was 
42 
reached . However, the signing of the armistice was 
blocked for sometime as a result of President 
Rhee's action in ordering the release of thousands 
43 
of anti-communist prisoners on 18 June 1953 . This 
was done despite President Eisenhower's assurance 
to arrange for a bilateral security pact with the 
44 Republic of Korea 
The crisis was resolved when President 
Eisenhower sent waiter Robertson, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to meet 
42. Department of State Bulletin, vol.28,22 June, 
1953, pp.366-68 
43. See Care, Poeyer, The Korean Knot,n.5.pp.166-67 
44. Eisenhower, n.40 p.183. 
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who .- assured that he would not wreck the time 
talks and would give up his demand for the 
45 
withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Korea. 
The Armistice agreement that was finally signed on 
•
 v
 4 6 
2 7 July 1953, marked the end of the war in Korea . 
The truce was to be folowed by a peace conference 
within 3 months to dial with political problem of 
Korea. 
The United States Urged the sixteen UN 
members who had contributed armed forces to the war 
in Korea to reaffirm their support in the bent of a 
47 
recurrence of communist attack on South Korea . At 
the same time it signed the mutual Defence Treaty 
on 1 Oct. 1953, with the Representation of Korea. 
Unlike other American treaties, such as with 
Australia, Newzealand and the philipiness designed 
primarily to restrain Japan the one with Korea 
aimed at containing communist expansion in East 
Asia. Article 3, which is the heart of the treaty 
45. Department of State Bulletin,Vol. 29,3,Aug.1953 
p.141. 
46. For text of truce See, Ind, PP.132-40. 
47. Text in Department of State, America Foreign 
Policy 1950-55, Basic Documents, (Washington, 
D-C, 1957) p.2662 . 
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stated that an armed attack on Rok would be 
considered by the US as "dangerous to its own peace 
and safety" and "that it would act to meet the 
common danger it accordance with its constitutional 
48 processes 
Unlike its treaty with Japan, this was no 
obligation to take part in the internal security of 
the Korean Republic or take any military measures 
in the event of a coup et *1 * snail US 
military force with supporting air and ground units 
was stationed in Korea after the treaty. An 
American Military Advisors Group supervised the 
training of the South Korea army. 
It is often said that the workings of treaty 
were somewhat ambiguous. For instance the treaty 
envisaged that if any attempt to unify Korea by 
force was undertaken without the prior sanction of 
the UN, the US would be under no obligation to 
48. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol.29,17 
August, 1953, p.204. 
84 
support such initiative- However, if American 
interests were threatened in Korea, the US would 
force appropriate action, whatever the treaty 
. 4 9 
obligation 
The political conference that was to follow 
the armistic was held in Geneva on 2 6 April 1954. 
It failed to produce a final settlement of the 
problem of Korean Unification. President Rhee's 
request to the US for a forcible unification of 
-• ,50 
Korea was also ignored 
Thus, the Korean war gradually led to the 
globalisation of US containment policy. The Told 
«ar in Europe begining ever since the end of the 
Second World War had kept the US involved in that 
area. Moreover the constraints imposed by the 
Congress on defence expenditure also prevents 
Washington from extending military support to 
countries in Asia. Again as result of the imbalance 
between ideological commitment and military power 
49. Glaude A.Buss, The US and Republic of Korea: 
Background for policy (Stanford, 1982) p.57. 
50. Deter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945, 
(London, 1968), p.272. 
"as demonstrated in China up to 1949, Americas Asia 
policy pivoted around Japan. The Korean war in fact 
served to globalize civil war politics. It 
stimulated immediately a increase in military 
spending, signing for the defence treaties 1 c?d to 
US deeper constraints in Asia in the 1950s. The 
conviction that the expansion of Commission in Asia 
was deterimental to its national security because 
the Keynote of American foreign policy and 
dominated Washington's Asian policy for years to 
come. 
Objections on the Action 
The United States submitted the "Korean 
Question" to the General Assembly on 17 September 
1947 following the failure of its negotiation with 
the USSR in regard to the impelementat ion of the 
cairo, Potsdam, and Moscow agreements. The 
Communist group held that the actions of the 
General Assembly were contrary to the previsions of 
the Charter and were invalid and that the Genera] 
86 
Assembly did not have the right to take action with 
regard to Korea as that matter had been covered by 
the Moscow agreement. Korea was clearly a subject 
* 
which should have been dealt with by the Allied 
Governments concerned. The establishment of the 
Temporary Commission was illegal, and it was a 
51 
violation of international agreements 
The Soviet Objection was based on Article 
107 of the Charter, according to which the 
governments primarily responsible for defeating an 
Axis power were to determine the terms of the peace 
settlement. Even at San Francisco a distinction had 
generally been accepted between the functions of 
peace-making and functions of peace maintenance, 
the former being regarded as the special 
responsibility of the powers primarily concerned 
with the defeat of the enemy states and the latter 
52 
as the responsibility of the United Nations . The 
51. GAOR, Session 2, First Cttec, mtg. 87,pp.250-1. 
52. L.M.Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in US 
Policy in the UN (New York, 1956) p.44. 
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United Nations was ask'ed to "candidate or preclude 
"any action which members of the war-time coalition 
might take in their Relations with the enemy 
states. The making of the peace following the 
Second World War was to proceed indepencb ntly of 
53 
the Charter, ie as if the Charter did not exist. 
The pommunist group, therefore, did not want the 
United Nations to deal with the disposition of the 
territories formerly occupied by the enemy states. 
A.M.Beranovasky of the tyrain USR referred to a 
Statement made by Senator vandenberg at the San 
Francisco conference, to the effect that the 
"General Assembly of the UN should make 
recommendations with regard to peace treaties and 
problems concerned therewith and to Article 107 of 
54 the Charter, which was fully applicable." This 
meant, he pointed out that the General Assembly 
should not make recommendations in such matters. 
53. Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the UN (New 
York, 1969), p.633. 
54. GAOR, Session 2. First Cttoe mty, 89,pp.258-91. 
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Further, the Soviet bloc argued that the 
activities of the UNCOK were contrary to the 
principles of the United Nations. Far from 
protecting Korea from possible foreign 
interference, the UNCOK was intervening in the 
domestic affaire of Korea and prepetuating that 
interference. It was an "obedient foot of US 
55 Department of State • . The Communists 
characterized the activities of the UNCOK as a" 
brazen expression of the bandit colonization policy 
of the American imperialists in Korea" . Their 
main objection was that it was a violation of 
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Which 
dealt with non-intervention in the domestic affairs 
of any nation. The Soviet representative. 
Vyshinsky, told the General Asembly: The provisions 
of Charter VII were illegally applied to the civil 
war whereas these provisions do not relate to civil 
55. GAOR, Session , First Cttee mtg. 92.p.290. 
56. Ibid, Session 4, Supplement Vol.2, Annex/DC. 
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War, to internal conflicts that were between two 
sections of the people of one and the same state, 
of one and the same country, temporarily splitiinto 
two hostile governmental camps but to war between 
5 7 
states. 
The Korean war was a war fought between two 
sections of the Korean people. 
Thus, the establishment of the UNCOK and its 
functions were illegal, and besides, they violated 
international agreements. 
Vyshinsky held that the unification of Korea 
and the establishment of a unified democratic state 
should be left to the Korean people themselves. He 
further stated that the General Assembly should 
have invited the representatives of both North and 
South Korea, so that thoy could express their view; 
on the question. Any discussion without them" would 
violate the provisions and principles of the 
Charter and in particular Article 32, which 
57. Ibid, Session 5,Plen Mtg.293, p.219.. 
58. GAOR, Session 5, Plon .mty .2 92 , p.193. 
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provided for the participation of non-member states 
in any discussions held under the conditions laid 
down by the Council. This was accepted practice of 
the General Assembly and Secretary Council. The 
decision of the First Committee to hear the 
representative of the Syngman Rhee Government was 
one-sided and not impartial. It was in 
contravention of the principles of the Charter and 
the right of self dj termination of people. It would 
not help in working out a settlement of the "Korean 
Question" 
The Soviet representatives also made the 
charge that there was an American conspiracy to 
establish a puppet government in Korea. This, if 
permitted to take its course would be a gross 
injustice to the spirit and latter of the Charter. 
He warned the General Assembly that if any decision 
on Korea was taken without any participation of the 
Korea people, his country would not abide"by that 
decision. He challenged the validity of the 
58. GAOR, Session 5, Plen.mtg.292, p.193. 
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Security Council resolution of 2 7 June and 7 July 
1950, on the ground that they were legally 
59 intenable . The resolution had been adopted by 
only six votes, the seventh being that of the 
Kuomintang representative, Tincfu F. Rsiang, who 
had no legal right to represent China, Article 2 7 
of the UN Charter required that the djecisions of 
the Security Council on all matters (not considered 
as procedural) should be made by an affirmative 
vote of seven members, including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members. The resolutions 
concerned had not secured the five concurring votes 
required by the Charter, as China had been 
represented by Taiwan and the Soviet representative 
had not voted.The representatives of poland 
charged the government of the United States with 
undertaking a military adventure in Korea without 
waiting for the consideration of the matter by the 
59. Ibid., Session 2, First trttee mtg.91,p.91. 
60. Ibid, Plen, mtg.293,p.219. 
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61 
lawful organ of the United Nations ,. the Security 
Council. He mad? it clear that the United States 
had undertaken a unilateral action contrary to the 
Charter. 
Besides, the Charter provided that Member 
States should try to settle their disputes through 
negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. In Korea the 
steps taken to promote a peaceful settlement of the 
problem were contrary to this provision of the 
Charter . The Communists charged the United States 
and its allies with complying only with those 
provisions of the Charter that suited them and 
neglecting the other, proper Articles. The Security 
Council was bound by the provisions of the Charter 
61. UN yearbook, 1950, p.225. 
62 . Ibid, p. 226. 
63. GAOR, Session 5, Plen.mtg. 293,p.219. 
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to invite the interested parties to participate in 
the discussion of the questions affecting then. The 
whole thing was an American couspiracy against the 
•Communist Russia. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Democrate Republic of Korea declared that 
this government did not recognize the decision of 
the Security Council because it was not a party to 
it as legally binding on itself. Moreover, 
representatives of the USSR was absent from the 
Security Council, and the Peoples Republic of China 
* A 6 5 
was not represented. 
The Communists took the position that the 
aggressive and imperialistic desiyn of the United 
States against the People' Democracies constituted 
the root cause of the war in Korea. They challenged 
the constitutionality of the" United Action for 
Peace." "The UN was created as the Charter puts 
64. Ibid. 
65. UN Docs, S/152 7 and S/1554, 
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it", to be centre for harmonizing the actions of 
the nations in the attainment of common ends. The 
unit for Peace" resolution was contrary to this 
basic principles of the United Nations. The real 
aim of that resolution was to shift the centre of 
gravity from the Security Council to the General 
Assembly and to subotage the principle of unanimity 
which was the cornerstone of the structure for 
67 peace 
The communists further maintained that the 
resolution would empower General Mac Arther, 
Commander of the UN forces in Korea, to occupy the 
whole territory of Korea with foreign troops on the 
pretext of establishing an independent denonctratic 
state in Korea. 
According to the American representative, 
the RussianVeto was the root cause of the failure 
of the Security Council. But Vyshinsky pointed out 
66. GAOR Session 5, Pl#n .mtg .2 79 , p.28. 
67. Ibid, Plen.mtg. 293, p.219. 
68. Ibid i First Cttee mtg.357,pp. 81-85. 
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that the veto was simply an instrument for 
attempting to settle differences.Ke asserted that 
the Security Council failed not because of the 
Russian Veto but due to the stand taken by the 
majority which allied itself with the United 
States.Again he claimed that in such a situation 
the minority needed the veto in order to defend 
itself against the hostile majority , and the 
Security Council was paralysed because in a number 
of cases the Agio-American group could not force 
decisions favourable to its own interests and 
purposes on the Security Council. 
The "Uniting for Peace", in the opinion of 
the USSR, was a device invented to make the veto 
meaningless. This was inconsistent with the spirit 
and letter of the Charter. It could hrdly have any 
effect on the course of action for maintaining 
peace and Security. If there is no agreement amony 
the Great powers on fundamental matters affecting 
69. Ibid, Plen. mtg.301. p.331. 
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international peace, the threat to peace would 
remain whether the General Assembly considered 
these questions in the absence of the veto or 
whether the Security Council decided them with the 
veto. 
The Soviet representative insisted that all 
matters concerning the use of force were reserved 
exclusively for the Security council. This view was 
based on Article 11(2), 24,43 and 47 of the 
Charter.The General Assembly could not be a 
substitute for the Security Council because if 
lacked the competence of the Security Council. The 
Communists believed that the transfer of competence 
would place the armed forces at the disposal of the 
General Assembly and it would be in contravention 
of the provisions of chapter VI, VII, VIII, and 
XIII of the Charter and would amount to an 
amendment of the Charter. 
70. H.F.Haviland, Jr. The Political Role of 
Generally Assembly (New York, 1957) pp.1-2. 
71. Repertory of Practice of UN Organs,Vol.1,p.309. 
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Czechoslovakia asserted that the sanctions 
enforced against the peoples Republic of China and 
the Korean People's Democratic Republic constituted 
another attempt to violate the Charter of the 
United Nations, because what the UN action involved 
was not the application of the general principles 
of Article 2 , pargraph 5 of the Charter but the 
actual imposition of sanctions under Article 41 of 
the Charter, which stated that the authority of the 
Security Council was beyond dispute. The Communists 
blow stressed that the United Nations was not 
legally entitled to authorize the use its flay, 
establish a UN command, or cb signate the United 
States as its agent, it held that the Actions of 
the General Assembly and the Security Council with 
regard to Korea were null and void according to UN 
Charter. This opinion w?..s based on the belief 
that nothing was lawful unless expressly authorized 
by the Charter. The General Assembly had been used 
as an instrument for mobilizing political and 
psychological pressures of the world community on 
the Soviet Union. 
98 
Justification of the Action 
The Anglo-American group rejected all the 
allegations made by the communist bloc against the 
validity of the UN action in Korea. It held that 
the actions taken by the General Assembly and the 
Security Council were valid and within their 
competence under the Charter. 
Alexander Cadogan to the United Kingdom said 
that he could not agree with the Communist bloc 
that "Article 107 barred the General Assembly from 
making recommendations in regard to the problem of 
72 independence of Korea" . This Article enabled the 
Allied Governire nts to deal with only the enemy 
states, but then Korea was not an enemy country; on 
the contrary, it was a victim of Japanese 
aggression. The UP government had submitted its 
proposal to the General Assembly after two ye^rs 
when it was found that the Joint Soviet, American 
72. GAOR, Session 2, First tftteo mtg. 88.p.256. 
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Commission could not reach any agreement. The only 
alternative left was that of referring it to the 
General Assembly which extended its cooperation to 
achieve Korean independence and unification as the 
Mosco agreement could not be materialized. And the 
UN commission on Korea was a legitimate organ of 
the General Assembly to achieve the said purpose. 
The Russian objection that the United Nations had 
not right to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
any state was baseless and it was "a clear-cut, 
preplanned attack of North Korea". These actions of 
the General Assembly were not in contravention of 
the provisions of Article 106. As lester Pearson of 
Canada put its "Article 106 had been intendj d to 
apply to the initial transitional period, prior to 
the creation of Security Council and the Military 
Staff Committee .Nov; the General Assembly is the 
73 principal force to consider such matters ". 
73. Jbid, Session 5, Pleri, mtg. 301. P.338. 
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The objections based on Article 32 were not 
secret as it was difficult to establish identity of 
the true representatives of the Korean people. The 
American representative, Dulles observed that his 
delegation was also in conplete ayreement with the 
USSR that the matter should have been settled only 
after consulation with true representatives of the 
Korean people. However, the USSR had failed to 
indicate the method of finding out the true 
representative of Korea. In fact, for eighteen 
months both the USSR and the United States had 
failed to agree as to who should be recognized as 
74 
the true representative of divided Korea . It was 
impossible for the General Assembly in such a 
situation to make the choice . The Communist 
Government of North Korea had not allowed the UN 
Commission to operate its territory and refused 
even to recognize it. That was why the Interim 
Committee advised the Commission to hold elections 
74. Ibid. 
mi 
in south Korea and recognized the Rhee government 
as the only legal government of the whole of 
Korea 
Another objection was raised in the First 
Committee invited the representatives of North 
Korea. It would amount to granting recognition to 
that government. This would be contrary to the will 
of the Assembly 
The Anglo-American group tried to rebuild the 
communist argument on the validity of the actions 
of the Security Council in Korea. The 
representative of the United States, Ernest 
A.Gross, observed: "The absence of the Soviet 
Union's representative will not prevent us from 
conducting the business to which we are pledged". 
The absence of a permanent member from a meeting of 
the Security Council would in no way diminish its 
powers or its authority of act. The charter 
7 5 . G A . R e s o l u t i o n 1195 ( H I ) 
76 . GAOR, S e s s i o n F i r s t j C t t o o . J u l y - 8 9 , p p . 2 6 0 1 . 
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provide? in Article 28 that the Security Council 
shall be so organized as to be able to function 
i 7 7 continuously 
It was further argued that the Soviet 
Representative, Malik, violated Article 2 7 of the 
Charter by remaining absent fron the meetings of 
the council. A practice had already been adopted by 
the Security Council by 1980 whereby the abstention 
of a permanent member fron voting was still deemed 
to be a concurring vote within the meaning of the 
said Article. It meant that a decision of the 
Security Council which received the support of at 
least seven members was not rendered legally 
ineffective by the abstention of a permanent 
member. The Soviet Union itself had clearly 
favoured this interpretation of the legal effects 
on abstention, and the practice had found favour 
78 
with all the permanent members. Thus, the absence 
77. SCOR, yr.5, mtg, 461, p.14. 
78. Repertory of Practice of the Security Council, 
1946-951 (1954) pp.170-5; suplenent for 1952-5 
(1957), pp. 67-68, Supplement for 1956-8(1959), 
p.64; Suplement for 1959-63 (1965) p.96. 
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of the Russian representative should be regarded as 
deliberate abstention from the vote incapable of 
preventing the passage of a resolution within the 
79 terms of Article 2 7. The Anglo-merican group 
stressed that it was not an intention of the 
Charter that the voluntary absence of a permanent 
member should stultify the role of the Security 
pouncil the essential structure of which was based 
on rapid and effective action for the maintenance 
of peace and security. Therefore, the opinion of 
their group, the accuration of illegality locked 
any legal foundation and could not be 
80 
maintained. The rule of unanimity was not an end 
itself but simply ameans to an end. It was only a 
hypothesis and not the fundamental basis of the 
United Nations, and it could not be allowed to 
stand in the way of smooth working of the Security 
Council. 
79. Resolyn Higgins, UN Peace-Keeping (London, 
1980), Vol. 2,p. 175. 
80. GAOR, Session 5, Plei mtg 2 92, p.201. 
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The other important objection related to the 
representation of Communist China in place of 
Nationalist China. The Soviet delegate wanted to 
add a word to the list of the permanent members in 
Article 2 3 of the Charter. That one word "Peoples" 
before the words "Republic of China" was enough to 
show that the USSR was attempting to rewrite 
paragraph 1 of Article 2 3 of the Charter which 
81 
would be a violation of the Charter. 
The question of the representation of 
Communist China could only be decided by the vote 
of the General Assembly. 
The Anglo-American group also challenged the 
allegations made by the Communist bloc against the 
validity of "Uniting for peace* as the Charter had 
provided for three basis security needs: 
a) Prompt and dependable action; 
b) reliable means of information; and 
c) a backing of adequate power ready for 
action 
81. Ibid, pl#n. mtg. 302, p.343. 
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In these three respects the Security Council 
had primary responsibility" as mentioned in the 
Charter.But if the Security Council was not able to 
act because of obstructive tactics of a permanent 
member, it did not meant that United Nations was 
important. The obligation of all Members to take 
action to maintain or restore peace did not 
disappear because of the veto. The Assembly should 
step in by invoking its residual power of 
82 
recommendations 
The primary responsibility of the Security 
Council was not exclusive, and the General Assembly 
could, under the provisions of the Charter, more 
appropriate recommendations in case of any breach 
of peace, threat to the peace or act of aggression. 
This authority sprang from the broad power of the 
General Assembly under the Charter, from the 
inherent right of the United Nations to survival 
and from its supreme responsibility to the peoples 
82. GAOR, Session 5, Plen mtg• 2 92, p.197. 
106 
of the world in the maintenance of peace . The 
Assembly was competent to deal with the maintenance 
of international peace and security. The uniting 
for peace" resolution was within the framework of 
the basic rules adopted at San Francisco. The 
Security Council remained the sole organ in the 
event of a threat to peace and was empowered to 
take decisions legally binding on the rtembers of 
the United Nations. However in their view the 
resolutions had not changed the basic principles of 
Charter. Only the General Assembly was given powers 
in a particular situation to preserve the 
principles and purposes of the United Nations in 
accordance with Articles 1 and 2 , notwithstanding 
the powers conferred on the General Assembly by 
Article 10 to 15 and the provision laid down in 
paragraph 2 of Article 11. The jurisdiction of the 
General Assembly was complete in this respect uncb r 
Article 11(2) and was limited only by Article 12, 
83. Ibid. 
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which states that an issue on the agenda of the 
Security council could not be discussed by the 
Assembly simultaneously. If the Security Council 
was given primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security 
under the Charter, the General Assembly had 
secordary responsibility in matter of this 
84 
nature . The General Assembly had clear and direct 
responsibility in this sphere under Articles 
10,11,13 and 15, and consequently it was fully 
competent to assert its authority or to delegate it 
so long as it limited itself to the functions 
described to it. Its authority was partly 
exclusive, partly prallel, partly residual and 
85 
secondary 
It was further argued that Article 10,11, 
and 14 empowered the General Assembly to recommend 
whatever measures it deemed necessary to connection 
84. Ibid, plen. mtg.301. p. 322. 
85. Repertory of Practice of UN organs,vol.1, p.300 
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with any matter within the scope of the Charter, 
including questions connected with the maintenance 
of international peace and security. The limitation 
in Article 11(2) did not in any way prevent the 
General Assembly from excercising powers to make 
recommendations conferred upon it by Article 10 
since Article 11 (4) envisaged that the General 
Assembly's power of recommendation was not united 
by the provisions of Article 11. If the provision 
of the last sentence of Article 11(2) was to be 
reconciled with Article 10, the term "action" was 
not to be defined as recommendation. This was a 
reason for making the distinction between "action" 
and "enforcement action". The General Assembly was 
not empowered to order or to take direct 
enforcement action, but it could recommend action 
of a certain character including the use of armed 
force. For this reason, it would be justifiable to 
adopt the point of view that whenever the Security 
Council was unable to take action, the General 
Assembly had the responsibility to act under 
109 
Article 10. Obviously a recommendation by the 
General Assembly did not have the force of a 
decision of the Security council taken under the 
provisions of Chapter VII. Therefore the General 
Assembly could not have the power to make decisions 
which would automatically impose commitments or 
enforcement obligations or the Members of the 
United Nations 
If the Security Council had implemented 
Article 43 of the Charter, there would have been no 
need to authorize the general .Assembly to recommend 
action. The draft resolution did not diverst the 
Security Council of its process, it only provided 
that whenever the five permanent members of the 
security Council were not able to achieve unanimity 
on special agreements provided for in Article 43. 
member states could cause no delay in discharging 
their obligation to maintain with their natural 
armed forces contingents to be held available for 
86. Ibid.p. 310. 
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the United Nations. The above provisions therefore 
might constitute a step towards implementing 
Article 43. The authority of the General Assembly 
in the matter of peace and security was not 
confined to Article 10 to 15, but it also included 
Articles 55, 56, 59 and 60, which referred to joint 
action under the authority of the General Assembly 
with a view to assuring friendly and peaceful 
relations in the field of economic and social 
cooperation, a question directly related to the 
maintenance of integrational peace and security. 
Article 73, 76, 85, and 87 also referred to action 
by the General Assembly for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in case of 
non-self governing and Trust Territories.Article 35 
provided that the General Assembly might be seized 
of a dispute, and Article 51 rtealt with the 
self-defence, individual or collective, Untill the 
Security Council has taken the measures needed to 
maintain peace. If, therefore, the Security Council 
Ill 
was prevented from excercising its functions and 
powers with regard to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the General 
Assembly could very well adopt measures for 
87 
collective self-defence 
The Communist bloc had claimed that the 
resolutions of the General Assembly amount to an 
amendment of the Charter without going through the 
procedure laid down for Charter amendments in 
Article 108. But in opinion of the majority of 
these resolutions did not amount to an amendment of 
the Charter at all. If the Security Council failed 
to fufils its paramount responsibility for want of 
unanimity, the majority had only two courses open 
before it could either remain inactive and allow 
the world to rush headlong tow.ards chaos and 
disaster or provide an alternative course of 
action. Through the "Uniting for Peace" resolution 
to General Assembly had only enabled itself to 
87. Ibid.p. 318 
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peace and security, without violation any of the 
great principles of international law and the UN 
Charter. The international Court of Justice had 
88 
also supported this view. 
The majority helfl that the use of UN flag 
was not illegal as it had already been used in the 
Balkans and in Palestine by the UN Commission the 
United Nations had itself decided to use to flag 
thus the Anglo-American bloc maintained that UN 
in 
action Korea was valid and according to the demand 
of the situation and the Chartershould be flexible 
enough to meet the exigencies of any situation. 
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CHAPTER-IV 
CRISIS IN CONGO 
Belgian Domination 
The territory of Congo had been created by 
two men, king Leopold II of Belgium and by an 
English explorer named Henry Morton Stanley in the 
area south of the Congo river in equaterial Africa. 
With relentless ambitions, full of energies as well 
as fixity of purposes both these personalities had 
accomplished the objectives of colonizing the 
African territory. In course of time king Leopold 
was able to impose his personal rule over the 
African colony and had got it ratified by the 
European powers at the Congress of Berlin in July 
1885 . The Belgian parliament on 15 November, 1908 
had terminated the personal rule of the Belgian 
king due to constant criticisms from foreign 
quarters and especially from the governments in 
England, US and Germany that the ruler had 
prepetrated severe attrocities on the native 
population and also that he had granted sweeping 
concessions to foreign companies in the 
1. For details see, Parker Thownas Moon, 
Imperialism and World policies (New York, 192 6) 
pp.79-80. 
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'2 Colony • The status of the Belgian Congo, however 
remained as such till it received its independence 
on 30 June 1960. 
The Belgian policy towards the Congo had 
been described as "Paternalism". This denoted the 
fact that all the Congolese population, except for 
those belonging to the administration had been shut 
out completely from getting any information about 
their country. The Belgian had followed a highly 
centralized policy and had been averse to the idea 
of providing higher education to the Congolose, 
because of the year of demand 
for independence. Their over.all objective 
had been aimed at insulating the Congolese from the 
"Wars of national liberation" and the "winds" " of 
change" that had taken place in various parts of 
Africa . 
At the same time the colonial government had 
concentrated its efforts towards economic 
development and social upliftment of native people 
2. P.B.Harris, Studies in African Politics (London, 
1990), p.23. 
3. Department of State, 1965 "as cited in Report of 
the Special study Mission to Africa, November 
27- December 14, 1965(Washington ,D.C1966) .p. 65 . 
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because of their belief that the Conglase would 
only crave for higher economic standards and not 
for their intellectual development as well as 
4 . . political participation . With this perspective in 
mind they had sought for the exploitation of 
Congo's vast natural resources. The Belgians had 
encouraged foreign private investment, by 
providing them with special protections, incentives 
and concessions in this regard. As a result of this 
policy large scale investment by Belyian and other 
outside corporations had been established jsuch as 
the societe Generate de Belgique (The Societe 
Generate), the Union Miniere due Hanut Katanga 
(Union Miniere). The Tanganyika concessions (TANKS), 
Sociate Internationale Forestiere Miniere due Congo 
(For miniere) the Compag&i-e Contonneira Congolese 
(Contonco) as well as the American Congo Company. 
In the social sphere, the Belgiam had 
adopted a cautious but step-by-step approach to 
4. Dorthy Doge, African Politics in Perspective, 
(New York, 1966) p.44. 
llfi 
acquaihtthe native people with modern standards of 
western civilization. To facilitate this process 
they had encouraged the migration of rural 
population urban centres and especially to mining 
and industrial areas. This, however, had resulted 
in an increase in social tension as well as a 
breakdown in the traditional African life. The 
colonical government had further entrusted the 
Catholic missions with the task of providing 
primary as well as technical education to the huge 
Congolose population . In the process the Congo had 
been able to reach almost a saturation point with 
regard to primary and technical education. The 
country, however, had to face several shortages in 
the areas of trained political leaders, civil 
servants, industrial managers as well as 
professionals. The hall-mark of Belgion policy had, 
thus been to create a prosperous native- working 
class in the Congo which would be content with 
prosperity rather than with votes. 
5. See Catherine Hoskyns. The Congo Since 
Independence (London, 1965), p. 19. 
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The reality of the Congo is that it is 
located at the strategic and geographic heart of 
Africa and is richly endowed by nature . For 
instance, it produces 7 per cent of world's copper, 
67 per cent of cobalt and one third of world 'j 
industrial diamonds, besides large quantities of 
cadmium, gold, silver, zinc, iron tungston, 
casseterite, maganese, uranium and radium . The 
geo-political situation, as well as richness of the 
country had prompted a competition betv/een the cold 
war antagonists for the control of region. 
It has, therefore, been aptly remarked that "the 
Q 
Congo is a bride every body wants . 
6. Ernest W. Crisis in the Congo : A UN Force in 
Action, (Washington, D.C. 1965), 8.6. 
7. Unity International; (New Delhi) Vol. . No.l 
January 1978, p.3. 
8. G.Mennenm Williams, Africa for the Africans 
(Michigan, 1969) p. 86, Menon williams was 
Assistant Secretary of State For African Affairs 
from 1961 to 1966. 
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A second Congolose reality is the divisive 
factor of tribalism. In a country comprisinq more 
than 2 00 tribes who spoke .some 2 00 principal 
languages and dialects, tribal loyalities as well 
as ancient enmities had formed characteristcs 
features of Congolese societies as elsewhere in 
Africa which however, had impeded and • fc-hwarted the 
9 
growth of national unity in the country . 
The tragedy of the Congo episode, however, 
had revolved around the main fact that the Belgians 
had proved themselves to the totally "unfit" to 
shoulder their responsibilities as a colonial 
power. They had not only refused to address 
themselves seriously to the question of 
decolonization, but had also failed to initiate 
measures of political reforms on the pattern of 
other European colonial powers. 
9. Stephen R.Weissman, American Foreign Policy in 
the Congo (New York, 1974), p.15. 
10. Ernest W.Lefaver, Crisis in the Congo: A UN 
Force in Action (Washington, DC 1965), p.6. 
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Details of the Congo tragedy are beyond the 
scope of this study. However one may portray some 
of the historical developments in the Congo that 
eventually provides the factual setting for the 
United Nations intervention and the TJnited States 
involvement. 
Congo had been a vast territory possessed 
by a Belgian company which established trade 
stations on the lower Congo between 1879 to 1884, 
and had formally given it over to the Belgian 
government Congress of Berlin recognized it as a 
"Congo Free State". 
This so called "Free state" remained under 
the Belgian colonialism from November 1908 to 1960. 
Untill 1908, for more than four centuries the Congo 
had been subject to ruthless exploitation of 
11. Rubert Fmerson, Africa and the United States 
Policy (Mew Jersey, 1967 p.62. 
12 0 
12 African labour . Approximately more than thirty 
million people were made slaves and traded abroad 
under Belgian sovereignty . The barbarious 
personal rule of the Belgian king who had taken 
12. So heavy were the levies of rubber that the 
natives had no time to cultivate their patches 
of grain, famine found its victims and infant 
mortality, always high, became apalling; many a 
phosperous village fell into decay and some 
parts of the crown domains (travellers tell) 
became deserted wilderness, where the silence 
of the forest "broken only by occassional 
trampling of the elephant and buffalo, the 
chatter of whilemaned monkeys, the screams of 
the grey parrot", see, Peter Thomas Moon, 
Imperialism and world polities. New York 1926. 
13. Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Concho (New 
York, 1967), pp.2-13. 
121 
over the control of the land from portugal in the 
last quarter of the 18th century, aroused 
widespread public outcry in Europe and eventually 
forced the Belgiam government to assure full 
colonial responsibility for the Congo in 1908. The 
kind of the rule that followed did introduce some 
humanitarianism like the establishment of some 
hospitals and schools. 
The Belgian Colonial system had its own 
sophistication. In one sense, the Congo was the 
most developed colony and was administered by a 
14 bureaucracy of 10,1000. Belgian Officers , who 
established a highly developed system of economic 
exploitation involving international cooperation 
and enormous investments (and profits) with complex 
rail, water and transport systems. But on the other 
hand, the Belgian approach to colonial management 
was merely a policy of paternalism , after brutal 
14. K.P.Saxena, The United Nations and Collective 
Security, (New Delhi, 1974), p. 17. 
15. Ibid. 
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traditions under the earlier personel regime of 
leopaldvitXe. The difference between the new and old 
government may be illustrated by one instance . In 
1912, a Congo official was arbitrarily executing 
seven native men, for women and a child. In old 
days such executions would have passed without 
notice. But humanitarianism of the new type was 
less profitable than Leopoldian methods. Throwing 
the colony open to internatonal trade, abolishing 
of forced labour, relinquishing the profitable 
leopoldian monopolies and assuming the debts of the 
Free State, left the Belgian government with a 
colony whose revenues were inadequate to defray the 
administrations expenditure. Its approach to 
colonialism was to short sighted that it did not 
anticipate the fast growing advancement of African 
nationalism and established a very differend kind 
of relationship between coloniser and the colony. 
No attempt was made to provide for participation or 
16. Peter Thomas, n.l pp. 88-89. 
12 3 
even association of the Congolese people with the 
administration of the country. By 1950, more than 
10,000 Belgians held all unparelal positions in 
highly advanced bureaucratic structure and not a 
single doctor or engineer was Congolese. Only 17 
Congolese were graduates at the time of 
independence and there were only two universities 
in the whole of the Congo. Administration was 
highly centralised and administered by Belgian 
Officers. 
The resources of the Congo were exploited 
by the Union Miniere a company, formed in 1906, 
jointly by the British and Belgian governments, 
which enjoyed exclusively mining rights over 
Katanga by agreement with Belgian government untill 
1990. The sudden decision to give independnece to 
the Congo in 1960 disturbed the earlier agreements 
17. This Union Miniere was formed in 1906 as a 
stock company with the million fromes capital, 
half Belgian and half British and obtained the 
right to exploit all copper mines in a zone 
about half large as Belgium untill the year 
1990 as well as to built railways and roads and 
to exploit coal mica, iron and gold mica. For 
details see, Peter Thomas More, n.l p.9 . 
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and provoked a strong reaction. The Belgium and 
British finance was closely involved in mining in 
Katanga. Soon after the independence of the Congo 
katanga seceded from the Congo Republician with the 
packing of Western colonial powers and became a 
complicated problem for the United Nations peace 
Keeping Operation. 
Being extremely rich economically the 
Congolose were politically backward. They were 
devided into various tribal groups. Political 
parties and their leaders emerging after the 
independence were purely based on tribal loyalty. 
The tribal structure was highly complex which led 
to disunity and wide differences between two 
regions. No single group was dominant in the whole 
country. Some important tribal groups which became 
powerful at local level because of their numerical 
strength or strategic situation or their 
12 5 
tradition and political culture- The Ba-Katanga 
Ba-Mongo, Ba-lunda, and Ba-Luba. The Ba-Kongo 
dominated the narrow strip of land between 
Leopoldville and the sea, and were also found in 
adjacent areas of free Congo and Angora covering 
nearly fifty percent of African population of 
Leopoldville. Joseph Kasavubu belonged to the 
group. The Ba-Mongo group was found in the Northern 
part of the old province of leopoldville and the 
southern part of the Congo river, Ba-Luba was in 
the Northern province of Katanga, whereas the 
Ba-Lunda acquired strength in North. Moise Thomba 
belonged to Ba-Lund group. 
The traditional conflicts were common 
before the advent of the Europeans and were put 
down during Belgian administration. But the lack of 
18. The Prefex "Ba" or "Bena" when added to some 
tribal name means "people". It is often 
omitted. Ouoted from B.Charavasty, Congo 
Operation (Ministry of Defence, Govt of India, 
1976) p.5. 
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concidence between ethnic and administrative 
boundaries often led to popular conflicts within 
ethnic groups themselves. 
Declaration of Independence 
Since the 1950s, a political awareness was 
sweaping across the whole Africa, including the 
Congo. In december 1955, Professors van Bislen's 
thirty year plan for the political emanicipation of 
Africa cought the imagination of some educated 
Congolese in the form of published manifesto in an 
African paper of Leopold-vdlle. ,.. "La consience 
Af ricaine". This manifesto became the ideological 
basis for a tribal group called Ba-Kongo, which 
mostly constituted Abako party led by Kasavubu. The 
manifesto was call "to all type of discrimination 
and establishment of a democratic government based 
on equality of man. After a year of this 
manifestoes publications the municipal elections 
were held for the first time in the history of 
Congo in three main cities. Elizabethville, 
Leopoldville, and Jodotville, which gave rise to 
political parties and strengthened the demand for 
interim autonomy, and self rule. Otherwise untill 
1957 Congolese did not know about "election". 
Most of the Congolose parties were based 
mainly on tribal affinity. The Abako party 
12 7 
represented the Ba-Kongo of lower congo region, the 
conkat party of Tshome was suported by the Bafunda 
of .Southern Katanga. Albert Kalonji's branch of MNC 
represented the Bafcunda of South Kesai and Jeson 
Sendues Balubakat party was explicify based on 
bribe of northern katnaga patrice Lumumba founded a 
national centrist party, unique in cutting across 
tribal and regional lines. His Movement National 
Congolose obtained wider support from people, 
although it was strong in province of Kasai, and in 
Stanleyville in the orientale province-. All four 
cyrille Aeloula, Joseph, Ileo and Joseph Mobutu 
including Lumumba who became Prime Minister 
belonged to this party.MNC was only radical party 
regarded uncomfortable for Belgian authority. Anothe 
important party was formed when Neo opposed Lumumba 
in 1957 and formed MNC (K) with the support of 
Albert Kalongi; the President of Kasai branch of 
MNC. Anoine Gizenga led the separatist party ie 
Party Solidaire Af ricai> ( PSA) . 
The interactions among emerging political 
party leaders to strengthen the demand for autonomy 
12 8 
and independence cane through many events like 
speech of President General de Gaulle, delivered at 
Brazzaville on August 24, 1958 and Pan Africa 
Conference held in Accra in December 1958 which was 
attended by Patric Lumumba . After his return to 
the Congo, he raised the Accra Conference call for 
immediate independence for the whole of Africa. 
Untill 1957 no significant political activity by 
African leaders had been permitted in the Belgian 
Congo and the very idea of independence was hardly 
discussed. 
20 
The first serious anti-colonial activity 
occurred during the first week of January 1959, 
when riots at mass scale broken out the 
leopoldville. The interest in riots were first 
responded by suppressive measures when more than a 
hundred of the Congolese national demonstrators 
11. He also established contact with Nkrnah and 
Nassar who saw in him a champion of left-win^ 
anticolonialism. 
2.1. B.Urquhart, Hammerskjold (London, 1973) P.390. 
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were killed and many of its leaders arrested. A 
Commission of Enquiry was set up by the Belgian 
government which found that discrimination 
unemployment and changing international environment 
were responsible for wac and violence. No longer 
could the Congo be isolated from world 
2 1 happenings and especially from neighbouring 
countries.As early as January 1959, king Baudoin 
announced that it was the Belgian policy to prepare 
the Congo for indepence. But Congolese politicians, 
suspicious of Belgian intentions began to build 
political support for the future. During April 
7-12, 1950, Lumumba organised a meeting in 
Luluabourg to demand self-government by January, 
1961 and to determine the date for independence of 
the Congo. It was followed by meeting in 
21 . From 1950 to mid 1960s events moved at hectic 
phase in the whole colonial Africa. The 
Belgians were facing a flood. By mid 1060s more 
than 15 African colonese already had or were 
scheduled for independence in time for 
admission to United Nations in the General 
Assembly session Sept;; 1960. 
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Leopoldville in June which alsc called fresh 
negotiation, with political leaders. In early 
November 1959 street rioting broke out in 
Stanleyville which was again suppressed at the 
cost of many Congolese lives and with arrest of 
Lumumba. When elections were held in December 
many political leaders boycotted them. During 
the course of these happenings, at last king 
Buadoin visited the C^ngo in the month of 
December. Immediately after his visit, 
invitations to a Round Table Conference. 
Leaders who attended a conference were Kasavuba 
(Abako) rizenga (PSA), Kalongi (MNC-K) and 
Lumumba (MNC). At the end of conference, 
independence was announced to be in effect by 
the end of the six months since conference. The 
Conference also worked out for a constitution 
system. In the absence of long tern 
preparations for independence of the Congo much 
hope was placed on a Treaty of Friendship and 
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Cooperation which was never ratified by the 
Congolese legislature after independence. 
According to the term of the treaty, the 
Belgian Administration officers and technical 
personnel were to stay back in the Congo after 
independence. The Law and order was to be in 
the hands of the "force publique* which 
required the officers (all Belgians) to stay 
for sometime. 
All this showed that the independence to 
the <Congo control to be still excercised by 
Belgiaum. This was soon realised by Congo 
after independence.The dream of the Congolese 
for a happy and prosperous Congo after 
independence. The dream of the Congolese for a 
happy and properous Congo after independence 
was dashed, thanks to their administrative 
experience, inter tribal and personal rivalries 
and international involvement leading to 
recession. No one in Congo was prepared 
either emotionally or otherwise for such 
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consequences of independence. There were widespread 
chaos, fear and mutual recrimination of few 
political leaders expected to hold the reigns of 
governmental were without experience of public 
life, all of them too young and inexperienced and 
many of them short sighted and parochial in 
perspective. During Belgian administration the 
position held by Congolese were only of clerical 
nature 
Belgium officers continued to occupy the 
same positions which they had held before 
independence, thus the whole administration was run 
by Belgians. There were no changes in the 
administrative structure except the new positions 
of the Prime Minister and the President. If Belgium 
officers were to leave their respective ports, it 
would have created a vacum in the country because 
the£e were no educated and administratively trained 
man power to fill the vaccura after Belgian 
22. Patric Lumumba born in 192 5 spent most of his 
youth in Stanleyville
 / where he became 
Contd... 
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departure.The history of Congolese independence was 
too short, in absence of any pre-arrangement for 
administrative training by one previous government 
although the history of brutal exploitation was too 
old. Belgian colonial intentions left the Congo in 
a state of chaos, conflict and fear, where no one 
except the expatriates were expected or equipped to 
excercise any control. 
Similarly, the newly born Congo did not 
have its own armed forces for its protection. Even 
the Chief Commander was a Belgian national. The 
same conditions remained even after two or three 
years of independence. 
The Congolese army mutined within a week 
after the declaration of independence, the reason 
being that the soldiers were not getting increase 
a postal clerk and at 34 years of his age 
became Prime Minister. Kasavabu who was 
President at the age of 42 years was a 
government clerk. Tshombe educated at the 
American Methodist Mission was grocer before 
associating himself with Unions Miniere of 
Katanga. The dangerous of all Colonel Mobotu 
born in 1930, sevrved as NCO in Belgian 
colonial army and became Chief of Staff of 
Force Publique (was supported by US and 
Belgium) . He created problem for Lumumba as 
well as the Republic of C6ngo. 
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in emoluments in Leopoldville and saw little chance 
of getting officer's rank. The mutiny also 
underscored the attitude of the Congolese nationals 
who found it difficult to continue to be commanded 
even after independence by the same officers as 
before independence. In the mutiny the Congolese 
soldiers captured the means of communication and 
terrorized the Europeans to the street at gun 
point.The situation was beyond control, since 
maintenance of law and order was under Belgian 
Officers who themselves were the targets. Thus the 
whole administration became paralysed. 
Soon after the incident, at the suggestion 
of the United States Ambassador Timberlake, the 
Congolese Government appeared to the United Nations 
for UN Technical and Military Assistance, including 
military advisors, experts and technicians to 
assist in developing a national army for the Congo 
to maintain national security and law and order. 
But before UN could reach to help the Congo, more 
than 300 troops of Belgian army landed at 
13S 
Elizabethville airport in Katnga , admittedly to 
protect the Belgian lives and property, occupied 
2 3 
military camps • The brutal fighting and 
counterattack by Congolese mutineers aggravated the 
situation. By July 13, the Belgium troops expelled 
the Congolese forces and occupied the European 
areas of leopoldville where parliament situated. 
Lumumba, the Prime Minister of Congo reacted very 
angrily at the violation of the Treaty of 
24 
Friendship between Belgium and Congo . Mois 
Tshombe soon declared the secession of Katanga from 
Congo and when President Kasavubu and Prime 
Minister Lumumba visited Katanga, they were not 
allowed to land in Elizabethville on the airport 
was controlled by Belgium troops. Tshombe was 
supported by the Belgium and this was anticipated 
by the Congolese government. Thus the Congds 
national integrity was threatened by an external 
aggression in this situation Congo government 
23. Rosalyn Higgin, United Nations keeping 
1949-1967. Documents and Commentry (London, 
1971) P.12 of n.30. 
2*. Ibid. 
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changed their original apeal from technical 
assistance in military field t o mantain law and 
order, protection of territory of the Congo from 
Belgian aggression. While appealing from United 
Nations intervention against the external 
aggression, Prime Minister lumumba also warned that 
if the UN assistance failed to come immediately the 
Congo would be obliged to seek assistance from 
other sources. 
Thus the Congo crisis as then developed 
with the breakdown of Law and order because of the 
absence of Congo's own force to control the 
situation and presence of Belgian troops in Congo 
at very large scale after independence, the threat 
to territorial integrity of the Congo because of 
Tshombos proclamation of independence of Katanga 
and the impanding danger of involvement by a third 
power which was likely to pose a threat to the UN 
capability to deal with the situation. To meet this 
deteriorating situation as noted already, Kasavuhu 
and Lumumba first appealed to the UN for technical 
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assistance of a military nature including 
technicians, experts and advisors to assist its own 
government in developing and strengthening its 
national army, for twin purposes; a) national 
2 * 
security and b) the maintenance TJ3W and order 
strangely enough they also appealed to the US for 
assistance on July 12 (The appeal was made by 
Gizenga, the Deputy PM of the Congo). Subsequently 
enough they also appealed for assistance of 
military rather than technical assistance of a 
military nature and they would be obliged to seek 
assistance from Bandung Powers if the aid was not 
2 6 
forth coming immediately . The essential purpose 
of the request for military was to protect the 
nationalist territory of the Congo external 
25. Brian, Urquhart, Hammersjold (London, 1973) 
P. 393. 
2fi. SCOR, S/4382, July 13, 1960 (Telegram of 
July 12 ). 
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27 
aggression 
27. Brain urquhart, n.24, p.396, on July 3, 1960 
Belgian para troops expelled Congolese troops by 
force from the main airport a Leopoldville and 
occupied the Furopean area of the town in which the 
government and parliament buildings were situated. 
Lumumba informed Ralph Bunche, that Ghana had been 
asked for military aid pending arrival of UM 
Force. 
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CHAPTER-V 
THE UNITED NATION5ROLE IN COHGO CRISIS 
Super Powers Unanimity 
Belgian rule in the Congo had for fifty 
years been based on the assumption that a 
paternalistic concern for the physical well being 
and economic needs of the indigenous population 
would prevent thevoiGe of a nationalist movement. 
When in January 1959, violent nationalist riots 
erupted in Leopoldville, the Congolese capital, it 
became clear that these assumptions had been 
incorrect. The Belgian Government, interpreting 
these riots as a harbinger of impending disaster, 
decided to end its coionial rule as rapidly as 
possible. Independance for the Congo was stated for 
June 30,1960. During the last year of Belgian 
colonial rule, little attempt was made to prepare 
an indigenous elite for the imminent 
responsibilities of self - government. Since the 
Congolese were not trained in self-rule and the 
overwhelming majority of 14 million people were 
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illiterate, the central government faced serious 
difficulties from within and from without . 
Thus, on June 30,1960, the Colony of the 
Belgian Congo was suddenly transformed into an 
independent nation, a newborn infant left on the 
world's doorstep. The government that took over the 
Congo was headed by President Joseph Kasavubu and 
premier Patrice Lumumba. Both had been members of 
the Congolese National Movement. Kasavubu the more 
conservative of the two, was not excessively 
hostile toward Belgium and the Western powers. The 
office of the presidency which he came to occupy 
2 
was largely an honorific post . 
Lumumba, the premier had been a more ardent 
nationalist than Kasavubu and was resolved to 
severe all relations with Beyium after 
independence. Both these men were challenged in 
1. New York Time, 10 July, 1960. 
2. G.Mennen Williams, "The US objectives in the 
Congo", Africa Report (Washington D.C., August 
1965) p.13. 
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their views by Moise Tshombe, Premier of the 
provincial government of Katanga.Tshombe had been 
backed by the Belgian government during the 
colonial period. He was a wealthy man, 
conservation, and pro-Belgian. Thus the n«?w 
Conglese leadership held political views along the 
entire spectrum-f rom lumumba'i uncompromising 
anticolonialism to Tshombe's pro- Belgian 
Sentiments. 
A few hours after its Declaration of 
Independence, the new government faced a crisis 
which threatened its very survival. The Congolese 
Army, which had never had an African officer corps, 
rose up, demanding the ouster of its Belgian 
officers and pay increases for the enlisted men. 
Many disappointed civilians who had expected to 
inherit all Belgian prossessions on independence 
had joined in the mutiny . During the following 
days the mntiny spread through the rest of the 
3. Sharma, D.N. Afro- Asian Group in UN, 
(Allahabad, 1969), p. 149. 
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Congo. In the major cities lawlessness prevailed, 
and thousands of Belgians fled. On July 11, Tshombe 
declared that Katanga was seeding from the rest of 
the country and forming a new state allied with 
4 
Belgium . Since Katanga province was the wealthiest 
port of the Congo, possessing the country's richest 
mineral deposits, this act of secession threatened 
the life of the new state. Moreover the provincial 
government of Katanga requested Belgian military 
help in order to suppress the violence that was 
engulfing it along with the rest of the Congo. 
Belgian troops reentered Katanga for the purpose of 
restoring order. But on the following day, the 
Belgian government charged that since the new 
Cojiglese government of premier tumumba had been 
unable to protect the lives and interests of the 
remaining Belgian population Belgian troops would 
march into leopoldville as well. When the Belgians 
reentered the capital, shooting broke out between 
4. UN yearbook, 1962 (New york, P.52. 
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them and Congolese solidiers.At this point the 
.Lumumba regime began to blame riots not on the 
Africans but on the Belgians. The premier accused 
Belgium of aggression and stated that the colonial 
power had conspired with Tshombe to engineer the 
secession of Katanpa province in order to find a 
justification for the reimposition of colonial rule 
what had started as only a local conflict thus 
quickly took on the dimension of a major struggle 
between nationalism and colonalism. 
On July 13, 1960, members of the Lumumba 
regime cabled the US government for aid, but both 
premier Lumumba and President Kasavuba immediately 
disavowed this appeal and stated that it had been 
meant as a request for a UN force composed to 
military personnel from neutral countries, 
Nvertheless, the earlier request touched off a 
sequence of events that turned the Congo into a 
battleground for the superpowers. Soviet premier 
5. Ibid. 
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Khruschev immediately announced that the Congolese 
soldiers had been perfectly right in their mutiny 
against the Belgian Officers. He also claimed that 
the United States and the Western colonial powers 
in NATO had conspired to send Belgian troops into 
the Congo to reimpose colonial status under the 
pretext of restoring order. UN Secretary General 
Dag Hammarskjold called an emergency meeting of 
the Security Council and urged authorization for 
the dispatching of a HN military force to the 
Congo.During the Council Session the Soviet Union 
condemned Belgian earned aggression" and accused 
the United States of collusion with colonialism. 
The United States denounced the Soviet accusation 
as" outrageous and untrue*'. The Security Council, 
in an 8 to 0 vote, called on Belgium to withdraw 
its troops from the Congo and authorized the 
Secretary General to organize a UN Operation in the 
Congo ONUC to be patterned on the model of the 
6. Everyman's United Nations, 8th Edition, 1968, 
p.168. 
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Middle East Force established during the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. Both the Soviet Union and the 
United States voted for the resolution, while 
Britian, France, and Nationalist China abstained. 
Thus, the first UN resolution of the Congo 
reflected at least a temporary consensus between 
the super powers. It was in the national interests 
when he announced that Soviet Union was considering 
direct intervention in the Congo. He stated that 
this might become necessary, since he had received 
a telegram from President Kasaurber and Premier 
Lumumba staking their lives were in danger and that 
they might be compelled to ask for intervention by 
the Soviet Union if the Western camp [did] not 
desist from aggression against the sovereignty of 
7 
the Congo Republic" . The Soviet leader pledged 
Russion support to lumumba and told the west "hands 
off the congo!" on July 2 4, the Soviet delegation 
to the United Nations demanded the evacuation of 
7. New York Times, 2 4 July, 1960. 
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the Belgian "aggressions" within three days. The US 
representative.-Henry cabot lodge, countered with 
the declaration that the United State "would do 
whatever may be necessary to prevent the intrusion 
of any military forces not requested by the United 
Q 
Nations." The Security Council barred unilateral 
intervention and urged the speedy withdrawal of 
Belgian troops. The two super-powers were carefully 
excluded from the international confident. Almost 
2 0,000 troops from twenty nine nations including 
Moreover, Tunisia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Mali, Guinea, 
Ireland, Sweden, and India', all under the UN 
flag- was, deployed through the Congo to prepare the 
way for the more ardous task of building a 
responsible and viable conferese government. 
Even while UN troops were arriving in the 
Congo, further complications developed. Tribal 
antagonisms erupted into local wars; South Kasai, 
following the example of Katanga secured from the 
central government ; and Moise Thonmbe not only 
8. Ibid. 
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refused do dismiss his Belgian advisers and troops 
but announced that he would meet with forces any 
attempt by the United Nations to enter Katanga . 
Since the Republic of Congo was not yet a 
member of the United Nations, the Security Council 
met at the instance of the Secretary General under 
Article 99 of the Charter. The proposal which 
Secretary General Hamerskgold outlined for the 
Congolese assistance was quiet positive and was 
pased on the premise that the only lasting and 
permanent solution to the crisis was to create 
conditions in which the Congolese government would 
be able to pursue its interests and to take care of 
the situation by itself. The nature of the United 
Nations action would be neither an inforcement 
action within the meaning of Articles 41 and 42 of. 
g 
The United Nations Charter nor the Korean type. But 
it would be like all otehr operations where the 
United Nations acted as a soldier and not as a 
fireman. 
9. SCOR 9D0C S/4387), July 14,1960. 
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The Security Council called upon the 
Belgians to withdraw from the Congo and authorised 
the Secretary General to take necessary steps in 
consultation with the Government of the Republic of 
Congo to provide the government with such military 
assistance as may be necessary untill through the 
efforts of the Congolese Governments with the 
technical assistance of the United Nations, the 
National Security Forces might, to the opinion of 
the government be able to fully meet their task. 
The Secretary General's mandate was vague and blank 
and it led to diverse interpretations. The 
Secretary-General reported b?ck to Security Council 
on July 18 indicating the following implications of 
his mandate as he understood it. 
1) Restoration of order was the main task. 
2 ) The United Nations Forces should be 
regarded as "Temporary Security Forces" in 
the Congo with Congolese consent. 
3) It might ^ e considered as serving as an arms 
of the government for the maintenance of 
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order and protection of life, but would 
exclusively be under the UN command and 
could not be permitted to become a party to 
any international conflict. 
4) The Security council'^ permanent members 
would be sought from States of Africa and 
Asia. Seven African battalians were 
requested and airlift specialised units and 
equipments had been made certain to non 
African states. 
5) The UN troops would apply force only in 
self-defence, any initiative in the use of 
force on its part was prohibited 
Evidently, the mission of the UN operation 
in the Congo (the organization des nations Unies du 
Congo) was not the name as was the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) and Uinted Nation Obervers 
Group (UNOGIH). In none of the latters operations, 
the United Nations was not put in charge of the 
low and order within a nation and this by its very 
10. SCOR, 15th year, supplement for July, April, 
September, 1996, Doc, A/4389. 
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nature became the main fource ofttouble for the 
UN in the COg°. This raised new questions about 
United Nations'role in democratic conficts in -tW 
country. Although it was denied that the 
United Nations had any role in the internal 
conflicts of the Congo; the nature of relation 
between the central government of the Congo or 
the Congo operation was unclear further if the 
UN Operation were to be non-intervening, 
non-partisan and without initiative the 
question was how inactively was the operation 
to succeed in the face of the law and and order 
situation in a vast country live the Congo. 
In the light of all these developments, 
Hamarskjord thought it necessary in early 
August to return to the Council for a 
clarification of his mandate. The consensus 
between the super-powers continued to hold. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
Voted for a resolution sponsored by Tunisias 
and Ceylon which declared that the entry of the 
United Nations Force into the province of 
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of Katanpa (was) necessary" and demanded the 
inwddiate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the 
province .The resolution was adopted by a vote of 
9 to 0, with France and Italy abstaining. The 
United States voted for the resolution with some 
misgivings because of the strong action against 
Belgium1, the Sovet Union.' Which wanted even 
stronger action had introduced a draft resolution 
that would have imposed upon the Secrectary 
General the obligation "to take decisive measures, 
without hesitating to use every means to that end" 
to remove the Belgian troops. But in the end, the 
Soviet Union, too, supported the Ceylon-Tunisia 
resolution. 
11. UN Doc. S/442 6 (August 9, 1960). 
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Breakdown of Understanding 
The consensus between the super powers 
broke down when, in the autuirn of 1960, the new 
Congolese government disintegrated into factions. A 
power struggle between Premier Lumumba and 
President Kasavuba erupted. In September, the two 
leaders fired each other from their respective 
positions. In the Melee, a young pro-Western 
coloneL -Toseph Mobutu, took command of the armed 
forces. As a result the position of the political 
leader most sympathetic to the USSR was undermined. 
Under Mobutus rule, many Belgian administrators 
returned to the Congo as unofficial advisers. 
The sup'er powers now took opposing positions 
on the two rival factions in the Congo government. 
The United States passed the United Nations to 
recognize the Kasavubu-Mobutu Government, while the 
Soviet Union begam to support the deposed Lumumba 
with aircrafts and trucks. The UN representative 
who was in charge of this Crifc-i-oal phase of ONUC 's 
operations in the summer and fall of 1960 was 
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Andrew W.Cordier, executive assistant to Dae, 
Hammarskjold; Cordior's overriding concern was to 
uphold the Charter and the resolve law and order in 
the wartorn Congo. In order to stop both Kasavubu 
and Lumumba, from inflaming popular feelings even 
further and to prevent the outbreak of civil war, 
he decided to close all Congolose airports, to 
immobolize troops, and to shut down the national 
radio in Leopoldville. Three years later, Mr.. 
N.T. Fedorenko, the Soviet delegate in the 
Administrative and Budgetary (fifth) Committee of 
the General Assembly, was to declare that by this 
action, "Cordier had adopted a decision that broke 
Lumumba's back" and had thus started the United 
12 Nation* on its pro Western course in the Congo. 
Similarly, many highly placed US officials later 
pointed to Cordier's decision as having stopped the 
Russians" . Cordier himself defended his action on 
the grounds that it had not been taken against one 
of the rival factions or against one of the 
superpowers but for the law of the United Nations 
and the Charter. 
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After the closure of airports and radio 
stations by the United Nations, the Soviet Union 
accused the United Nations of neocolonialism and 
proposed a draft resolution directing the United 
Nations to cease any interference in the internal 
affairs of the Congo and to hand over the airports 
and radio-stations to the Central government. Only 
Poland supported this resolution. Ceylon Tunisia 
abstained and proposed a substitute resolution 
which endorsed the policies and notions of the 
Secretary- General. This resolution was vetoed by 
13 the Soviet Union . The consensus between the 
superpowers had now broked down completely, 
paralyzing the Security Council. The General 
Assembly was immediately called into emergency 
session. 
The superpowers now attempted to line up 
majorities for their opposing positions in the 
General Assembly. The United States led to the 
13. UN DOC, S/4526 (September 17, 1960). 
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forces seeking "to affirm and strengthen the 
Mandate already given to the Secretary General by 
the Security Council". The Soviet Union on the 
other hand, took position that "the United Nations 
Command and the Secretary-General personally have 
unmasked themselves as supporters of the 
14 
colonialism." After intensive and often 
acrimonious debate, an overwhelming majority of the 
Assembly supported the Secretary Generals policy 
appealed to members to refrain from unilateral 
action in the Congo, and created a Oonciliatign 
"Commission made up of African and Asian 
representatives in order to pacify the internal 
dissensions in the Congolese government 
The General Assembly also considered 
another important matter at this time: who should 
represent the Congolese government in that body? 
14. UN General Assembly, Official Records, 4th 
Emergency Special Session, 858th Plenary 
meeting (September 17,1960). 
15. General Assembly Res. 1474 (ES-IV) (September 
20,1960). 
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The Republic of the Congo had been administered to 
membership on September 2 0, but the question of 
seating its representatives had been left to the 
Credentials Committee. Several days later, Guinea 
proposed that, pending a decision of the 
Credentials Committee, representatives of the 
lumumba government should be seated. This proposal 
was supported by Ceylon, Ghana India, Indonesia, 
Mali, Moroe'eo and the United Arab Republic, all of 
which had troops in th4? Congo. It was also 
vigorously defended by the Soviet Union. 
The Guinean proposal brought a sharp 
protest from Kasavubu who immediately set out to 
plead his case at UN Headquarters in New York. On 
November 8, he appeared on the rostrum of the 
General Assembly and demanded the seating of his 
representatives. He was supported in this demand by 
the United States, which claimed that Lumumba 
government did not have effective and stable 
control of the country or the ability to fulfills 
its international obligations. The Assembly debate 
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was adjourned briefly, pending the return from the 
Congo of the Conciliation Commission. But on the 
Credential Committee, which had been given a 
seperate mandate after the vote of the Congo';, 
membership, the west had a clear majority. The 
United States proposed the accridiation of the 
Kasavubu delegation, and after two days of heated 
debate, the motion was adopted in Committee by a 
vote of 6 to 1. Lumumba's supports now had to bring 
their fight into the General Assembly. 
Both super powers lobbied intensively for 
their positions, especially among the African 
members of the Assembly. The United States was 
backed solidly by all the NATO power, most of the 
latin American states, and a majority of the French 
Speaking African members, althogh a considerable 
number of African and Asian states which had 
endorsed the Congo policy of the Secretary-General 
not badked and either abstained or voted against 
it. The final vote on the critical condition 
issue was 53 in favour of sealing the Kasavubu 
15R 
delegation, ?>4 opposed, and 19 abstentions. The US 
position emerged victorious. 
The Congo operation continued, but now it 
was clear that one of the Superpowers no longer 
felt that it served its national interest. Though 
it could still be said that ONUC was impartially 
assisting the legitimate government of the Congo to 
restore order; it was obvious that the Soviet Union 
believed the Kasavubu government to be pro-Western. 
For the reason the USSR vetoed the continuation of 
ONUC in the Security Council and, when the 
Secretary General carried on the operation under 
Assembly authority, mounted the attack against him 
and his office. The United States, of course, 
insisted that it was supporting a disinterested UN 
Operation that thought to restore peace and order 
in the Congo. On wonders, however, what American 
policy might have been had the credentials 
Committee and the General Assembly seated lumumba 
instead of kasavubu. 
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The United Nations' Force in Action 
On February 13, 1961, it was announced that 
Patrice- Lumumba had been killed by hostile tribesmen 
in Katanga. This event which convulsed the Congo 
and threatened to plunge its into civil war, led to 
a partial restoration of super power consensus in 
the Security Council. On February 21, the Council, 
in a 9 to 0 vote with the Soviet Union and France 
abstaining passed its strongest resolution to date, 
urging that "the United Nations take immediately 
all the appropriate measures to prevent the 
occurences of civil war in Congo, including the 
use of force, if necessary in the last resort." 
The resolution also called for" an immediate and 
impartial investigation" of lumumba's death. The 
United States had some misgivings about the 
implications of the use of force, even "in the last 
resort" but the fact that most of the Africa and 
Asian states delegation to vote for it. The Soviet 
Union also fearful of alienating the African States 
16. UN DOC, S/4741 (February 21, 1961). 
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of vetoed the "force in the last resort" 
resolution, abstained. Thus with the reluctant 
approval of one of the superpowers and the full 
consent of the other, the Security Council - no 
longer veto-bound resumed political direction of 
the Congo operation. The African resumed political 
direction of the Congo operation. The African 
States had thus been instrumental in restoring a 
partial consensus between the superpowers. 
During the spring and summer of 1961, the 
Congo presented a picture, of extreme confusion. 
Kasavubu had oppointed Cyrille Aboula as Prime 
Minister of the Congolese Government, but Adoula 
Government was unable to control the entire country 
Lumumba's vice Premier, Antonic Gizenga, 
established the "legitimate Government" of the 
Congo in Stanleyville. And ONUC Forces in their 
efforts to integrate Katanga into the control 
government, ran into mounting resitence not only 
from the Katangese forces of Moise Tshombe but from 
French, Belgian, and South African mercenaries. 
l f i l 
There were numerous casualities on all sides. 
Finally, on September 17, in an effort to pursuade 
Tshombe _ desist, the Secretary-General decided to 
go himself to Kantanga but was killed during a 
night flight when his airplane crashed near Ndola, 
in Northern Rhodesia. The tragic event imperiled 
the entire operation. Nevertheless, top officials 
in UN Secretariat continued Hammarskegold's work. 
On September 21, a provisional cease fire was 
agreed upon, but ratification did not follow untill 
five weeks later. The Security Council met on 
November 13, year days after the election of Othant 
as Acting Secretary General. The continuing need to 
revolve the problem of Katanga resulted in an even 
stronger resolution than the one on February 21, 
with no negative vote and only France and the 
United Kingdom abstaining, ONUC was who authorized 
"to take vigorous action, including the use of the 
requisite measure of force for the immediate 
apprehension of all foreign military personal and 
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political advisors not under the United Nations 
17 Command, and mercenaries . Both the suporpowers 
strongly supported this antisecessionist 
resolution. The United Nations was now clearly 
committed to support Adoula's central government 
against the seccessionst efforts of both Tshomba 
and Gizenga. 
In early December, Acting Secretary-General 
Ufhant directed UN Forces to reestablish law and 
order in Elisabethvilla, the capital of 
Katanga.This initiative resulted in heavy 
fighting.The United Nation moved in heavy 
reinforcements for an all out offensive to gain 
control in Katanga. But some Western powers notably 
Belgium and Great Britain, still hesitated to see 
Tshombe suppressed. Apart from the considerable 
financial interest both countries had in Katanga, 
Tshombe was considerd the only pro-Western anti-
communist, whereas Gizenga was seen as a serious 
communist threat to the congo, and the control 
17. UN DOC, S/PV 982 (November 24, 1961) 8 p.71-75. 
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government as beig at best merely neutral. There 
were supporters of the Tshombe reyime even in the 
United States. Britain refused to supply bombs to 
the United Nations to be used against Katarjya. Some 
Western openion Viewed the danger of communist 
influence as the greatest threat, while the 
anti-colonial African and Asian nations saw Tshombe 
as the tool of "imperialism" and therefore the 
major danger. The Soviet Union backed the anti-
Tshombe forces 
The United Nations was now determined not 
18 to stop untill the secession was ended . UN Forces 
supported by the jet fighters, pressed on; and on 
December 2 0, Tshombe signed the Kitona Agreement, 
acknowleding the authority of the control 
government and promising to comply with the UN 
resolutions requesting the removal of foroign 
mercenaries. But talks to implement this agreement 
• 
18. Lovis B John, "The Role of UN in civil war", 
Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law at the 5fc*ithe Annual Meet, 
25-27 April, 1963.(Washington, DC 1963) p. 15. 
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were not began untill March 1962, and in June, 
after a second breakdown of discussion, it appeared 
that Tshombe still had no intentions of ending his 
secession. Sec .General UThaiffc Submitted a plan for 
the reunification of the Congo, consisting of a 
50-50 sharing of revenues from Katangese mines, 
integration of the Katangese Army with that of 
central government, and discontinuance of separate 
representation abroad, in return for which Katanga 
would receive considerable local autonomy. UThant 
intimated that if this plan was not accepted 
economic pressures would be used, possibly 
extending to a complete trade and financial 
boycost.But neither Belgium, Britain, norths United 
States wanted pressures to go beyond the economic 
sphere, and Tshombe conditional acceptance of the 
plan suffered to overt any economic sanctions. In 
October, the West became pre-occupied with the 
Cuban crisis and secured content to let Congolese 
matters drag on. But the Chinese attack of\ India 
gave rise to Indian pressures to obtain the release 
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of her jtroops in the Congo, numbering over 5,000 
men, to fight in the Himalayas. Moreover, the 
weakening of Premier Adoula's position, occassioned 
by the central government's mobility to enforce its 
authority in Katanga, created a need for the early 
settlement of the Katangese secession. Finally, 
•ONUC, which cashed ,$ 120 million a year, was leading 
the United Nations into serious financial 
difficulties. 
By December 1962 , UThant'S plan to 
incorporate Katanga into the central government had 
not yet been carried out. Thus the pressure for 
economic measures against Tshombe increased.Adoula 
had been requesting such measures since August, but 
at that time both Britain and Belgium had been 
opposed.Nor had the United States actively 
supported such a move. Now Belgium shifted its 
stand, in return for a promise from the central 
government to grant Katanga a large share of the 
mining source. The United States too, threv its 
support behind Adoula. But Britain and the union 
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Minere still refused to go along. Fighting again 
broke out in late December but Elisabethville was 
captured by UN Forces on December 2 8, and the 
important mining centre of Jadotville. fell a week 
later.At first it appeared that Tshombe was going 
to fight to the end and pursue a scorehed earth 
policy which would ruin Katanga, but he surrenderd 
his last stronghold at Kolwezi in return for a 
general amnesty for Katanga's officials. - By the end 
of January 1963, the resistance was ended, but the 
situation continued to be tense throughout the rest 
of the year19. In mid-1964, the last ONUC 
contingents were withdrawn from the Congo, and the 
problems of reconstruction and reconciliation among 
the many warring factions reverted to the Congolese 
Govt* Ironically, Moise Tshombe emerged as the 
new premier of the Congo after the withdrawal of 
UNUC. 
The only UN presence remaining in the Congo 
after June 1964, was the UN civilian operation. This 
19. James Mayall, Africa : The cold war and After 
(London, 1972) 1 p.119. 
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undertaking had begun in July 1960 side by side with 
the UN's peace-keeping function. It aimed to keep 
infact transport and communications , sustain a 
decent level of public health, further education 
and public administration, and develop industry and 
agriculture. During the later part of ONUC's work, 
the civilian operation become almost 
indistinguishable from a large and very ambitious 
teachnical assistance program. Most of the 
operation was financed from the UN Congo Fund. This 
Fund was supported by voluntary contributions from 
twenty governments. The United States at first 
contributed almost three-fourth and later about 
one-half of the expense. The remainder was paid by 
other Western countries. The Soviet Union made no 
contribution. 
The problem of putting the Congo back on 
its feet politically and economically had been a 
staggering one. Indeed, maintaining ONUC in the 
Congo for four years had nearly bankrupted the 
United Nations. Like the kings men the United 
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Nations could not put Congo back together 
again. But the presenceof the organization had at 
least brought a solution within reach. And it had 
prevented a major clash between the superpowers in 
the heart of Africa. 
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CHAPTER-VI 
UNITED STATES'RESPONSES 
TO THE CONGO CRISIS 
Process of Decolonization 
The history of American association with 
the Belgian Congo could be traced as far back as, 
1894 when the US government had established a 
Consulate in response to the efforts made by 
Belgian king Leopord II to harness the rich 
resources of his colony with the help of foreign 
private companies. In the process, one of the 
American companies namely to American Congo company 
had engaged itself in developing the rubber 
plantations in the Congo. The treatment meted out 
to the Congolese native by the Belgian king had 
produced severe criticisms in Britain as well as in 
the United States. The Senate, for instance, had 
moved a resolution in 1893 urging Belgium to improve 
the conditions of the Congolese natives.. It may be 
recalled that American Blacks had also reacted 
violently to the atrocities committed against the 
nativ-e population and had formed an organization 
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called the Congo Reform Association to take up 
their cause. Also the eminent Black leader william 
Edward B.Du Bois had urged at the firm Pan-African 
Conference held in 1900 at Paris that the Belgian 
Congo should become "a great Negro State of the 
world" and at its prosperity should be counted "not 
simply in cash and commerce, but in happiness and 
true advancement of its Black population." 
The name of Congo, however had not figured 
in American circles for a long time untill the 
advent of second World War. But the Congo, in the 
meanwhile had, received wartime prominence because 
of the fact that President of Belgian Union 
Miniere, Edgur Edouard Sengir had provided the 
American scientists with Uranium from the Congo 
which had helped them in the production of the 
first nuclear bomb that had been dropped in the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. 
1. Phillip Forner, W.F.B. DU Bois Speaks: Speaches 
and addresses (Newyork, 1970) P.127 . 
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Art the end of the war and especially after 
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
organization (NATO). Americans had prefered 
not to criticise Belgium for its colonial 
policies. On the other hand Statements had been 
made by prominent Americans highlighting the 
impressive role played by Belgium in the Congo. For 
instance, Senator Allan J.Ellender (Democrat, 
Loisiana) after his visit to the Qongo in 1953 had 
stated; 
" Even Belgian government got out of this 
territory the natives would suffer. To my way of 
thinking it will require years of schooling and 
training before the natives are able to govern 
themselves. Darkness would return here, if the 
settlers leave and permit the natives to take over 
entirely"... 
2 . See Report on United States Foreign Operations 
Africa, By Senator Allen J.Ellender, 1962 
(Washington D.C., 1963) P.17. 
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Chester Bowles a former under Secretary of 
State, at the end of an African tour in 1955 had 
commented "Not even the most optimistic Congolese 
patriot dreamed that in five years his country 
3 
would be an independent state" . 
Despite these adverse remarks, the process 
of decolonization in the fongo had been initiated 
with the independence of Ghana in 1957. Kweme 
Nkrumah, who had led the Ghanian movement to its 
successful outcome, had begun the process in Africa 
by hosting two international conferences at Accra 
called the First Conferences of Independent African 
States (April, 1958) and the All African Peoples' 
Conference (December, 1958). In the wake of hosting 
the latter the Ghanian leader had invited two 
prominent Congolese politicians, namely patrice 
M.Lumumba, and Joseph Kasavubu to attend the 
conference, it may be stated that both the leaders 
3. Chester Bov.O »s, Promises to Keep My years in 
Public Life, (New Delhi, 1972) p.419. 
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after their return had organized public 
demonstration against the Belgian rule. In fact, 
Lumumba had been instrumental in organizing a 
successful riot at Starflayville in 1959, which had 
followed by riots at various places led by Kasavubu 
and other Congolese leaders. It had been 
described as to how those developments had prompted 
Belgi'um to invite the Congolese leaders to a Round 
Table conferences in January I960, as well as to 
announce the intention of its withdrawal from 
Congo on 30 June 1960 after holding parliamentary 
elections in May 1960. The Belgian government also 
had promulgated a constitution called the "Loi 
Fundamentalte"or the "Basic Law". 
The response of the UF.. government to the 
political developments had been one of open support 
for Belgium during this period. This is evident 
from the testimony provided by the Secretary of 
State for Africa, Joseph Salterthwaite before the 
House Sub-Committee on Africa on 5 March 1959. The 
Assistant Secretary stated: 
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"... The Belgian government has carried on 
a very enlightened policy in the Belgian Congo 
atleast to the extent of educating the Congolese to 
become good artisians and raising their standard of 
living to the extent that it is probably higher 
4 
than in any other dependent area " 
The US government had also been careful in 
respecting the sentiments of Belgium in respect of 
its colony. This was evident from the fact that the 
State Department had not allowed some American 
blacks to visit Congo, left that "might 
encourage the African natives to press for main 
independence" Also it may be stated that in May 
1960, the US government had extended an invitation 
to a group of Congolese leaders for a visit to the 
United states and curiously enough, the Belgian 
government in response had sent only its own 
4. See Briefing on Africa, 1959, Hearings Before 
the sub Committee on Africa of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs (Washington DC, 1989) P.8. 
5. Phillip Forner, n.l. p.44. 
176 
nationals on this trip to represent the African 
country. 
The reaction of the Congress towards the 
process of decolonization had been marked by 
expressions of "caution" and "moderation". Senator 
Leverett Saltonstall(Republican, Massachusetts) for 
instance, had stated that the African states while 
striving for their independence, should not indulge 
in "breaking friendship and assistance with their 
former masters" Saltonstall however had gone 
onto add that United States should adopt a balanced 
and creative middle path approach towrds emerging 
it should initiate ste^s 
African States" and that| to induce both Europe and 
Africa to work together as partners" . 
With regard to the process of 
decolonization, however, Americans had been on the 
horns of a dilemma. While the US had felt committed 
to the principle of self-determination in general, 
at the same time it had been obvious of the fact of 
6. Congressional " Vol.116,, pp.15304-15305. 
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its alliances with European colonial powers in a 
global defence net wort, for its own security as 
well as survival. In the circumstances, the US 
policy makers h^d found it hard to challenge the 
African possessions of European powers as any such 
move might weaken or undermine their alliance 
system and endanger the western unity against 
„ . . 7 
Soveit expansionism . 
A powerful section in the Onited States 
however, had urged the Administration for a more 
positive stance towards the issue of 
decolonization. The American Blacks, for instance 
had highlighted the issue by calling upon the US 
government to adopt a more dynamic policy towards 
the colonial question. Another powerful section 
namely, the American Corporations also had a stake 
in the process of decolonization, as it had the 
possibility of opening up opportunities for them 
once colonial ties had been disolved and that the 
7. See Hans J .Morgenthan, The Impasfi€ of Power 
(Chicago, 1967), p.301. 
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privileged positions of their European competitions 
had been removed. Also, military planners, drawiny 
upon the experiences of the Second world war had 
been interested in the potential use of African 
facilities in a possible war against the Soviet 
t)nion. Further the Captains of industry and 
American resources palnners had been alive to the 
importance of ensuring continued access by the US 
to the critical raw material of resources of Africa 
during the period of the Cold War. In the 
circumstances, these interests had urged upon the 
US Administration to respond quickly, if an 
oppening had been created, in the direction of 
decolonization by any of the European powers. 
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Formulation of PS Policy 
The crisis in the Congo and the Gold War 
competition that had followed on its wake had 
provided the American policy-markers with the basic 
stimulus to formulate the United States policy 
towards the central African state. The request for 
military assistance, as mentioned earlier, had 
prompted them to go ahead with that task in a sense 
of urgency, as things had been getting out of hand 
in Oongo. But the formulation of American 
policy towards Congo had to be conceived within 
the broad frame.work of its over all policy towards 
Africa evolved since world war II. Infact, Africa 
did not constitute a "priority area" since the 
Second Would war, as it had regarded as the 
"responsibility" and "preserve" of European 
colonial powers which had been the allies of the 
United States in the Cold War against the Soviet 
Union, American policy-makers, had therefore sought 
to refrain themselves from indulging in acts of 
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interference in the affairs of the Black 
p 
continent . The factors which had prompted to 
invoke a change in the US attitude had been the 
Cold War, the process of decolonization, American 
Strategic interests and the need to have access to 
African raw materials, the provention of extension 
of Soviet influence, and building of economic, 
political and cultural relations which had been 
aimed at inducing the African countries to remain 
oriented towards the west in general and to the 
United States in particular. 
The Cold War had prompted the US government 
to think pragmatically in terms of the advantages 
which a friendly Africa had offered as against a 
situation in which the countries of the Black 
Continent had taken into Soviet orbit. The 
manifestation of this situation had already become 
evident in the Middle East as well as in the North 
8. Andrew M . Kamrack, The Fconon ics of Africans 
of .^ African Development (New York, 1967) P.2 64. 
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Africa. In the existing scenario the US policy 
makers, had naturally sought to resist any further 
extension of Soviet influence from these areas to 
infiltrate in to Black Africa. The advent of Nikita 
Khrusch^v to power in the USSR as well as the 
skillful policies followed by him to ,Woo the 
emergent Afro-Asia states had prompted America 
policy makers to adopt policies calculated to him 
the goodwill of the elites of emerying Black Africa 
States and thereby to prevent the growth of soviet 
influence. 
The formulation of American policy towards 
Africa, had been a by product of the East-West 
Struggle and by its overall objectives of 
continent. As a global policy, the United States 
had proceeded along two levels namely the military 
and the ideological. Militarily, the United States 
had sought to prevent the Soviet Union from 
"Stepping over the lines of demarcation which had 
been established at the end of the world War II" 
whereas ideologically, American interest had 
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consisted "in the denial of African continent to 
military and ideological conquest by the Soviet 
Union" . 
Within this over all framework, the US 
government had responded to the crisis in the Ponc,o 
by advising the African government to look for UN 
support in order to maintain law and order in the 
country. Reflecting on the development, President 
Eisenhower in his memoir had ruled out the 
deployment of US troops in the <~ongo even as part 
of the UN contigent. He had mentioned, however, of 
his decision to place a US naval attack carrier on 
the month of the river Congo for its possible use 
in the case of emergency. The position of US 
Administration had been reflected in the action by 
its officials. The US Ambasador to the UN, Henry 
Cabot lodge, for instance, had spoken energetically 
in favour of a UN Force and had pledged American 
support for the same in the form of transport, 
communication as well as food for the Congo. The US 
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Ambassador Timberlake, also had urged upon his 
government to send 100 tons of flour to the conyo 
immediately, "less hunger riots in Leopoldville 
9 
should turn into anti-white riots" . 
The Administration however had been 
confronted with the problem of providing security 
as well as safety for about 2000 Americans who had 
been left stranded in various danger zones of the 
country. Ambassador Timberlake in this regard had 
sought for permission from the Leopoldville 
government for possible use of American helicopters 
to evacuate its citizens from the rongo. After the 
permission had been granted, the US government had 
undertaken a massive airlift and had succeeded in 
evaluating about 1500 American citizens 
As regards the reasons as to why the US had 
acted through the UN, former Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk had stated: 
9. New York Times, 14 July 1960, p.6. 
10. For details on the US airlift see Ibid, 9 July, 
1960, p.6. 10 July, 1960, p.13, 16 July, 
1960,p.3. 
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"...Why was this decision taken? The alternative 
to United Nations intervention would have been 
evidence and chaos and a ready-made opportunity 
for Soviet explanation which the United States 
would have been compelled to encounter" 
According to Assistant Secretary Mennen 
williams, the United States had decided to support 
the Congolese government economically but had 
refused to provide troops in order to "avoid a direct 
East-West confrontation in the Congo" Former US 
Ambassador to the UN, Adlai stvenson had maintained 
that direct intervention would have been 
interpreted as an attempt by the United States to 
reimpose colonial rule. 
After receiving the Congolese request for 
American Military support the discussion within the 
administration had revolved round three options 
namely (1) to do nothing (2) direct US intervention 
(3) to work through the UN. Cleveland, had gone on 
11. Ibid. 17 July, 1960. 
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to add that after careful thinking the option 
12 
number (3) had been accepted for implementation 
The first two options had not been considered 
seriously since the UN option had been "the 
instictive reaction of Eisenhower and top echelon-s 
of the state. The UN option had been accepted 
becuse of one common perceptions that had shared 
by key members of the Eisenhower Administration 
namely, that the Congo had not been vital to US 
security and that the Soviets would not intervene 
unless the UN efforts had been discredited as well 
as that a success in the multilateral effort would 
enhance the viability and effectiveness of the UN. 
The former UN chief representative in Katanga, 
Coner Cruise 01 Brien had been of the opinion that 
"though the decision to turn to UN was a gamble", 
the US had been confident that it would" win its 
points by a kind of parliamentary diplomacy which 
it had successfully negotiated with Afro-Asian 
12. Ibid, 20 July, 1960, p.14. 
1RF 
nationg" 
The decision regarding the response to the 
Congo crisis had been taken after a series of 
meetings between top officials of the US 
Administration, namely, Secretary of State, 
Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State 
Livingston Merchant and Assistant Secretaries of 
state Francis O. Wilcox (International 
Organization) Foy D.Kohler (European Affairs) and 
Joseph C. Satterthw^ite (African Affairs). There 
had been no evidence of a bureau level dispute on 
the issue, as the unanimous consensus had been in 
favour of the UN option. 
This unanimity had been reflected in the 
reported remarks of Herter that "if the UN did not 
14 
exist, one would have to be created", 
13. Conor Cruise O' Brien, Conflicting Concept of 
United Nations (Leads, 1964), p.6. 
14. Pisano, Jane G., "Policy Making and Policy 
Type, Six cases of US-African Policy", (New 
Delhi, 1972 ) p. 92 . 
187 
The absence of controversy on the UN option 
could be attributed to the fact that European view 
had predominated within the Administration. It may 
be pointed out in this connection that the bureau 
of Africa under the Eisenhower Administration had 
been staffed largely by officiers who had spent 
long years on European assignments. Also prominent 
officials like Secretary Herter, Under Secretary 
Douglas Dillon as well as an influential advisor to 
the President Eisenhower namely Robert Murphy had 
all shared a common European like . President 
Eisenhower himself had a strong European bias, 
which could be found from the remarks made in his 
memoir that he had been specially interested in the 
development of close ties between the Oongo and her 
former European ruler. Though the decision had been 
largely influenced by the combined efforts of the 
bureau of Africa as well as international 
organization the options of several veteran 
15. New York Time, 24 July, 1960.p.10. 
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Furopeanists had been taken into account at the 
policy-formation process 
The UN option might have appeared satisfying 
also to the NATO partners of the United States 
despite the fact of their strong sentiments and 
bias in favour of Belgium. This is evident from the 
Statement made by the British Prime Minister Harold 
McMillan on the floor of the Parliament, that the 
withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo before 
the arrival of a UN force would have left "a 
complete vaccum in the unsettled new republic." 
The option of French government, however was that 
"the Belgian forces had not only the right but the 
duty to protect lives when public order had broken 
1 8 down in Congo." It may be stated in this connection 
that while France and Britain had been supporting 
16. Ibid. 15 July, I960, p.3. 
17. Ibid, 16 July, 1960, p.3. 
18. Ibid. 17 July, 1960. p.8. 
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Brussels openly, the US government had been working 
behind the scenes through the UN to protect the 
19 
Belgian interest in the Congo. 
Thus, the US government had approached 
Congo problem in the initial phase of the crisis by 
turning to the United Nations in order to avoid the 
Cold War conflagration in Black Africa. It had to 
remain watchful, however, with regard to the 
evolution of political developments in the Congo. 
The UN option, had been considered as apropriate 
since the American policy makers had probably made 
the calculation that it would be possible on their 
part to keep the political developments in th« 
Congo under control through interventions by 
friendly UN officials working in the ONUC. 
19. Ibid. 16 July, I960, p.3 
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The United States in the United Nations 
The United States on its part and its 
Western supporters did not in the beginning want any 
bold steps for the withdrawal of Begians from the 
Congo, as proposed by USSR. Later, however USA 
along with some European and Afro-Asian states 
supported vigorous steps for the immediate 
withdrawal of Belgian troops and other foreign 
elements from the "ongo, for the Congolese unity 
2 0 
and to preserve peace in Tongo 
During Eisenhower period Lumumba who was 
firescely anti-Belgian had held the stage in 
^•ongo as the central figure and that the US 
Administration had been severaly affected and 
plagued by his charismatic personality. As he 
wanted a speady withdrawal of Belgian troops from 
his country, he made appeals to the governments of 
Soviet Union as well as radical African states.The 
20. Hoffmann Stanley, "In Search of a Thread: The 
United Nations in the Congo". The United 
Nations Political System; (New York, 1967). 
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United States in the circumstances had felt greatly 
concerned as the Soviet Union had responded 
energetially to Lumumba's request and had actually 
pledged to intervene along with the troops 
belonging to the radical Affrican States placed 
under the UN command. The matter/ had headed for a 
tense situation for the United states as it had 
gathered concrete evidence of active Soviet 
involvement in the form of ^supplies, of arms as 
well as military and technical assistance to poster 
2 1 
up Lumumba's efforts in the congo 
In the meanwhile the situation had 
aggrevated in Congo by the power struggle that 
had ensured between Kasavufcu. and Lumumba as each 
one of them had dismissed the other through radio 
broadcasts to the nation. On 12 September I960, 
however, no Congolese Parliament in a surprise move 
had voted to support Lumumba. 
21. New York Times, 2 0 August, 1960. 
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The next stage in the struggle for power, 
had taken place at the UN in New York as both 
Kasavubu and lumumba had moved over there to press 
for their respective recognition. The matter, 
however, had been discussed and votel upon first in 
the Credential Committee and final in the General 
Assembly on 22 November I960. The voting at the UN 
had been marked by hectic UR lobbying in favour of 
Kasavubu, which had eventually resulted in ensuring 
victory for the Congolese President over Lumumba. 
The UN voting had finally sealed the 
political fate of Lumumba as soon after his return 
to Leopoldville, Congolese leader had been arrested 
and put inside prison under the orders of the 
Mobutr> government which could be characterized as 
"anti-communist" " anti-Lumumba" as well as 
22 
"pro-west" 
The whereabouts of Lumumba after his arrest 
could not be traced untill February 1961, when 
22. Ibid, 30 September, 1960. 
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reports were received to the effect that he had 
been murdered at the hands of his unknown enemies 
somewhere on the way as he was proceeding towards 
2 3 
Stanleyville after escaping from the Jail 
When John F.Kennedy assumed the Presidency 
he had also encouraged 'American initiatives in the 
form of behind the scene activities for reconvening 
of the Congolese parliament, as well as for the 
formation of a federal government consisting of all 
Congolese factions. At the same time he had 
authorized the Defence Department to draw up a 
"contingency Plan" with a view to prevent the 
Soviet Union from providing military supplies to 
the Gizenga Government in Stanleyville and had in 
this regard altered a Naval Task Force operating in 
the Gulf Guienea for a possible "emergency" role in 
the Congo. The Aministration had further encouraged 
the efforts made by the UN Concitiation Commission 
and President Kasavubu for a series of meetings 
2 3. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemy, ACTA Story 
(Newyork, 1978). p. 105. 
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between Congolese leaders which had eventually 
resulted in recovering of the national 
parliament the loihvanium University, near 
2 4 
Leopoldville on 27 June 1961 
The more challenging task that remained 
before the ONUC and the US government following the 
submission of Gizenga had been the presence of 
Belgian troops as well as the "assorted white 
mercenaries" recruited by Tshombe from Belgium, 
Rhodesia and South Africa. It had been further 
complicated by the fact that Tshombe had continued 
with the issue of his own currency and also that he 
had successfully prohibited any efforts at hoisting 
of the Congolese national flag over katanga. 
The UN operation was commenced on 2 7 August 
1961 under the title "Rumpunch" to disarm and case 
out no Katangan gendarmes. It had been supplemented 
by another military operation called "Round one". 
These tough actions had caused huge uprottrs in 
2 4 . Congressional Record, Vol. 108, p.15546. 
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British, French and in NATO circles, which had 
prompted in UN Secretary General Dag HammarskjoId 
to undertake a trip to Katanga to review the 
situation as well as to make an attempt to soften 
the feelings of the NATO members. But while 
travelling to Ndola in Rhoi^esia to discuss the 
Katanga situation with Tshombe Hammarskjold had met 
his tragic end. His death, however, had forced the 
UN Authorities to sign a ceasefire agreement with 
Ts;hombe on 30 September 1961. 
The United States government had provided 
its solid backing to these UN operations despite 
strong words of denunciation that had been voiced 
by its NATO allies. Ambassador Stevenson, for 
instance, had maintained that the "UN operations 
would go down in history to the credit of the UN" 
and also Assistant Secretary Harban Cleveland har* 
hailed the UN action as" the most dramatic 
2 5 illustration of the UN power for peace " Further 
2 5. New York Times,18 September, 1961. 
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Assistant Secretary williams had stated that the US 
government had recognised the need of "seeing 
through the UN operated to a successful 
. • „ 26 
conclusion . 
By way of a concrete measures of support, 
the US government had provided four transport 
planes to the UN for the movement of its troops as 
well as the equipments inside the Congo. 
Being authorized by a fresh resolution of 
the Security Council on 25 November 1961, the UN 
representative in Katanga, O'Brien had once again 
launched another military operation called "Round 
Two" for the expulsion of Katangan gendarmes and 
mercenaries. The operation which had taken place at 
the disposal of the UN Command in the Congo. The US 
government had also provided the UN Operation with 
its most vocal and strong support which had been 
evident from the remarks made by under Secretary 
George Ball that "if Katanga is not peacefully 
26. Ibid. 19 September, 1961. 
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integrated the Congo will face Civil war and 
2 7 
anarchy and be open to communist penetration. UN 
had become largely dependent on US support during 
these operations in view of the strong hostilities 
that had been demonstrated by its NATO allies 
towards "Round Two* 
In the final showdown between the UN troops 
and the Katanga forces, called the "Round Three" 
started on *4 December 1962 and had continued till 
2 1 January, 1963, Tshombe had made the announcement 
of his surrender as well as the termination of his 
two and half years of secession. 
Though the response of the congress to the 
military measures taken in Katanga (Round Three) 
had no been favourable, the number of supporters 
for the American policies in Congo had increased 
considerably and that their views could be turned 
up in the words of Senator Joseph S.Clark: that 
the UN and US policies in the Congo had been a 
27. Ibid. 11 December, 1961. 
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"striking success". The UN offensive against 
Katanga and the involvement of active support as 
provided by the United States, however, had 
represented a stormy chapter in President Kennedy's 
active involvement in the affairs of the Congo. 
"Thus, the year 1963 had started rather 
auspiciously for the Central government with the 
reintegration of South Kasai in the fall of 1962 as 
well as the successful completion of Round Three on 
21 Janury 1963. The integration of Katanga, however 
had prompted Tshombe and a group of his suporters to 
leave the breakaway province as they had been 
fearful of reprisal at the hands of the control 
Government. The Leopoldville government, however, 
had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the 
2 8 
whole situation in Katanga 
President Johnson inherited from the Kennedy 
Administration a "troubted Congo", with the 
immediate prospects for the country being "not-too 
28. Congressional Record, Vol. 109, PP 4564-4566, 
p.4331. 
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promising" despite the integration of Katanga.In 
fact, the President had been confronted with the 
immediate problem of the withdrawal of the UN 
troops from the Congo scheduled for 31 December 
1963, owing to the fact that UN had been faced with 
almost financial backruptcy due to the refusal of 
France and the Soviet block countries to meet their 
contributions arising out of UN dperations in the 
Middle East and in the Congo. While the Soviet 
Union had demanded that the US and NATO powers 
should meet the entire cost of both the UN 
Operations, the Western powers led by the United 
States had requested the UN Secretary Geneal, U. 
Thant to reconsider his decision with regard to the 
withdrawal of UN troops. They had requested the UN 
to maintain at least a "token" presence in the 
Congo. A compromise agreement had eventually been 
worked out by which the tenure of the ONUC had 
been extended for six months still 30 June 1964. 
The prospects of UN troops withdrawal had the 
most demoralizing effect on both Adoula and the US 
2on 
governments.As for the Adoula government it had to 
confront with the immediate threat of 
disintegration due to the two factors, namely the 
lack of enthusiasm on the part of political leaders 
and factions in the country towards process of 
national reconciliation. As far as the United 
States was concerned, it had not only been worried 
about the "internal security gap" in the Congo, but 
also because the UN had become the "deterrent" to 
political violence" and a "dependable military arms 
2 9 for the Adoula Government." Thus on the make of 
UN troop withdrawal the US government had given its 
major attention to the reorganization of the 
Congolese army and had entrusted the task of its 
military mission in Congo (COMISH) established 
in August 1963. 
The US Government had helped to reorganize 
the Congolese police with an assistance of 
$538,000, following the police mutiny at 
29. G.Menneh William, n.2. p.800. 
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Leopoidvilla in May 1963. Further it had provided 
178.6 million in the form of economic assistance of 
the Congo government apart from sustaining Adoula 
in power. It may be stated that the Congolese 
treasury had become practically barren during his 
three year tenure as the Prime Minister. In the 
words of Catherine Hosky^np by 1964 Congo had 
become the first country in Africa to be solely 
30 depended on American assistance". As the events 
had unfolded, the US government had succeeded in 
the UN to assume a new role for itself as the 
» protector*
 Df Adoula regime through its 
generalizd support and specific interventions" in 
Congo. 
30. Hoskynes,Catherine The Congo Since Independence, 
(London, 1965) p. 471. 
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CONCLUSION 
Every President,beginning with Harry S.Truman 
who assured the first General Assembly on October 
2 3,1946 that the policy of the United States would be 
to"support the United Nations with all the resources 
we posses not as a temporary expedient but as a 
permanent partnership." indeed had a profound impact 
on the subsequent Presidents who further reiterated 
to defend the cause of international peace and 
security in every corner of the world. 
With the post world war IT division between 
the communist bloe and the West, the United States 
quickly emerged in the security Oouncil as a leader 
of the democratic nations in the UN and fought the 
diplomatic battle to promote the right of 
self-determination of every nation and determined to 
stop the communism by every means not only in Europe 
but in Asia and Africa well. A large majority of the 
1. The United States and the United Nations Report, 
by president to -Congress for the year 1946, 
(Washington, 1947). 
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US public was in favour of the general support to the 
United Nations for achieving these goals. The former 
Senator Barry Goldwater eloquently once expressed the 
Americans willingness to support the functioning of 
the United Nations in these words : "The United 
Nations —is at best an instrument of international 
accord. It is useful to the West now for a special 
reason; it provides a forum in which to discuss 
2 
communist violation of the Charter." 
Controversies arising in the Cold War 
situation had been dominated by direct and serious 
conflict between the major communist and non 
communist powers because the interest of the United 
States had been adversely affected by such disputes. 
The United States was compelled to move to the United 
Nations. Wherever feasible to maximize support for 
its own strategy and to confound the communist enemy. 
But because of the intense hostility and massive 
2. "My proposal for a 'can win' Foreign Policy", 
Life, January 17,1964 . 
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power involved, it became difficult for the United 
States to mobilise strong support for its position in 
these cases within the United Nations. Despite the 
difficulties, the United States and its allies 
considered advantageous to use the United Nations as 
a major instrument for dealing with some of the most 
3 
dangerous Cold War conflicts . The study is concerned 
with two major cases of international crises in 
Korean and Congo. During the intense Cold war period 
of first two decades of the formation of the United 
Nations the Korean crisis (1950-53) and Congo crisis 
(1960-64) lingered for very long duration. Congo was 
the largest military operation which the UN had been 
involved, not only the largest militury operation, 
but the largest financial operation as well. The UN 
maintained a force of some 20,000 (ONUC) at the cost 
of over $ 1000,000,000 a year. The budget for 
maintaining the UN forces in the Congo had been 
3. H.Field Haviland, "The United States and United 
Nations" International Organization (Boston, 
1965), Vol.20 p.644. 
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greater than the total normal budget of the UN prior 
to that activities. In the operation in Korea, it was 
4 
involved with a larger number of forces. But it was 
somewhat questionable whether it could be called a UN 
operation. The UN had delegated authority in the 
Korean matter to the United States and the forces 
were in large measure from the United States forces 
and the forces from the South Korea. Infact the 
United Nations came nearest to establishing a 
fighting force. It did create a United Nations 
Command and requested ftiembers to make forces 
available to it. But this was a mere an extension of 
existing command of the United States in Far Eastern 
military operation under the command of General Mac 
Arthur. The action taken by the Arthur and his forces 
was in fact United Nations action and of course 
justified norms of international law. 
The Secretariate of the UN had no part in 
operation or even deployment of troops. By the end of 
4. Quincy wright "Legal Aspects of UN Action in Congo 
"Foreign Affairs Report, Indian Council of World 
Affairs (New Delhi,March 1962) p.2 3. 
5. Guenter Weisberg, The International status of 
United Nations (New York, 1960) pp. 78-77. 
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1950, the only foreign ground troops fighting by the 
American side were from the United Kingdom, 
Australia, France, Greece, Turkey, the Netherland, 
the philipines, Thailand and Turkey . The Unified 
Command in Korea consisted of about a quarter of 
million American compared with only about 36,000 
troops from all other Member States combined. 
Korean crisis had got special significance as 
it had extended the dimension of the moral authority 
of the General Assembly. The General Assembly became 
a definite alternative to the Security Council for the 
first time in Korean crisis. The United States was 
successful in shifting the discussion from the 
Security Council to the General Assembly which was 
dominated by Angf '-American majority in 1950s and 
60s. It was noticiable through Uniting for Peace 
Resolution of 1950 which demonstrated for the 
empowerment of General Assembly as the generation of 
6. In 1951, group troops were also furnished by 
Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Luxemburg and 
New Zealand. 
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international peace and security in case the 
consensus fail in the security Control. The Security 
Council had been unable to act owing to acute 
differences among its permanent members. The Assembly 
was able to play a complementary role by endorsing 
the resolution of the Security Council . The lesson 
learnt from the Korean experienced proved fruitful in 
resolving the Congo crisis. When the then Secretary 
General proceeded to recruit forces he emphasised the 
need that the conditions for the forces to be sent 
should be that they should include no forces from any 
of the great powers. It was realised that to have a 
genuine UN forces it ought to be recruited from a 
good many of the smaller countries or from countries 
at least which were not the major protogonists in the 
cold war. It was also recognized that it would be 
desirable to have a large number of forces from Africa 
and this was one of the provisions made in the 
recruitment of froces. At the same time it was also 
7. GAOR, Session 7, Plen. mtg. 431. p.747. 
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provided that there should be some troops from 
outside Africa, so that it could be regarded, as 
United Nations universal operation . This shows a 
tremendous influence in strengthening the UN against 
the opinion of one protogonist or other in the Cold 
War, could be exercised by the uncommitted states. 
The uncommitte^-tateFoonsisted a large proportion of 
the members of the General Assembly and it appeared 
that these states had expressed their solidarty with 
the UN mission in Korea as they felt that United 
Nations also could protect "heir interests in the 
World. 
Management of Korean Realities 
The United States had pursued two major 
objectives in Korea: first, to achieve the 
establishment of a Unified, independent and 
democratic Korea in accordance with the promise of 
the Cairo Declaration and secondly pending or failing 
the achievement of that goal to contain communist 
8. Quincy weight, n.6. p.30. 
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expansion and prevent the communists from taking over 
the whole of Korea. During period September 1947 to 
June 1950, the emphasis at least in the public 
statements was on achieving the first objectives, a 
satisfactory settlement of the whole problem. From 
June 1950 on the defeat of communist military 
aggression became a dominant motive in invoking 
United Nations action, though the desirability of 
achieving a satisfactory political settlement was 
never lost. 
When the Soviet Union entered the war against 
Japan on August, 1945, which posed the US government 
the question of where to draw the dividing line for 
the US and Soviet occupation zones on the Korean 
peninsula. Some American diplomats, seeing through 
the Soviet manoeuvre recommended that their 
government speed up military actions of the Far East 
and US troops accept surrender of the Japanese troops 
at least in the entire peninsula to prevent 
2in 
governmental forces entry into Korea. But when Soviet 
troops promptly initiated direct military action 
against Northern Korea after their entry into the 
war, on Aug. 9, the nearest American forces were on 
Okinawa Island. 
Under the circumstances that UN government 
accepting a recommendation from Colonels G.H. 
Bonesteel, who later seved as commander in Chief of 
the United Nations Command in Korea and Dean Rusk 
(Later Secretary of State) of the war Department 
General Staff on August 11,1945 decided that Soviet 
Union would be authorized to receive the Japanese 
surrender north of the 38th Parallel and the U.S 
would receivetKe South of that lint . On August 13, 
the Plan was transmitted to and accepted by the 
government of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and 
9. Harry S.Truman, Year of Trial and Hope, (New York, 
1956) Vol.2, p.317. 
10. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1945; The British Commonwealth and 
the Far East (Washington, DC, 1969). 
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China. It was sent on August 15 to the Mac. Arthur 
Command for immediate implementation of General 
order 
Order No.l. The |provided that after the US and USSR 
occupation commandery of the Korean peninsula 
received the surrender of Japanese troops in their 
respective areas, the civil administrative function 
should be integrated and turned over to a committee 
of commanders from these countries taking part in 
the occupation of the Korean peninsula to place the 
entire area of Korea under integrated control. The 
order on the other hand helped turn the military 
division by stipulating that during the receipt of 
surrender period the US and USSR occupation 
commanders would be responsible for the 
administration of civil affairs in their respective 
areas . The Soviet forces, who entered northern 
Korean ahead of the America landing in South Korea, 
had no time embarked on a carefully prepared 
scenario to build a communist society in their 
occupation area of North Korea. 
11. Ibid. 
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At 4 a.m. Sunday, June 25,1950, the North 
Korean forces unleashed an unprovoked attack all 
along the 38th parallel. Before the invasion many 
reports on the impending invasion were filed to the 
Army Headquarters from frontline divisions. But Army 
Generals did not take them seriously. Unexpectedly 
the United States took speedy action to repel the 
aggressors. On a US initiative, the United nations 
Security Council adopted a revolution on June 27, 
1950 in the Soviet delegates absence, which stated 
the armed action by north Korea was by express act 
of aggression. Counter to the UN Charter and 
called upon the members of the United Nations to 
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as 
might be necessary to repel the armed attack. 
On July 7th Security council resolved to 
establish a Unified Command Under the United States 
for the integrated control of forces which UN member 
countries dispatched to Korea and requested the US 
to designate the commander of such forces. Accepting 
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the resolution the United States established the 
United Nations Command in Tokyo on July 8 with 
General Douglas Mac. Arthur as its Commanding 
General. 
On the battlefield, the North Korean invasion 
forces advanced as far as the Poyong-Taeyu-Masan 
Poimeter. But the tide of war soon turned aside. 
Seoul was recaptured on September 28. The UN forces 
and the South Korean Army pushed the retreating 
North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel and 
captured Pyongyang on October 2 n. The South Korean 
6th Division reached the border town of Chosan 
along the Yalu River on October 26, 1950. The 
unification of the Korean people was certainly 
within sight as the Communists were driven back and 
were badly disarmed both by the United Nations and 
United States troops. General Mac. Arthur declared 
that all UN forces could return home before 
Christmas after successfully ending operations. 
Towards the end of October, however the situation 
began to change. 
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Red Chinese forces intervened in the war as 
"peoples volunteer Army" and began to push the UN 
forces back to the South in "human wave" tactics. 
The UN forces/ heavily outnumbered by more than one 
million Chinese troops, retreated South of the 38th 
Parallel. For a period of roughly years thereafter, 
bloody battles ragged along a line cutting across 
the central part of the peninsula in hot contest for 
each mountain peak and every inch of land. 
Truce talks began July 10,1951, between the 
United Nations Command and the communist forces 
(North Korea and Red Chinese Armies). The ceasefire 
negotiations dragged on for about two years before 
the artimistice was finally signed on July ?7, 1953, 
by ONTj'c Commander General Mark Clark, North Korean 
Commander kin II-Sung and Chinese "Peoples volunteer 
Army" commanding peng Te-huaian. Three years war Was 
thus brought to a halt but it could not unify the 
divided Korea. 
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American Experience in Congo 
American Policy in Congo crisis was designed 
to support the principles of national Unity and 
indepence, internal security, and territorial 
integrity. The United States faithfully and 
consistently supported the central government of the 
Congo since June 1960-under President Eisenhower, 
under President Kennedy, and under President Lyndon 
B. Johnson-and under Congolese President Karavubu and 
his Prime Minister, Iko, Adoula, and Tshombe. The US 
Administration devoted more attention to the rest of 
Africa Combined because of the immediate dangers, 
commercial opportunities and available expanding 
market. Wayne Fredericks of the State Department's 
African Bureau, said: "if we don't have a Congo 
12 Policy1, we don't have an African Policy". 
Washington was deeply concerned with the 
lawlessness and disorder that followed the July 1960 
mutiny of Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC), Prime 
Minister Patric Lumumba's dismissal of its Belgian 
12. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. A Thousand Days 
(Boston, 1965) pp. 635. 
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Office corps, and exodus of Belgian administrative 
and technical personnel from the Congo. 
The Department of State feared that the Soviet Union 
woulo exploit the chaos for purposes inimical to 
stability and the best interests of the Congolese, 
and regarded Moscow, not, Brussels, as the chief 
threat to the Congo's independence. Although the 
United States was the only government to receive a 
formal invitation from Leopofdville to provide 
military assistance of restore law and order, 
Washington from the outset and for a variety of 
reasons channelled its aid through the United 
Nations . 
Direct US military aid was quickly ruled out 
lest it be used as a pretext for more substantial 
Soviet intervention on behalf of Lumucba which could 
lead confrontation of the two great powers. T'he 
leaders did not feat a political contest with the 
communist bloc in Congo, but they wanted the contest 
to be conducted by acceptable rules and at minimum 
risk. 
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Given these considerations, US Ambassador-
designate clare H.Timbes^ake advised President 
Joseph Kasuvubu and Prime Minister Lumumba to appeal 
for UN aid. This was on July 10, arid, on July 12, 1960a 
group of Congolese cabinet members asked Timberlake 
to request 3,000 American troops to restore 
order. At his insistence they formalized the request 
in writing. Since the matter was already before the 
UN Secretary, General, President, Eisenhower 
declined to act unitaterally on the invitation. Two 
and a half years later Assistant Secretary of State 
Harlan Cleveland summed up the initial US response: 
"Should the Congo's chaos be attacked by a 
hositility assembled international peace force; or 
should we send in a division of United States 
Marines; or should, we just sit on our hands and 
wait for our adversaries to exploit the situation?" 
We wisely decided, he continued, "not to risk a 
confrontation of nuclear powers in the Central 
13 
Africa." We believed, he added, that a UN force 
would serve the national interest of the United 
States. 
13. US Department of State Press Resease 34, January 17, I9fi3 p.34. J 
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By virtue of its power and active 
involvement, the United States had a greater impact 
on the Charer, effectiveness and duration of the UN 
Congo operation than any other government. Though it 
sent no troops and was not a member of the Secretary 
Generals Congo Advisory Committee, the opinion could 
not have been authorized without Washington's 
assurance of political and financial and logistical 
support. Had American support been withdrawn at any 
point, the efforts would have collapsed or been 
greatly reduced in size. The widespread assumption 
of consistent US support made possible the 
political, financial and manpower support from many 
other states. Especially important were the troops 
contributions of India and Ethiopia, each of which 
made available more than 100,000 men. 
Washington became the informal leader of a 
relatively stable coalition of states that 
supported, each for its own reasons, the UN 
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resolutions and their interpretation and 
implementation by Hamersk Ford and UThant. As the 
only great power and the only permanent member of 
the Security Council that steadfastly backed the 
operation, the United State was inevitably thrust 
into a position of influence and responsibility. 
This leadership role was further strengthened 
because there was substantial concurrence between 
the US goals of stability in Central Africa and the 
prevention of communist penatration, and the 
Security Council resolutions calling for the 
restoration of law and order and prohibiting states 
from unilateral intervention. 
Washington turned both as a generator and a 
balance wheel. It generated ideas and plans and 
constantly sought to achieve a working consensus 
among the associated states. The Secretary General, 
the senior members in the "Congo Club" and UN 
officials in Leopold vjTie and Elizabethville 
frequently sought American counsel. US officials,vho 
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offered technical, military and political advice, as 
did the officials of other interested states. The 
United States acted as a balance wheel between the 
sometimes irreconcilable positions of the militant 
Afro-Asian leaders and more conservative European 
Spokesmen. It was precisely this mediating role that 
drew criticism from both sides. Nevertheless, the 
United States and the United Nations established the 
credibility of ensuring peace and security whenever 
and wherever threatened. Both Korean and Congo 
crises gave a new impetus to the American policy 
makers in the Ftate Department that the United 
States had responsibility towards the world 
community to promote the rights of 
self-determination and self-assertion either be in 
political, social, cultural or economic spheres of 
any nation in any parts of the world. 
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APPENDIX-I* 
SELECT ON RESOLUTIONS O KOREA 
RESOLUTION S/1501, 25 JUNE 1950 
The Security Council, 
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 
1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established 
government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea 
where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to 
observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea 
reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid 
expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which 
were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only 
such government in Korea"; 
Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution 
of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might 
follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results 
sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete 
independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation 
described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces 
the safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea 
and might lead to open military conflict there; 
Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea 
by forces > from North Korea, 
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace, 
I . Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities 
of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel; 
I I . Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea 
(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation 
with the least possible delay, 
(6) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th 
parallel, and 
(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this reso-
lution; 
III . Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations 
in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to 
the North Korean authorities. 
* Rosolyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping- 1946-1967/ 
Documents and Commentary, Vol.2, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1970. 
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RESOLUTION S/11511, 27 JUNE 1950 
The Security Council, 
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by 
forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, 
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and 
Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith 
their armed forces to the 38 th parallel, and 
Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea 
that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor with-
drawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures 
are required to restore international peace and security, and 
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations 
for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, 
Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assis-
tance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack 
and to restore international peace and security in the area. 
RESOLUTION S/1588, 7 JULY 1950 
The Security Couticil, 
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by 
forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, 
Having recommended that Members of the United Nations . furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed 
attack and to restore international peace and security in the area, 
1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and 
peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 
1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack 
and thus to restore international peace and security in the area; 
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the 
United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea; 
3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other as-
sistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such 
forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United 
States; 
4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces; 
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United 
Nations flag in the course of operations against Norh Korean forces con-
currently with the flags of the various nations participating; 
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports 
as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command. 
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UNITING FOR PEACE 
RESOLUTION'317 (V), 3 NOVEMBER,1950 
The General Assembly, 
Recognizing'that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are: 
"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
die peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means* and in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settle-
ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach 
of the peace", and / 
"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace", 
Reaffirming that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United 
Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such 
a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter 
VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United 
Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions, x 
Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale, 
Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essentials of Peace", which states 
that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is pri-
marily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring 
to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution, 
Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise 
restraint in the use of the veto, 
Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed 
forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Coun-
cil and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, 
the United Nations has, at its disposal means for maintaining interna-
tional peace and' security, 
Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsi-
bilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those reponsibilitics 
referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does cot relieve Member States 
of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the 
Charter to maintain international peace and security, 
Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General 
Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter 
in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities 
in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain 
the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces wt\ich could 
be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the 
General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action 
which, to be effective, should be prompt, 
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1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity ot 
the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears 
to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General 
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making ap-
propriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including 
in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If 
not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special 
session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency 
special session shall be called if requested by,the Security Council on the vote 
of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations; 
2. Adopts for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set 
forth in the annex to the present resolution; 
3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission which, for the calendar 
years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, 
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Paki-
stan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and 
Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area 
where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the 
invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commi-
ssion would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the 
Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council 
is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to 
the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on 
the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The 
Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its au-
thority under the Charter; 
4. Decides that the Commission shall have authority in its discretion to 
appoint sub-commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it 
in the performance of its functions; 
5. Recommends to all governments and authorities that they co-operate 
with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and faci-
lities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel 
oT Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV); 
7. Invites each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in 
order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position 
to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of 
the General Assembly for th; restoration of international peace and security; 
8. Recommends to the States Members of the United Nations that each 
Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, orga-
nized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accord-
ance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or 
units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, 
without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter; 
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9- Invites the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective 
Measures Committee provided for in paragraph II as soon as possible of the 
measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph; 
10. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the 
Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could 
be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical 
advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service 
as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8; 
I I . EstaHishes a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen 
Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France 
Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, 
and diiects the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and 
with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and 
make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later 
than I September 1951, on methods, including those in section C of the 
present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen inter-
national peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles 
of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrange-
ments (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter); 
13. Recommends to all Member States that they co-operate with the Com-
mittee and assist it in the performance of its functions; 
13. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities neces-
sary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C 
and D of the present resolution; 
14. Is fully conscious that, in adopting the proposals set forth above, endur-
ing peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against 
breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and 
lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principles and 
Purposes established in thr Charter of the United Nations, upon the imple-
mentation of the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly 
and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the main-
tenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on 
the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-
being in all countries; and accordingly. 
x5- Urges Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, 
in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal 
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic 
stability and social progress, particularly through the development of under-
developed countries and areas.23 
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For the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters 
V, VI and VII of the Charter, 
The General Assembly 
Recommends to the Security Council: 
That it should take the necessary steps to ensure that the action provided 
for under the Charter is taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches 
of the peace or acts of aggression and with respect to the peaceful settlement 
of disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security; 
That it should devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 
45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of xhz United Nations regarding the placing of 
armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members 
of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff 
Committee; 
The above dispositions should in no manner prevent the General Assembly 
from fulfilling its functions under resolution 377 A (V). 
The General Assembly 
Recognizing that the primary function of the United Nations Organization 
is to maintain and promote peace, security and justice among all nations, 
Recognizing the responsibility of all Member States to promote the cause of 
international peace in accordance with their obligations as provided in the 
Charter, 
Recognizing that the Charter charges the Security Council with the primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, 
Reaffirming the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of 
the Security Council on all problems which are likely to threaten world peace, 
Recalling General Assembly resolution 190 (III) entitled "Appeal to the 
Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish 
a lasting peace", 
Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that: 
(a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, 
with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten inter-
national peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view 
to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accord-
ance with the spirit and letter of the Charter; 
(6) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the 
Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of 
their consultations. 
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SELECT ON RESOLUTION ON CONGO* 
A/4510, RESOLUTION 1474, REV. I (ES-IV), 20 SEPTEMBER i960 
The General Assembly, 
Having considered the situation in the Republic of the Congo, 
Taking note of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and of 9 August of the 
Security Council, < 
Taking into account the unsatisfactory economic and political conditions 
that continue in the Republic of the Congo, 
Considering that, with a view to preserving the unity, territorial integrity 
und political ir.dcpcndcr.ee of the Congo3 to protecting and advancing the wel-
fare of its people, and to safeguarding international peace, it is essential for 
the United Nations to continue to assist the Central Government of tht 
Congo, 
1. Fully supports the resolution of 14 and 22 July and of 5 August of the 
Security Council;
 x 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in 
accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central 
Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and 
order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to 
safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the 
interests of international peace and security; 
3. Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek 
a specd> solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity 
and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and 
African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, 
in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation; 
4. Appeals to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contribu-
tions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations 
control and in consultation with the Central Government for the purpose of 
rendering the fullest possible assistance to achieve the objective mentioned 
in the preamble; 
5. Requests 
(a) All States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the 
restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo 
of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine 
the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic 
of the Congo; 
(b) All Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the 
Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and 
to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the 
Security Council; 
* Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping- 1946-1967, 
Documents and Commentary/ Oxford University Press, 
New York, 19R0. 
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6. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Cor.30, 
calls upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms 
or other material of war and military personnel and other assistance for rrjli-
tary purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assis-
tance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United 
Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of this 
resolution and of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and of 9 August i960 
of the Security Council. 
[This resolution was adopted by 70 votes to i , with 11 abstentions (Alba-
nia, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Poland, Ro-
mania, the Ukraine, Union of South Africa, and the U.S.S.R.). Bolivia wng 
absent.] 
S/4741, 21 FEBRUARY 1961 (ALSO IN DRAFT FORM, S/4722, 
17 FlHRUARY I 961) 
t 
A 
The Security Council, 
Hewing considered the situation in the Congo, 
Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the killing of the 
Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Miurice Mpolo and Mr. 
Joseph Okito, 
Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger 
of wide-spread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to 
international peace and security, 
Noting the Report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative 
(S/4691) dated 12 February 1961 bringing to light the development of a 
serious civil war situation and preparations therefor, 
1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate mea-
sures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrange-
ments for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention 
of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort; 
2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and eva-
cuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-
military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Com-
mand, and mercenaries; 
3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic measures to pre-
vent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, 
and for the .denial of transit and other facilities to them; 
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B 
The Security Council, 
Gravely concerned at the continuing deterioration in the Congo, and the 
prevalence of conditions which seriously imperil peace and order, and the 
unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, and threaten international peace 
and security, 
Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of rule of law in 
the Congo, 
Recognizing the imperative necessity of the restoration of parliamentary 
institutions in the Congo in accordance with the fundamental law of the 
country', so that the will of the people should be reflected through the freely 
elected Parliament, 
Convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands 
of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside 
and that there can be no solution without conciliation, 
Convinced further that the imposition of any solution, including the forma-
tion of any government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from 
settling any issues, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo 
and threat to international peace and security, 
i. Urges the convening of the Parliament and the taking of necessary pro-
tective measures in that connection; 
2. Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized 
and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements be made on 
impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination 
of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political 
life of the Congo; 
3. Calls upon all States to extend their full co-operation and assistance 
and take such measures as may be necessary on their part, for the imple-
mentation of this resolution. 
[This resolution was adopted by nine votes to zero, with two abstentions 
—France, the U.S.S.R.] 
S'5002, 24 KOVLMUHR 1961 
The Security Council, . 
Recalling its resolutions S'4387, S/4405, S/4426 and S'4741, 
Recallitig further General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 1592 (XV), 
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1599 (XV), i6oo (XV) and 1601 (XV), 
Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect 
to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely: 
(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence 
of the Republic of the Congo; 
(b) T o assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration 
and maintenance of law and order; 
(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo; 
(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo 
of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under- the 
United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and 
(e) To render technical assistance, 
Welcoming the restoration of the national Parliament of the Congo in 
accordance with the Loi fondamentale and the consequent formation of a 
Central Government on 2 August 1961, 
Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist activities and 
armed action now being v carried on by the Provincial Administration of 
Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and 
completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a "sovereign independent nation,' 
Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United 
Nations personnel, 
Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively 
responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo, 
Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and effective action to 
implement fully the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo 
to end the unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the 
interests of world peace and international co-operation, and stability and pro-
gress of Africa as a whole, 
1. Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out by 
the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources 
and manned by foreign mercenaries; 
2. Further deprecates the armed action against United Nations forces 
and personnel in the pursuit of such activities; - • 
3. Insists that such activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all 
concerned to desist therefrom; 
4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including 
the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate appre-
hension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign 
military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the 
United Nations Command, and .mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 
of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961; 
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.$. Further requests the Secretary-General to take, all necessary measures 
to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and 
also of arms, equipment or other, material in support of such activities) 
6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or 
other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the 
necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also 
to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their 
territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of 
the United Nations; 
7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from promoting, condoning, 
or giving support by acts of omission or commission, directly or indirectly, 
to activities against the United Nations often resulting in armed hostilities 
against the United Nations forces and personnel; 
8. Declares that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the 
Congo are contrary to the Loi fondamentalc and Security Council decisions 
and specifically demands that such activities which are now taking place in 
Katanga shall cease forthwith; 
9. Declares full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo, 
and the determination to assist that Government in accordance with the 
decision of the United Nations to maintain law and order and national inte-
grity, to provide technical assistance and to implement those decisions; 
10. Urges all Member States to lend their support, according to their na-
tional procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, 
in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations; 
11. Requests all Member States to refrain from any action which may 
directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of the United Nations 
in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the general purpose of the 
Charter. 
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APPENDIX-II* 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT 
N 
X 
[This 'basic agreement* between Secretary-General Hammarskjcld and the 
Congo was initialled on July 29, i960. It was circulated as document 
v
 Sl4389\Add. 5.J 
i . The Government of the Republic of the Congo states that, in the excer-
cise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the pre-
sence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be 
guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from 
the United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Security 
Council of 14 and 22 July i960; it likewise states that it will ensure the free-
dom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord 
the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the 
activities of the Force. 
2. The United Nations takes note of this statement of the Government 
of the Republic of the Congo and states that, with regard to the activities 
of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, 
by the task assigned to the Force in the aforementioned resolutions; in parti-
cular the United Nations reaffirms, considering it to be in accordance with 
the wishes of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, that it is 
prepared to maintain the United Nations Force in the Congo, until such 
time as it deems the lattcr's task to have been fully accomplished. 
3. The Government of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary-
General state their intention to proceed immediately, in the light of para-
graphs 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly specific aspects of the functioning of 
the United Nations Force in the Congo, notably with respect to its deploy-
ment, the question of its lines of communication and supply, its lodging and 
its provisioning; the Government of the Republic of the Congo, confirming 
its intention to facilitate the functioning of the United Nations Force in the 
Congo, and the United Nations have agreed to wrrk together to hasten the 
implementation of the guiding principles laid down in consequence of the 
work of joint exploration on the basis of the resolutions of the Security 
Council. 
4. The foregoing provisions shall likewise be applicable, as appropriate, 
to the non-military aspects of the United Nations operation in the Congo. 
*M.v. Na idu , C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y and t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s , 
Macmi l l an , D e l h i , B o m b a y , C a l c u t t a , Madras, 1974 . 
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APPENDIX-III* 
Serial 
So. Nationality 
I 
2 Canada 
3 India 
5 Ghana 
6 Sudan 
7 Tunisia . . , 
8 UAR 
9 Morocco . . . 
1 0 
II 
12 
i j 
M 
•5 
ib 
17 
iS 
19 
2 0 
21 
^^  
-3 
24 
25 Guinea 
26 
=7 
2S 
2 9 
3° 
3' 
r-
33 
34 
35 
36 Morocco . . 
37 
38 L'AR 
39 
40 
4' 
42 Ethiopia 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
•Rosalyn 
1 9 4 6 - 1 9 6 7 
O N U C : LOCATION AND STRENGTH STATEMENT 
A. ONUC location itattment 
Unit/Sub-Unit 
O N U C Headquarters 
.Signal squadron 
.Supply platoon * 
, Ordnance company 
Brigade of 3 battalions and 1 
police companies 
Battalion HQ.and 2 companies 
. 1 company 
. 1 company 
Brigade HQ. 
HQ.ist Battalion 
Company HQ_and 1 platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Company 
Company HQ.and 1 platoon 
Section 
Platoon 
Platoon 
HQ_2nd Battalion 
Company 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Company HQ_and 2 platoons 
Battalion HQ. 
Company 
Company HQ.and 1 platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Company HQ_and 2 platoons 
Platoon 
Company HQ.and 1 platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
. . Parachute company 
Platoon 
Battalion less 3 companies 
Company less 1 platoon 
Company 
Company-
Brigade HQ. 
H Q j s t Battalion and 2 companies 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Company HQ. 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Location 
Lcopoldville 
Leopoldville 
Lcopoldville -
Lcopoldville 
Leopoldville 
Lcopoldville 
Leopoldville 
Leopoldville 
Leopoldville 
Thysville 
Borru 
Tshela 
Lukula 
KLitoru 
Matadi 
Songololo 
Lufu 
Lukala 
Moerbcke 
KiWit 
Levcrville 
Banga 
Kizia 
Popokabaka 
Banningville 
Dimi 
Mushie 
Kwamouth 
Bolobo 
Inongo 
Kin 
Kutu 
Oshwe 
Nioki 
Mabenga 
Coquilhatville 
Boende 
Gemcna 
Lisala 
Bumba 
Libcnge 
Stanleyville 
Bunia 
Aba 
Mambasa 
Paulis 
Poko 
Watsa 
HQ_2nd Battalion and 2 companies Yangambi 
Company HQ.and 1 platoon Isangi 
Higgins ,Uni ted Nations 
Remarks 
1 platoon in Boende 
2 companies in 
Katanga 
1 company in 
Leopoldville 
Moving to Paulis 
peacekeeping-
',r>ocuments and Commentary Oxford Unive r s i ty 
P r e s s , New y o r k , 1 9 8 0 
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5' 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
6o 
6i 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
7' 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
9i 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Tunisia , 
HQ. ONTJC . 
Sweden 
Morocco . . . 
Sweden 
Platoon 
Company HQ a^nd 2 platoons 
Platoon 
HQ_3rd Battalion and 2 companies 
Company HQ_and 2 platoons 
Platoon 
Company 
Brigade HQ_ 
HQ.ioth Battalion 
Company HQ_ 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Section 
Section 
Platoon 
Company HQ_and 1 platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Company HQ.and 1 platoon 
Platoon 
HQ_9th Battalion and 1 company 
Company 
Company 
Platoon 
Platoon 
.Battalion HQ_and 1 company-
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
.Sub-Command 
for Eastern Provinces (Katanga-
Kivu) 
Battalion HQ_and 1 company 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
.Company HQ.and 1 platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Company HQ a^nd 1 platoon 
Platoon 
HQ_3rd Battalion 
Platoon 
Company HQ_and 1 platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
Platoon 
. . 1 Company 
Elisabctlu 
Ponthicrville 
Banalia 
Stanleyville 
Buta 
ALeti 
Bambesa 
Luluabourg 
Luluabourg 
Bakwanga 
Kabinda 
Dibaya 
Kaulu 
Kalala 
Lusambo 
Mwene Ditu 
Gandajika 
Luputa 
Kadima-Diba 
Dimbelenga 
Tshikapa 
Port Francqui 
Mweka 
Lubami 
Katumba 
Luluabourg 
Tshimbula 
Kalu 
Kcle 
Muscnga Banza 
Luputa 
Elisabcthville 
Elisabethville 
Kasenga 
Sakania 
Manono 
Jadotvtlle 
Kambove 
Mitwaba 
Lubudi 
Tcnke 
Kolweri 
N'zilo 
Dilolo 
Mutshatsha 
Kasaji 
Sandoa 
Kapanga 
Kamina 
1 company in 
Leopoldville 
On railway protection 
duties 
1 company in Kamina 
On temporary 
assignment 
From and Moroccan 
Battalion 
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A. ONUC location statement (cont.) 
Serial 
No. Nationality Unit/Sub-Unit Location 
100 Ireland a Companies Kamina 
101 Ethiopia HQ_ath Battalion Kamina 
102 Platoon Kaniama 
103 Platoon Malemba 
104 Platoon Bulama 
105 Platoon Luena 
106 Ireland HQ_33rd Battalion Albcrtville 
107 Platoon Kabinda 
> 08 Platoon Bcndera 
109 Platoon Baudouinville 
n o G>mpany HQ a^nd 1 platoon Nlinono 
111 Platoon Piana 
> 12 HQ_32nd Battalion G o m a 
1 • 3 Company Kindu 
• • 4 C o m p a n y B u k a v u 
115 Mali Battalion HQ_and 1 company Kabalo 
116 Company Nyunzu 
• > 7 C o m p a n y Kongolo 
11S Company Kabongo 
Remarks 
1 company each from 
32nd and 33rd 
Battalions 
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APPENDIX-TV* 
Mo. l 
LETTER FROM SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHO BYUNG-
OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PER-
SONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED 
APRIL 10, 1949* 
April 10. 1949 
Dear Dr. Chough: 
I thought your radiogram inquiring as to the advisability of openly ask-
ing for military aid was very timely. However, 1 did not wish to proceed 
openly in the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements 
made by Mr. Muccio, who was reported to have secured "something."** 
When he came to see me with Mr. Drumright, I quietly asked him what had 
been accomplished, and he said this: "The military aid has been granted 
.ind the President has signed certain documents relating to it." I am not 
sure whether lie referred to the President's signature on the military aid 
request or on the ECA agreement. He further said that the publicity regard-
ing a direct request for further military aid might hurt the plan. I thought 
he was right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arms to Koreans 
as they would oppose giving sharp knives to children. Our enemies have 
spread propaganda to the effect that the ignorant, thoughtless Koreans 
might attack the Soviet Union, thus bringing about a clash between Russia 
and the United States. This idea is prevalent among some Americans in 
Korea even now. For such reasons, the thought of giving military aid to 
Korea is considered dangerous to the United States. 
* This document was found in the archives of the president's office ot 
the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy. 
** The words "to have secured something" are underlined in ink in 
the original. 
*Facts Tell, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang 
1960. 
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What you and I are trying to do is to convince the world that we are 
not as foolish as we have been represented to be. We must make it known 
that we can manage our own affairs as well as any other well organized 
nation can. It is in this respect that publicity work is most important. The 
Americans are beginning to learn more about us and their estimate of our 
strength and capability is rising higher every day. But unless we can be 
sure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers in the United 
States, it would be too risky to make an open demand for arms and am-
munition. This is why I have thought it best to keep your mission confi-
dential. 
Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity 
when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known 
to the proper authorises. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and am-
munition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon 
us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason 
for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of 
the obligation it owes us. * 
We have more justifiable grounds for demanding arms than any other 
nation in the world. It was the United States that invited the Soviet Union 
to occupy northern Korea, and it was the United States that prevented us 
for two and a half years from arming ourselves. Despite these facts, among 
the nations of Northeast Asia, Korea is the only one that has been fighting 
the Communists successfully. 
While the United States as the Arsenal of Democracy was freely grant-
ing Lend Lease aid z-nd military equipments to every Allied nation, we 
were the only people denied the privilege^of securing any aid. During all 
•.he past years we have had to fight the common enemy alone and unaided. 
Now as the Americans are withdrawing their occupation forces from Korea, 
would it not be a gross crime to leave us alone and unaided, ill equipped 
for national defense, while the north Korean Communist force is armed and 
aided by the Soviet Union? It the northern army should invade our country 
.and force us to accept a Communist rule, would not the United States be 
responsible for it? 
Ever since the attack on Pearl Harbor we urged and begged the State 
Department to give us military and economic assistance, so that after the 
defeat of Japan we would have an army of our own to defend our own 
homeland against Communist attack. We told them plainly that if the Com-
munists were allowed to occupy Korea a situation would be created disad-
vantageous not only to Korea but also to the United States. This statement 
was made repeatedly, both orally and in writing, as is fully evidenced in 
the contents of the State Department files. They turned a deaf ear to our 
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appeals, and you know the result Both the United States and Korea are 
paying the price for the mistakes made by the State Department at that 
time. 
Now we are asking for arms both for our own defense and for the se-
curity of the United States. If they fail us again, both Korea and the United 
States will suffer. We might as well go on record to this effect, to show that 
we see in advance what is coming and to warn against a repetition of the 
earlier mistake. Whether our American friends realize it or not, it is up to 
us to make plain the warning and the appeal. 
I think you should frankly discuss this situation in fullest confidence 
with high officials of both the United Nations and the United States. In a 
strictly confidential manner tell them what plans we have for the unifica-
tion of north and south. As a matter of fact, we are ready for the unifica-
tion now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms and ammunition. 
A large proportion of the Korean Communist Army is ready to mutiny and 
help us chase out of the country such Communist hirelings as Kim II Sung 
and others. And the civilfan population in the norlh will join with them in 
cleaning up and keeping under control all the terroristic Communist ele-
ments. They are all ready to do it without our aid. They have asked us to 
give them the signal by radio or by other secret message, setting the time 
and dale. In fact they are urging us to do it. 
However, we are urging them to wait for the simple reason that we do 
not have sufficient arms and ammunition for the next necessary step. Sup-
posing we do clean up the north and settle everything quietly to our satis-
faction? Who is there to keep the Chinese Eighth Route Army, the Yenan 
group, and the Siberian forces from moving in again? We have to be pre-
pared with a sufficient military force so that we can proceed into the north 
to join with our loyal army there, and to move the Iron Curtain from the 
38th parallel up to the Yalu River, and there to guard it against infiltra-
tion from without. 
For this operation we need two naval vessels of 8,000 tons each, with 
18 inch guns, for the defense of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. We need fast 
running patrol boats to guard against Communist underground movements 
along our coasts. We need 200,000 soldiers trained and organized for de-
fense along the northern border. We need planes for defense and anti-air-
craft guns. And we need them now. 
Some Americans worry about the lack of technicians, but they do not 
know that we have ten or twelve aviators who were among the best in 
Japan, three of whom were accounted the best in the Orient. We have sea 
captains who can direct our merchant marine. For our army, we can Or-
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ganize a force of 200,000 men in a short iimt. We have several hundred 
thousand returned soldiers who were forced to join the conscript army dur 
ing the war. They are, in fact, veteran soldiers. They were put into the 
Iront lines by the Japanese, and many of them were killed in the South 
Pacific Island and Manchurian operations. Most of the officers. were trained 
in Japanese universities. People do not know much about them for they 
keep quiet for fear they may be branded as pro-Japanese. They are loyal 
citizens and are ready to give their lives for their country. If we get suffici-
ent arms, we can prepare them in no time. 
This outline will show you why I wish you to keep the request con-
fidential, and also suggests the line of approach you may find effective in 
your talks with United States and United Nations officials. Our need is 
great, and it will be disastrous for both Korea and the United States if it 
is not heeded. The mistake of withholding arms from Koreans must not be 
made again, as it was made during the war. 
I shall expect your confidential reports on the reactions you receive 
from the high officials, and we shall try to help in all ways we can from here. 
Sincerely yours, 
(Syngman Rhee) 
Dr. Pyung Ok Chough^ 
Washington DC 
• In some places Pyung Ok Chough is spelled as Clio Byung-ok. 
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Apr i l 10, 19*9 
uear Dr. Chough: 
I thought your radiogram Inquir ing as to the adv i sab i l i t y 
of openly asking for mi l i t a ry old was very t l x e l y . However, 
I d id not wish to prooeed openly In the mat ter for fear i t might 
spo i l some confidential arrangements made by ter. Kuoo.lo, wlio wes 
repor ted to have seoured ^something." Whan he oesa to eoe me 
with Mr. Drumright. I qu ie t ly asked h ln what had been aoocmpllsh-
ed, end he sa id th l6 : "The m i l i t a r y aid ha6 been granted and 
the Pres ident has signed oe r t a ln dooument6 r e l a t i n g to i t . " I 
am not sure whother he re fe r red to the P re3 i aen t ' 6 sl'jnati-.re 
on the ml l l t e ry aid request or on the £CA agreement. He fu r thor 
6aid that the rubl iol ty regarding a d i roo t request for fur ther 
m i l i t a r y a id might hurt the p lan . I thought he APE r i g h t . 
There a r e l o t s of people who oppose giving arm6 to Koreans as 
they would oppose giving sharp knives t o o M l d r e n . Our enemies 
have spread propaganda to the ef feot t h a t trie ignoran t , thought-
l e s s Koreans might a t tack the Eovlet Union, thus bringing about 
a olaah between Russia and the United S t a t e n . This idea i s 
p reva len t among some Americans la Korea oven now, for euoa 
r ea sons , the thought of giving m i l i t a r y e ld to Koreaio ID 
considered dangerous to the United S t a t e s . 
Vtfhet you and I are t ry ing to do I s to oon7ince the world 
t h a t we e r e not as foolish as we have boon represented to bo. 
We /nuBt make I t known tha t we oan l i n a g e oar own off a i r e ua well 
ao any o ther well organized nation oan. I t io in th l3 rocpoct 
tha t pub l i c i t y work i s most impor tant . The Axorioaus a re bogln-
ning to l e e rn Jiore about us and t h e i r es t imate of our s t r eng th 
and oapub i l i ty i s r l6 lng higher every day . But unless we;oan 
be 6ure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers 
in the United S ta te s , I t would be too r i s k y t o make an open 
demand f o r arms and ammunition. This la why I have'thought i t 
6o6t to Keep your nlasioa c o n f i d e n t i a l . 
Now on the other hand, I want to t e l l you why we need f ee l 
no t i m i d i t y when we have the opportuni ty to u&ke our sentLxeuts 
on t h i s mat te r known to the proper a u t h o r i t i e s . We are perhaps 
in g r e a t e r need of arms and ammunition than any othor nut i on , 
l a rge ly beoause of conditions imposed upon us by the Orc'ot 
Powers t h o a s e l r e s . At the caao t ime, t he re i s core reocon for 
the United StatC6 to a ra ue than to e r a any o ther people, beoause 
of the ob l iga t ion i t owes UB. 
Photosiatic copy of the 1st page of Document \'o. I 
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No. z 
LETTER FROM SYNGMAN RHEE TO DR. ROBERT 
T. OLIVER, AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR, 
DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1949* 
September 30. 1949 
To: Dr. Robert T. Oliver 
From: President Syngman Rhee 
I received your letters and thank you for them. 
I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or anything of that kind. 
Please contact Mr. K.** and Mr. Mead in a very confidential way and find out 
all what is necessary. In case you think that it would not be advisable to em-
ploy Mr. K. in regard to what Mr. W.*# told you we may have to drop the 
matter. In my last letter I asked you to find out from the National Press Club 
more about K. We simply cannot engage anyone who has not a good 
business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter. 
There is some criticism about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them 
that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly 
terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more 
I think of your work Uie more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful 
here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am 
thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your term of service 
in the university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon 
• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of 
the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy. 
* * As in the original. 
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as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office 
How often I wish wc had you here. 
I wish I had time to write out from time to lime some of my thoughts 
(dating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been 
impossible. 1 will try however. One thing is that 1 want to tell you briefly 
concerning our situation. 
I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we 
should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal communist army in 
the north to dean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of 
Kim II Sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve 
them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman 
and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position. The natural boundary 
line along the river and the Paikdoo Mts can be made almost impenetrable 
with sufficient number of planes and two or three fast running naval vessels 
standing at the mouths of the two rivers with fighting planes defending all 
the coast lines including Oeju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly 
during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great invasions 
of Emperor Tang, Emperor Soo, the Mongols and the Japs. I believe we are 
leady to repeat the successful defense of our nation against foreign invasions. 
All the Chinese, Japanese and the Korean communist army in Manchuria and 
Siberia may do all they want to but we will be able to fight them off. We want 
to do regardless of what outside nations may do against us. I believe the 
Soviet Union will not be foolhardy enough to start invasions at the present 
t:me. Our people are clamoring for it. Our people in the north want us to let 
them do it now but we are doing everything we can to quiet them down and 
it is a mighty difficult task. I want you to express tills situation very clearly 
and convincingly and show a copy to Ambassador Chang and Ambassador 
Chough. We will all quietly work together, you in Washington and in New 
York and our two Ambassadors and other friends, and we here in Seoul and 
Tokyo toward one end; that they agree to our cleaning up and setting our 
house in order. Use the old phrase that Churchill used once, "Give us the 
tools and we will do the job." Convince the American statesmen and the 
general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out 
our program and give us all the material backing we need. The longer we 
drag along the harder it will be. Soviet's cold war is always a winning war. 
First they give the communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda 
literature to stir up the people to fight among themselves. Then later they 
get the communist converts into a gang of terrorists, assassins and robbers 
by killing, and burning and making the whole human society hell. So long 
as they continue robbing they have enough to support themselves. They do 
everything to make trouble for others. By so doing the communists are 
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strengthening themselves'and spreading wider and digging deeper all the 
tfme. The more robbery they commit the more money they get With the 
money they carry on their killing and burning activities. But the nationalists 
everywhere have no one to count on for help. They have to use every 
means of their own to defend themselves and these sort of things continue 
herein hereout. They cannot keep fighting. They are forced sooner or 
later to give in and that is what happened in China and everywhere else. 
What the Americans are doing now in the so-called cold war is a losing 
battle and if we continue in this losing battle by sitting still and warding 
off these gangsters no human flesh and nerve can hold on very long. When 
the Koreans are willing to get up and clean them up once and for all it is 
the most psychological moment to do-it now. I am.sure we can settle this 
question within a reasonable short time if we are only allowed to do it. 
Please put this whole story in a very convincing statement and quietly 
approach some influential people here and there and let us get their support 
If you could get this story into President Truman's ear I think it will have 
some desired effect. 
2 4 4 
September 30 , 1%9 
To : Dr. Robert T. Oliver 
From : Prosidont Syr^ Man Rhee 
I roeeived your le t ters and thank you for tnen. 
I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or enythin£ of that kind. 
Please contact t*r, K. and Mr. Head in a very confidential way and find out 
a l l what Is necessary. In caee you think that i t would not be advisable 
to enploy Vy. K. in regard to whet Mr. W. told you we may hove to drop the 
matter. In njy last l e t t er I aeked you to find out from the National I .-ess 
dun more about K. We simply cannot engage anyrne who has not a good 
business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with th is matter. 
There is aomc cr i t lc iza about the work we are doing. 8ut 1 wrote to thoo 
that you are doing a l l r ight , so do not let that worry you but be on 
friendly terns with everybody a,nd carry on your work at your best ab i l i t y . 
The moro 1 think of your work the nore 1 feel convinced that jrou can be 
•ore helpful here in Koroa. I need eonsone to take care of my important 
-•ork and I a» thinking seriously of asking you to corae at the eoi of your 
term of sorvice In ti;a university. Do not whisper i t to anybody but keep 
It in mind and as tco-i as you can get out I wish you would come and wcrx 
for i*e rl£ht in isy o f f i ce . Mow often I wl6h we had you here. 
I wish 1 had ti"* t:» write out fro* tloe to t i i e some my thoughts 
relating to tne changing events both here and In A f r i c a . So far i t has 
been impossible. 1 wil l try hovevor. CS".e thins i s t h »t I want to t o l l 
you briefly concerning our situation. 
I feel strongly tl-at now ia the isost psycholnjiccl boosnt when we shr.uld 
take an aggressive censure and Join with our loytl coururvlst arwty in the 
north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyiuig. Ho wil l drlva 6ouc of 
Kin 11 dung's *on to the roountaln region and where we wi l l gradually starve 
th«a out. Then our line of defense eaut bo tt-engthenod a Ion ft tho Tunan 
onrt Yelu pivors. We wi l l bo in a 10C# hotter position. The naturcl 
boundary line along the river and the PaiWoo Hta can be mado aL^st 
impenetrable with sufficient nuriber of planes and two or three fast running 
naval vosselo standing at the souths of the two rivers with fighting planes 
defending e l l the coast l ines including Cheju Island. What Koreans of old 
did repeatedly' during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against 
great Invasions of £jp«ror Tang, ijvptrrr Soo, th» Mongols and the Japs. 
1 belicvo we are ready to repeat t.">«i au&Sessful L^fenos of our nitior. agaiwat 
Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document <Vo. 2. 
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No. 3 
LETTER FROM, CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN 
AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO SYNGMAN 
RHEE, DATED JANUARY 11, 1950* 
Confidential* * 
KOREAN EMBASSY 
Washington D.C.*»* 
January 11, 1950 
Your Excellency: 
This letter is being prepared just before the pouch leaves for the airport 
so that I may give you some encouraging news which I have received con-
fidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed 
that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with 
respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan Korea will 
occupy an important position. I have every hope that we will get much 
more help, militarily speaking, as a result. 
1 have had word from a confidential source in the State Department 
that President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant 
permission for armament for Korean ships and planes. Thus I am confident 
that there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on the 
Bakdusan, for the President's order will remove the principal and important 
obstacle. 
The Turkish representative on UNCOK has met with me and I found 
• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of 
the Syngman Rhee Government 
• This is hand-written and underlined in ink in the original. 
•** Letterhead. 
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him to be a strong and sympathetic person. I feel sure he will make a good 
Commission member. 
With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am 
Respectfully yours. 
John M. Chang* 
His Excellency 
Dr. Syngman Rhee 
President of the 
Republic of Korea 
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C**>f*/6*~&*£> 
KOREAN EMBASSY 
WAHUINOTON. D.O. 
Usury 11, 1950 
Ton* Excellencyi 
This le t ter i s being prepared just beforo the pouch leaves for the 
airport so that I nay give you coca encouraging r.-zzs which I hare received 
confidentially frcn a top l eve l , reliable source in the Pentagon. I aa 
Informed that the State Dopa-toent and the Pcr.ta^cn cro planning a f ira 
stand with rospect t o the U. S. Oriental policy. In this anU-Cosaunist 
plan, Korea wil l occupy an lnporta*. position. I heve every hope that we 
wi l l get such noro halp, mil i tari ly opolicing, as a result. 
I hive had word from a confidential source in the State Depcrtaeni 
that P-csldunt Trusan w i l l eign, very soon, authorization cMchwill grant 
peraisalon for armaxent for Korean ships and planes. Thru I aa confident 
thst there wi l l bo no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on tfae Bak« 
dusan, for the President's order w i l l removo the principal and important 
obstacle. 
Tha Turkish representative on UNCOK has rat with ce and I found 
him to be a strong and syepathetic person. I feel sire be r i l l sake a 
good Concaission oezber. 
With sentiitents of loyalty and esteea, I aa 
Respectfully yours, 
X/john M. Chang J 
His Excellency 
Or. Syngaan Rhee 
President of the 
Republic of Korea 
Photostatic copy of Document No. J 
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No. A 
LETTER FROM REAR ADMIRAL SOHN WON-IL, 
SOUTH KOREAN CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 
TO ADMIRAL RADFORD, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
OF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, U.S. NAVY, DATED 
JULY 18,1949* 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE** 
Washington Embasy 
Muccio 
Tokyo 
Admiral Sohn*** 
Office of Chief of Naval Operation 
July 18, 1949 
My dear Admiral Radford: 
The Government of the Republic of Korea desires to express to you its 
sincere appreciation for the friendly visit made by a unit of your fleet con-
sisting of the Cruiser Manchester and the auxiliary destroyers under the 
command of Admiral T.H. Binford. 
This visit has greatly enhanced the already existing good feeling be-
tween the United States and Korea. We particularly appreciate this signifi-
cant manifestation of your friendship for us. and we are desirous to express 
our gratitude in return. We have learned to respect and admire the noble 
spirit shown by Admiral Binford and by the officers and enlisted men under 
• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of 
the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy. 
• • Letterhead. 
•** These four lines were inserted in ink, presumably for distribution. 
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his command. This Government hopes that this unit, in its present form or 
enlarged grouping, will call on us again and oftqn. Indeed, we shall be 
glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, 
Yosu, Mukho and the Naval Base of Chinhae, as temporary Mobile Bases of 
any such a unit of your Fleet. 
- Such an arrangement as this will not only further solidify the friendly 
relationship between our two nations but also be a source of encouragement 
to all tlie peace-loving democratic nations, in and around the Pacific. We 
cannot convey this suggestion to the Secretary of the United States Navy. 
We may not be able to offer you all the conveniences and facilities for the 
comfort of our visitors but we shall strive to be genial hosts. 
I take this opportunity to convey to you the high esteem of our President, 
Dr. Syngman Rhce, and the hope that you will also honor us by a personal 
visit in a near future. 
Most sincerely yours, 
Won II Sohn 
Rear Admiral 
Chief of Naval Operation 
Admiral A. W. Radford 
Commander-in-Chief 
United States Pacific Fleet 
United States Navy 
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N I M U M N T O— W W OF 1** HCFK^JC O* «CW»«A 
10 we* uwito us**©** 
e-r»T* 
•ovaaher ), 19b9 
•ear *>. President! 
I haws the honour U ask* a brief report covering tha followl**; eubjectai 
TW lagMl PWCTIPI MP TW COIPUI aSSPClT 
la rla* of tha fact that I ba*a made telegraphic raporta at the vaj-lma etaeaa of 
tha deliberations, that yoa mast hate heard a detailed report from Harold Noble and 
that various official dooaonta of tha On J tad *aUona co*arlng proceedlnge »« the 
Korean dlacuaalon are to ba aaat «e tha Foreign Minister, I etiall not «»»11 aueh 
opoo datalla of tha dallbaratlona. I want only to point o i l U J I w T*nr Poaera 
draft resolution eas pasted by tha Caaaral aasoafclr 07 an ovtnrtxlalnc majority; 
that la to say, W to 6, la aplta of tha oppoaltlon fro* U>« Jorlat Bloc- It ke 
gratifying to nota thoee friendly natlona ehleh Had supported Koraa'a ease In Parle 
l snt jaar are s t i l l steady and atronc In eymnathy tcaard Korea, u> aplte of the cor— 
tlnuoua and trag Ic development la China since thaa. 
THE W rMTTTRSS OF TIC HESOLOTiah 
Tha characteristic difference boteeaa tha December l?th, 19US resolution an) the 
preaant four Poaora draft-resolution Ilea la the feet that toe preaant reaolutlon 
emphasises tha organey of oboerratloo on (be security situation axlatlag la lore* 
awe, and lit the future. That la tha reason any Military «cperta ara to be akUuwl 
to the United Nations Coaadsaloa am Korea. with tha unification of Korea aa tha 
ultimate objective, tha Coaalaslan'a chief ruoctlon thla year la to aaka observa-
tions 00 the security altBatloa. Tha aeoood difference la found In that the existence 
ef tha Coanlsslon la Indefinitej It wi l l continue l t a aerk until the problem or 
unification haa been achieved. 
• 
THE CGRTiTVTlOW OF THE CCIWgSICT 
1 ad) happy to report that aa the rata l ! of atronc prasenUU.cn cade by car Delage-
t lon, tha Onltad State* Delegation and tha Steta Department, the Prejldent of the 
General Aaaeably and the Secratary-Oaneral of the Secretariat aeeaad to bate gives 
duo attention to the need of etranthenlng tha Coandaaloo. Syria la dropped and 
Turkey, la nominated la Ilea of that former trooblaaooa mezber cocntry. Secretery-
Ceaerai Lie has farther aatarad ma ha had requested various oeador governments on 
tha United* Nations Comnisslcn on Korea to nonlnate their represses* tlvee from amove 
persona of atronc conrlcUon and high experience'end rank, with a ' l e a of baring a 
eyatea,6f permanent chairmanship t h a t ' t i l l Intare etetdy and sUMUsed fanctlanl.-^ 
«f the CommUalau 
T» atttfizmcst cr TB txamrauT 
trlTbjpOTted to 700 by radiogram, *>. Bartll memborg was appointed aa the na« prln*-
Opal SCgimtary in l ieu of Dr. merthelmar. Tha aeereUry-Oeaeral and Mr. Cordiar 
fanartC*n)» Executive Aaalatamt to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, hare aatarad ma 
\hat>kr. Ranborg la a man of atrccg conrlctlam end leadership. Ba la a overfish 
•Alison and has been In charge of tha Division, of CbaajonicaUcrii and aecorla. He 
had tan yeare' experience la the foreign aarrlea of the Swedish Oorertaent. Tbay 
farther have aaaurad ma that thoaa f ive objectionable persona) neatly, &hanbas, Ktta, 
and three othara mlU ba r*iingor1 and that ao entirely new and sound aeeratarlat «U1 
**, constituted. 
I . S . D r . Syngaaa Rhta 
rVaaldant of tb* Republic of term. 
Seoul, Korsa. 
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No. 5 
MEMORANDUM OF SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHANG 
AIYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN 
WASHINGTON, AND CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSA-
DOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PERSONAL RE-
PRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED JULY 18, 1949" 
July 18, 1949 
•MEMORANDUM 
To .'Ambassadors Chang and Chough 
From: President Syngman Rhee 
Ambassador Chang's letters of 13th with the enclosures and the Ko-
rean letter, and Ambassador Chough's letters of July 7 and 12 have arrived. 
1 will make my answer to you both in the form of a memorandum so that 
jt will answer both of your letters. 
-;'-. Since Ambassador Chough represents this government to the UN with 
complete authority to take up any matter 1 wonder whether it is necessary 
for you to get separate authorization in making membership application to 
Various organizations belonging to the UN. If necessary, we will make 
Separate credentials each time. But you have the authority to apply after 
being authorized by your government for memberships to UNWHO and 
UNESCO. 
' I feel that you should have someone to be in charge of the office dur-
ing your absence. The young man you suggest cannot be adequate to act 
• This document was found in tr>e archives of the president's office of 
the Syngman Rhee Government. 
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Jn your behalf, He is young and his qualifications are limited altogether. 
He is not the person for such a position. Roy Kim who was serving in 
AMG* as one of the officers in the Property Custody is now visiting with 
the Businessmen's Goodwill Party. We have used him In our office for some 
lime and he proves himself very helpful and careful. He speaks and writes 
English very well and takes shorthand. If you care to use him, wire me at 
once and we will arrange to have him remain there to help you. 
I am sure your trip to Canada will be highly successful and hope you 
will find it enjoyable as well. 
Ambassador Chang's report on the interviews made together with Dr. 
Chough came together with Ambassador Chough's report covering the 
•nearly same although your report is more in detail from which 1 gather 
more of the true aspects. 1 thank you for them. 
I am so happy that our two Ambassadors in America are working in 
such complete cooperation. Very few representatives of other countries 
have shown such good spirit. I have nothing to worry about at that end 
and that harmony alone is sufficient to increase the prestige and solidity 
of our people and government. 
As you will find my answer covering the general topics in my memoran-
dum a copy of which will be sent to Dr. Chough, I am answering 
several questions relating only to the matters of personal interest. I am 
sorry to disappoint you but th-ej chancery building project is far beyond 
our limit. In the first place we have no money to meet this obligation. 
If we can pay in Korean Won we can meet it but since we have to pay 
in dollars we cannot pay $50,000 for the building with the equipments and 
the architect and all that. If you want to build it half a year or so later 
when we have some of our gold mines developed and some commodities 
exported we may be able to consider it, but at the present time it is a matter 
of physical impossibility. Why don't you make a temporary arrangement for 
the chancery to be accommodated in the Embassy building and get along as 
best as you can. The architects do not have to be so high-priceid people. We 
can get some smaller companies 2 or 3 companies be invited to submit their 
bids and if their plan is satisfactory we agree to pay so much. I do not think 
we have to pay 10 per cent fee for the plan alone, and that building also 
need not be so complete. Please do all you can to minimize the obligation 
on dollar basis as much as you can. 
It seems to me that J.J. Williams is taking more time in our service than 
I thought he could spare. If he keeps up as he is doing now please quietly ask 
* "American Military Government*' 
254 
him what his railroad fares are and we might grant him expenses on a diem 
basis if he is in Washington. I am afrafd if we ask him to present his bills 
we might not bo able to pay for it. 
REGARDING STAGGERS 
We are not paying him anything for his service or even the time he 
spends. Ask him confidentially how much you should give him not as com-
pensation but actually for the time he uses in serving us—if he does any im-
portant work you ask him to do. We do not want him to have a hand in 
everything but what you think is important. Everything should be itemized 
so that it will go on our files. All these things must be understood so that you 
are to decide what expense to pay and what not. That is to say, when you 
deliberately ask them to do certain things you must clearly state that their 
carefares* and hotel bills you will pay. No one in the Embassy's service Ko-
rean or foreign should decide so much for one trip. 
Sorry I had to take this paragraph out** We received the papers 
for the SS Washington bought by the ECA. 
About the Washington mail. We are still trying to make the ECA pay 
for it because the boat was not chartered by the Korean . Government. 
Please do not pay unless you have direct orders from m i 
REGARDING NATIONAL DEFENCE 
We declare that our defense program consists of the following 
figures: 100,000 standing army; 200,000 reserve force and 100,000 police 
force; total of 400,000 arc to be trained and equipped for our national 
defense. We have now 35,000 police and it will take a long time to reach 
that maximum number, but that is our aim. I do not think anybody can 
interpret it as militaristic expansion project. 
The American officials in Washington are of the information that 
50,000 fully armed, 15,000 lightly armed, and 35,000 police reasonably 
armed. These are the information furnished by General Roberts and we 
cannot give full credence to his reports. We are going to check these. 
Since the beginning of the arms discussion I appointed our govern-
ment representatives to sign the receipt of every item that we receive 
from the Americans and ask them to get the signature of the American 
* As in the original, evidently misspelt. 
• • The preceding paragraph (regarding the steamship Washington) 
has been crossed out in the original and is omitted here. 
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officials showing what they are turning over to us. and what we are 
receiving. There will be no disagreement in the reports , regarding tiie 
quantities of arms and ammunition we receive. 
You have already received one list of* the materials turned over 
to us. As soon as we have another list we shall not fail to forward 
it to you. 
MILITARY AID 
The ECA bill should be passed before we take up the military aid I am 
glad our Ambassadors and our friends have done so well that the ECA bill 
is progressing very nicely and I hope this will be adopted by the end of 
ihis month. However, the military aid is the most important one. If 
things come out as I hope 1 am sure we will get a large portion of the 
military aid appropriation of 1 billion 4 million dollars requested by 
President Truman for several European nations and Korea. These funds 
will be handled solely by President Truman, and I hope we can convince 
the President that Korea needs a lion's share, and I believe we deserve 
it America's investment on Korea will pay more dividend to the United 
States than all the' other receiving nations can yield. However, we must 
pave the way and if there is any obstacle we must leave no stone 
unturned until such obstacles are removed. General Roberts, head of 
the military mission was chosen by Gen. Hodge because Roberts' idea 
regarding Korea are just about the same. Roberts has no sympathy 
whatever for the Korean people or for the government. The best way 
to handle this question is to use Dr. Chough's suggestion that we ask 
for an official of a higher rank to head the mission. I am confidentially 
sending word to Gen. MacArthur asking him to appoint Gen: Coulter 
to head the mission. Whether Gen. MacArthur is in a position to do il 
or not is more or less uncertain. At any rate the presence of Gen. 
Roberts here at this time is not helpful to say the
 ( least, and if we can 
possibly get him out of Korea our case will be won hundred percent. Of 
course, we do not make this an open issue just as China did about 
General Stilwell. If we can succeed in quietly replacing him it would 
all be the better. If not we may have to make open demand which we 
are trying to avoid. 
It was very wise of you and friends in Washington to advise us 
against any attempt to purchase weapons of war or planes at this time. 
1 was so mad when they said we had more weapons than necessary 
and we did not need planes or naval vessels since the United Statco 
planes could be here within four or five hours, and I told them that we 
are going to arm ourselves sufficiently for our protection either with or 
256 
without United States aid. We inquired all around and we have offers 
of all kinds of weapons but we have postponed it. We arc appointing 
competent men to survey the entire field of our defense program and 
make n complete list of things wo need ;md let you have it as soon as 
wc can. 
LOAN PAYMENT 
We have mailed you the minutes of my conversations with 
Ambassador Muccio. Please go over carefully the part covering the loan 
of $25,000,000 the payment for the U.S. war surplus materials as both 
cf you know the circumstances surrounding the signing of this loan are 
highly questionable. Although the agreement was signed by the 
Representative Democratic Council and was also included in the financial 
settlement agreement, none of us ever thought that we would 
be asked to pay it and 1 had to be quite frank with Ambassador Muccio 
regarding it. They told me that we had to sign and I told them that wc 
would rather pay it out of our aid fund and forget it. They can do as 
they please with the money which is supposed to be spent for the 
educational work of Americans. The Fulbright Act regulations are such 
that we have little voice in the matter. We are to spend money for the 
educational purpose in Korea and pay the expenses for American 
professors to come and lecture here and all that. They said that the 
Committee is composed of four Americans and four Koreans with the 
American Ambassador here as Chairman. That is not all. 
They asked us to sell the Banto Hotel together with a number of 
some important buildings in Seoul. As a matter of fact wc do not want 
to go on the record that the Korean government sold any of our 
properties to any foreign government and we would rather offer them 
as a gift with the understanding that when they are through with the 
buildings sooner or later they will give the Korean government the 
lirst opportunity to purchase it back according to the prevailing market 
price then. And we made the deeds including the words "free gift" and 
the paper was beautifully made and presented in a ceremony in presence 
of American and Korean officials. Now they told me that Washington 
declined to accept it as a gift. They want to deduct several million 
dollars as their price out of the $25,000,000 loan. I do not know if 1 
should ask you to take it up with the State Department and find out 
iheir definite reply regarding this or let it go as it is. I am requestea 
to sign the Fulbright uronosition and as I do not wish to show my ugly 
face I am inclined to'sign it wnatcver it is. 
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REGARDING OFFICIAL STATEMENT 
I know that the June 8th statement was meant to be the guarantee 
that we asked them to make but it was not at all sufficient and our 
newspapers make quite a headline. If such a statement has any value 
st all the publicity about it in America should make it worth any. Time 
and again we found out that any such statement regarding interna-
tional situation does not mean much unless the American people are 
informed of the fact that their nation is committing itself to certain 
obligations. Whether the State Department will make it known to 
America to that extent I do not know. 
The treaty of commerce and amity is rather urgent. American 
businessmen are so anxious to open trade. We cannot afford to make 
an open door to everybody without any rules or regulations and 
therefore we are very anxious to get this commerce treaty signed soon. 
REGARDING CHINHAE BAY 
We had another visit by a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet 
under the command of Rear Admiral Binford. We had a little conversation 
with him and he is so impressed of the Bay and of our situation in 
general that he suggested wc address a letter to the commanding officer 
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to accept our olTcr of the privilege of using 
all our open ports as temporary mobile bases. That means they can 
visit and stop or stay any time at our invitation, and I think it would 
be helpful for both countries in safeguarding peace and security of the 
Pacific. Such a letter will be sent soon. 
Since no naval or air officer of high rank can be employed by the 
Korean Government as it being against the law of the United States—we 
may have to find some other way of securing the services of able, 
experienced United States officials. Whether we should ask President 
Truman or the State Department autlioritics I do not know. If you think 
it available please quietly call on Admiral Yarnel and give him the 
best regards from Mrs. 'Rhee und myself to him and Mrs. Yariwl. They 
are our good friends.. I would like you to tell him that we should like 
him to come and visit us as our guest sometime in the near future, if he 
would accept our invitation. When he comes we could ask him to stay 
and he may suggest some plan. However, it should be done as top 
secret. Of course; we do not want to create any impression that we are 
giving any of our naval or air base to the United States or any other 
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foreign power because that will create bad impression .ill around. You 
understand that, I am sure. 
Noble's article seems to reflect the ulc;i of the officials in the SUitc 
Department. These arc all the views of the pro-Japanese sentiment. We 
strongly object to the Japanese possession of Manchuria. If Japan had 
to have it she may be allowed to take north of Mukden up to Harbin 
and Vladivostok. But from Mukden to south Korea we will not allow 
any other nation to occupy it even temporarily. We will fight to the nail, 
and this idea should be gradually made known, although at present 
people may misunderstand our motive and the result may be hurtful to 
us. We might as well let the world know that we are strongly opposed 
to the Japanese occupation of Aianchuria or any oilier part especially the 
part adjacent to Korea. We will never allow Japan to occupy that par: 
of Manchuria without our opposition. 
From Noble's article in the Saturday Evening Post you will see 
that he is propagandizing that Japan should be included in the Pacific 
Periphery Alliance which each state is bound to defend Japan. If you 
would particularly read Page 82 you will see that arming Japan is the 
main purpose of this article and is sugar-coated enough to make the 
American people take it. Particularly on the second column of Page 84 he 
outlined that the first half of the Pacific Periphery Alliance should be 
strong precise military alliance. The second pact is the Asiatic Pacific 
Pact which includes Korea, should be etc. etc. 
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REPORT OF CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR 
PLENIPOTENTIARY, PERSONAL REPRESENTA-
TIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
KOREA AND PERMANENT OBSERVER TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, 
DATED OCTOBER 12, 1949* 
TELEPHONE CABLE ADDRESS 
LONGACRE 3-4420" • KORUNMISON" 
PERMANENT" OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
Rd»** EMPIRE STATE BUILDING 
ROOM 6010 
350 FIFTH AVENUE . NEW YORK 1. N .Y ." 
October 12, 1949 
Dear Mr. President: 
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Heated discussions are going on now at Lake Success on such important 
problems as the Greek problem, the Italian Colonies, Human Rigtits and 
Religious Freedom, the China question and Atomic Energy Control. 
As for our problem it will probably come up before the General Assembly 
in the latter part of next week even though there may be usual delay tactics 
rhat will be employed by the Soviet Bloc. The resolution affecting Korea 
* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the 
Syngman Rhee Government. 
• • Letterhead. 
•••• Marked in pencil by Syngman Rhee personally, presumably an 
abbreviation of "read." 
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which had been adopted at the Special Political Committee will certainly 
pass through the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. 
AS REGARDS JOHNSTON 
In compliance with your wishes, I had taken up the case of Dick Johnston 
with General Adlcr of The New York Times and he had assured me that he 
would not make an immediate change of position for Johnston, which fact 
was indicated also in General Adler's letter to me. 
I have made an appointment with Mr. Sultzbcrger for today to deliver 
personally your letter to him. 
YOUR LETTER TO OLIVER 
It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver 
with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet 
regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the 
circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing 
about our desired unification. However, after taking into consideration all 
the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as 
yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our 
preparedness, and the international opinion will not approve of such an 
action to be taken. It must be recalled that the Greek Government itself 
has been persuaded by the friendly powers from taking military steps 
against Albania. 
I do not see what or how Oliver can do under the present circumstances 
in connection with this serious problem. I am sure he cannot publicize such 
ii proposal as our fixed government policy. Nor do I think that it would be 
wise for him to make public such matters of secret import. I have discussed 
it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that 
this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our Government that 
should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune. 
Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for laying before you such 
outspoken views but I should like to assure you that I have felt that it is 
my bounding duty to be candid in order to be of loyal service to you. 
PACIFIC PACT 
Ambassador Chang and I have had a full exchange of views on the 
subject matter. In view of the situation existing, which was described in my 
last report, we do not see how the proposal you have in mind can be effected 
as a reality. The matter of the Pacific Pact is entirely entrusted by Quirino 
in the hands of Romulo and he in turn has a program somewhat different 
from that which you, Generalissimo Chiang and President Quirino had in 
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MO.? 
REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN 
AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO SYNGMAN 
RHEE, DATED JULY 13, 1949* 
Confidential* * 
H.E. the President* 
v 
WEEKLY REPORTS. 
J. Regarding interview with Gen. Wedemcyer and Brig-Gen. Timberman. 
On July 8th, in the afternoon, I and Dr. Chough visited the War 
Department and had an interview with Gen. Wedemeyer and Brig.-'Gen. 
Timberman, a member of his staff. We explained to them that at present 
our country is in urgent need of reinforcement of the armed forces on 
account of the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces, and asked them what 
measures the U.S. Military authorities would take. Brig.-Gen. Timberman*•* 
answered. 
"As far as we American authorities can see, Korea has nothing to worry 
about. Because: 
1. Taking into account the international situation, the Soviet Union wi'l 
certainly not attack Korea with hex own troops. 
2. The Chinese Communist Army, too, will not possibly invade Korea. 
3. As the North Korean Communist Army is inferior to that of South 
• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of 
the Syngman Rhee Government. The original is in Korean, written 
in ink by Chang Myun personally. 
•* "Confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs. 
• • • In the original the name of "Gen. Wedemeyer" was written first, 
then crossed out and "Brig. Gen. Timberman" was inserted in its 
place. 
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Korea in its numerical strength as well as in its equipments, it will certainly 
rot itself start the expedition against the South. 
4. The South Korean National Army is splendid in its numerical strength 
i-nd in its equipments. 
5. When the U.S. Forces pulled out, they left a large quantity of 
weapons; and munitions, too, must be sufficiently reserved. 
6. As for further military aid to Korea, as soon as the sum of aid is fix-
ed by Congress, we will decide on kinds and quantities of weapons to bz 
delivered, taking account of the opinion of the Chief of the Military Advisory 
Group in Korea." 
(Lieut.-Gen. Wedemeyer could not abide the interview very long as he did 
not have much time). 
We said, we were told that we were very short of ammunition, and in the 
event of an actual warfare it would last only for a couple of days; and wc 
asked him, if that was true. He answered: "We haven't received any such 
report from Brig-Gen. Roberts, and we don't think you are short of ammuni-
tion." He said further: "It was a matter of course that the U.S. troops pulled 
out this time." He said, anyhow it was an established fact that the United 
States would militarily assist Korea; and after the decision by Congress, 
further aid would be itemized in accordance with the recommendations by 
the Military Advisory Group, etc. 
It is certain that American military aid in the future will depend a great 
deal on the will and attitude of Brig.-Gen. Roberts, Chief of the Military Advi-
sory Group—a fact which Your Excellency will have to consider. It seems to be 
adequate to make a confidential proposal for the change of his post through 
Ambassador Muccio. 
As for the ammunition, 1 also had a talk with Mr. Bond of the State 
Department. They say here that there are about fifteen million rounds in all, 
of which not the whole quantity will be handed over to the Korean National 
Army, but will be kept by the U.S. Military Advisory Group and delivered 
occasionally. We insisted that the whole quantity should be handed over to 
the Korean National Army so that we could use them as occasioa demand-
ed. Any way, for the sake of further negotiations, too, we need an itemized 
table of weapons and munitions we received when the last troops of the 
U.S. Forces withdrew. I hope Your Excellency will send me the table. 
We asked both Generals to do their utmost for the military aid of our 
country. Mr. Staggers will have an interview with A\r. Wedemeyer this af-
ternoon, and appeal to him again. 
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2. Regarding interview with Acheson, Secretary of State. 
On July 11th. at 3.00 p.m.. I and Dr. Chough made a call on Mr. A-
cheson. Dr. Chough conveyed to him the following three points as Your Ex-
cellency's message: 
1. For the Korean National Army and the security forces, at least 
100.000 standing army, 50.000 reserve force, 50.000 police force and 200.000 
militia must be equipped and be ready for any emergency. The United 
States shall supply us with arms sufficient to meet this. 
2. It must be clearly mentioned that in the event of invasion of foreign 
forces or of the North Korean Communist Army under command of a cer-
tain foreign power, the United States shall positively come to our military 
assistance or back us. 
3. The United States shall take an active part -in supporting a Pacific 
Pact or a similar union of Asiatic countries for their common security. 
Thereupon, Mr. Acheson answered as follows: 
1. As for the first item, it will be carried out by decision of Congress; 
2. As for the second item, though no specific statement can- 'be made 
concerning any individual state, we think measures for Korea, as was 
declared by the State Department on June 8th, can fully comply with the 
demands (Original enclosed); 
3. As for the third item, for the time being, the United States cannot 
officially take part in it 
Though the United States hesitates in officially taking part in the mat-
ter of the 3rd itqm, we can gather from yesterday's statement of Mr. McDer-
mott. official reporter of the State Department, that for the first time the 
United States is deeply Interested in a union of Asiatic countries against 
the communist influence; and we can expect that in due time she will take 
an active part in it. 
The press here published a good account of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's inter-
view with the President of the Philippines concerning the Pacific Pact as 
well as Your Excellency's statement. Herewith I enclose selections of them 
for Your Excellency's reference. 
I made a . statement concerning the so-called September Elections in 
North Korea, which I am also enclosing.' 
Mr. Staggers has just come back, having had a confidential talk with 
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Gen. Wedemeyer for two hours concerning the situation in our country. Gen. 
Wedemeyer's attitude is through and througli sympathetic and co-operative, 
by which we are very much enlightened. The talk includes Brig-Gen. 
Roberts' case, question of establishing a Korean-American Joint Commission 
concerning the arms etc. I cannot make reports on it this time; but Mr. 
Staggers will make a detailed report by the next mail. 
Ambassador of the Republic of 
Korea to the United States of 
America. 
Seal# 
* A square seal, "Uic seal of the Ambassador of the Republic of 
Korea to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs. 
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SCHEME (A) OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE 
YEAR 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTEL-
LIGENCE BUREAU OF THE SOUTH KOREAN 
ARMY HEADQUARTERS* 
(STRICT MILITARY SECRECY)*• 
SCHEME OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR 
; THE YEAR 1950. 
Section III, Intelligence Bureau, 
Army Headquarters. 
Policy: 
In consideration of the tense international situation at home and abroad 
fundamental policy of the intelligence work shall hinge upon execution of 
matters of importance. Extermination of puppet organizations of North Ko-
rea shall be aimed at by means of secret warfares, and with might and 
main successful intelligence works shall be carried out for a rapid frustra-
tion of the said organizations for the restoration of lost territories. 
INTELLIGENCE: 
TARGETS: 
J. Military intelligence: 
1) Formations and equipments of the stationed units; 
2) Movements and defence of the 38th parallel line; 
3) Ideological tendencies of the People's Army officers; 
4) Attitude of the Army towards the government and the people; 
• This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the 
South Korean Army Headquarters. The original is in Korean. 
This document is divided into A and B Sections by the editor in view of 
the difference in their contents. 
• • Stamp. 
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II. Po 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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How far the Army participates in politics; 
How much the population has confidence in the" Army; 
Relations between the Army and political parties • and social 
organizations; 
Morale and discipline; 
How far the Soviet military advisers have a hand in the North Ko-
rean affairs; . 
Relations with the Eighth Route Army in Manchuria; 
Operation plans; 
Anti-army and anti-war sentiments of the Army personnel; 
Military finance and funds; 
How the Army is supplied; 
Military intelligence work versus the South. 
itical, economic and ideological intelligence: 
Popular rumours about the lower administration officials 
Collection*, labour service, requisitions, taxes; 
Complaints of the civilians against the officials; 
Political co-operation of the people; 
Industrial conditions; 
Rehabilitation of business and industry; 
How far the communist regime is understood; 
' How transportation facilities are being operated; 
Foreign trades; 
How far the international situation is understood; 
Propagandas at home and abroad; 
Education and culture; 
Ideological tendencies of the students; 
Materials delivered to the Soviet Union. 
ESSENTIAL POINTS: 
Main points of the intelligence work: 
I. The main point of the intelligence work lies in getting the mainstay of 
secret agents as follows, and equipping them with the qualifications of 
best workers through a thorough-going training: 
1) One who has knowledge of military affairs, is interested in getting 
wind of secrets, and predisposed to adventure; 
2) One who is clever, has sound judgement and knows the art of social 
intercourse; 
3) A quick witted. Lold and self-possessed person; 
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4) A shrewd person with a wealth of common sense and who is skilled 
in techniques; 
5) One who has a strong lust for fame and money; 
II. Together with the permanent secret agents, liaison agents shall also 
be used, and through their intimate connections informations 
shall be transmitted; liaison agents shall be selected as 
follows: 
1) One who is skilled in feigning a pedlar, also skilled in arts and 
techniques; 
2) Beggars who hang about the taverns, and give performances of 
dancing, singing and musical instruments; 
3) Barbers, photographers, train conductors and engineers; 
4) Pedlars of miscellaneous goods, motorcar drivers, fishermen, etc.; 
5) Cooks, bar-maids, waitresses and day-labourers. 
Powerful nets of intelligence service shall be laid with the above-men-
tioned permanent and liaison secret agents; they must assume an ever-
growing dimension, and at the same time they shall have cells as follows: 
III. Cell organizations: 
1) Cells, up to 5 in number, shall be organized around a leading 
agent; each cell shall consist of 3 to 5 persons, and they shall 
incessantly bring in informations; 
2) In each cell, the person who is in charge shall have direct contacts 
with the permanent agent, and other cell members shall work by 
themselves; 
3) One who is in charge of the cell shall give only partial orders io 
the agents under him, and the full account of an affair shall not 
be revealed; 
IV. To bribe persons in important positions in various organs: 
1) To make use of officers and men of the Army, who are prone to 
conversion, and pilfer confidential documents; 
2) To infiltrate into important organs such as police stations, 
Counter-intelligence Bureaus, etc., and steal confidential documents 
or obtain secrets; 
3) To buy off workers and purveyors of prohibited military areas for 
sketches of Important buildings. 
INTRIGUES: 
TARGETS: 
I. Intrigues for Destructions: 
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1) Concerning railroads: 
a) To destroy bridges and tunnels; 
h) To derail and overturn military trains; 
c) To destroy freight cars and station buildings; 
d) Collision; 
c) To destroy main railway factories. 
2) Heavy industry, firms and factories: 
a) Munitions factories of the People's Army; 
b) Various important factories of the Army; 
c) Public buildings; 
d) Aerodromes; 
e) Power plants and transformer stations; 
f) Broadcasting stations; 
g) Cylinder-press of newspapers. 
II. Incendiarism: To set afire 
1) Public buildings, 
2) Dwelling houses, 
3) Public halls. 
4) Military barracks and school buildings. 
5) Buildings of political parties and other organs, 
6) Aerodromes, ' 
7) Power plants and transformer stations, 
8) Broadcasting stations, 
9) Various factories of the Army, 
III. To infect with bacteria: 
1) Army kitchens, 
2) Dining rooms of the police, 
3) Banquet halls of the Army, government, party, etc., 
4) City reservoirs, rivers, 
5) Houses of the leaders of the Army, government and the party. 
IV. Propaganda: 
1) To distribute leaflets; 
2) To post wall newspapers; 
3) To scribble on walls; 
4) To circulate sensational rumours; 
5) To inspire liberalistic ideas; 
6) To stir up people against the war, against military service; 
7) To instigate anti-communist, ideas; 
8) To provoke revolts and nationalistic uprising; 
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9) To instigate strikes; 
10) To instigate sabotages; 
11) To propagandize the might of the National Army of the Republic 
of Korea; 
12) To instigate migration to South Korea; 
13) To propagandize freedom in South Korea. 
V. Economic intrigues; 
1) To corner and hold back main goods; 
2) To waste d^ily necessities; 
..•) 'lo counterfeit North Korean bank notes; 
•1) To hinder collections of provisions. 
VI. Assassination: 
1) The biggest ringleaders of North Korea; 
2) Higher officers of the People's Army; 
3) High-er officers of the Home Ministry; 
4) Leaders of the political parties and social organizations; 
3) Persons in charge of cultural organizations; 
G) Highest cadres of the ministries; 
7) Highest cadres ar.d those of middle rank in ch'arge of intelligence 
work on South Korea; 
8) Bad elements in the intelligence service, policemen and officials; 
9) Previous officers of the National Army who have deserted to the 
north, and the ringieader in the desertion of s/s Smith to the 
north. 
E-'SSENTIAL POINTS: 
1) Bold and valiant persons shall be selected from the agents in 
service, and they shall receive sufficient remunerations; at the 
same time orders shall be given in accordance with their specific 
characters; 
2) Agents shall personally and secretly take up the execution of 
destroying main buildings; at the same time they shall pick up 
adequate collaborators on the spot of their actions; 
3) Prior to destroying the objects, thorough-going study of the 
situation shall Le done; 
4) In setting buildin.js afire, employees in the buildings shall be 
bribed, but the agots shall personally make a careful survey of 
the matter beforehand; 
5) In assassinations, cell members shall bribe waitresses or kitchen 
workers, and have them poison the persons in question; 
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6) Skilled agents shall manage to be near the leaders, and poison 
them during meals or at drinking parties; 
7) Employees at the city reservoirs shall be bribed into poisoning the 
water; 
8) Kitchens of the Army and public organizations shall be poisoned; 
9) Purveyors and pedlars who regularly visit the Army or main 
organs shall be utilized for mixing poisons in food supplies; 
10) In propaganda intrigues, circulations of leaflets and northbound 
broadcasts, which have already been in use, shall be intensified; 
11) Students who harbour patriotic ideas shall be utilized for posting 
wall newspapers or scribbling on walls; 
12) Propaganda leaflets shall be dispatched to youth organizations 
through mails; 
13) In the main cities secret senders shall be set, and counter-pro-
paganda shall be broadcasted as occasion allows; 
14) Songs in praise of the Republic of Korea shall be propagated 
among' the primary school children; 
15) Dynamite, etc. shall be buried at aerodromes or main bridges. 
MAIN POINTS OF COMMUNICATING INTELLIGENCE: 
1) Secret ink-cloth shall be used if there is no wireless set; 
2) Colourless letters shall be used in newspapers or magazines; 
3) Ciphers shall be used in disguised mails; 
4) Bacteria shall be disguised as ordinary drugs; 
5) Other tools and materials, mentioned in the instructions, shall be 
obtained from the spot if possible, and shall be sent over only 
when they are not obtainable there. 
UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES: 
TARGETS: 
1) North Korean secret agents who have reliable guarantors in South 
Korea; 
2) Members of the South Korean Workers' Party, who are disposed 
to conversion; 
3) To select adequate persons from converted captives; 
4) To select adequate persons from businessmen who trade between 
the north and south; 
5) To utilize spies who live permanently in south Korea; 
6) To utilize north Korean ships now in south Korea for smuggling; 
7) R.H. special service; R.C.K. special service; N.N. special service; 
2 73 
R.I.W. special service; K P. special service. 
ESSENTIAL POINTS: 
1) To take advantage of criminal acts, i.e. weaknesses of the person 
in question, pretend to pardon him leniently, fully protect him and 
utilize him; 
2) To double the pay, when employing spies of north Korean 
intelligence organs, and try to get accurate informations; 
'<) To train North Korean spies for not less than a week how to give 
false informations, when sending them Lack; 
4) The person who manipulates an enemy spy must be very careful 
that the latter does not know that the southern authorities are 
aware of his double-dealings. He shall keep his eye on the enemy 
spy in strict secret. 
WORK FOR CONVERSION: 
TARGETS: 
1) On officers and men of the People's Army; 
2) On officers and men of the Police; 
3) On leading cadres of various political parties and social organiza-
tions; 
4) On technicians in heavy industry; 
5) On leading railway cadres as well as engineers and assistants; 
6) On offioers and men of the Air Fore* 
7) On officers and men of the Marines; 
8) On cadres in freight vessel service; 
9) On leading intelligentsia in the organs and magazines of com-
munist hordes; 
10) On higher officials in administrative bodies. 
ESSENTIAL POINTS: 
1) To send back patriotic young men from the North, and send them 
to the People's Army, to influence those who axe prone to 
ideological conversion or those who have joined the army by force, 
and to persuade them to desert or revolt; 
2) To praise incessantly the might of the South Korean National 
Army by means of leaflets; 
3) To allure the person in question into conversion through his 
relatives, schoolmates and other friends. 
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STRATEGIC MAP FOR ATTACK ON NORTH KOREA 
EXPLANATORY NOTES. 
This is a U.S. military map found in the South Korean Army 
Headquarters, published by Army Map Service, U.S. Army in 1941 
(Scale 1:1,000,000) 
Lines, arrows and other conventional signs indicated in this map show 
the plan drawn up by the American imperialists and the Syngman Rhee 
clique for an attack on north Korea. 
This map shows that there were to be two South Korean armies 
stationed along the 38th parallel for the attack on the north. The first army 
was to begin military operations against north Korea between the Yellow 
Sea coast and Kolangpo, north-east of Kaesung; whilst the second army 
was to begin operations between Kolangpo and the east coast. 
The first army was to deal the main blow from its right flank in 
Kaesung area, directly opposite Pyongyang; whilst its left flank was to 
attack from Ongchin area on Sinchon and afterwards on Sariwon. In 
addition, a landing under air cover in Hanchon area was to be carried out 
from Inchon, and to advance towards Pyongyang. 
The first army was to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was 
to be composed of the 1st and 2nd divisions and one regiment, and the 
second echelon was to be composed of the 5th division, three independent 
regiments and several A.A. gun companies. 
The second army was io start an attack on the north from Tongduchon, 
Chunchon and Hanchi areas, and a landing under air cover in Dyengpyeng 
area was to be carried out from Chumunjin, to cut off communications 
between Pyongyang and South and North Hamgyeng. 
The second army was also to consist of two echelons. The first echelon 
was to be composed of the 7th and 8th divisions, and the second echelon 
2 7 6 
Was to be composed of the Gth division, independent regiments and AA. 
gun companies. 
In addition to the 1st and 2nd armies there were to be reserve units 
consisting of the 3rd division (5 regiments) and mechanized divisions. 
In the area along the 38th parallel, about ten divisions were to be 
concentrated for star-ting the offensive against North Korea. 
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PERSONNEL AND EXPENSE FOR OUTSIDE INTELLIGENCE 
SERVICE IN VARIOUS PLACES 
Permanent Secret Agents: 
Place 
Pyongyang 
Sinijoo 
Haejoo 
Nampo 
Namchun 
Sunchun 
Sariwon 
Hamheung 
Chungjin 
Wonsan 
Heungnam 
Chulwon 
Sungjin 
Najin 
Hoeryeng 
Total 
Personnel 
15 pe 
10 , 
10 . 
5 . 
3 , 
3 . 
4 . 
10 . 
10 . 
8 . 
5 , 
5 . 
5 . 
5 . 
5 . 
r. 
103 per. 
Expense per 
person in won 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50.000— 
50.000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
50,000— 
750,000—wons 
Expense per 
month in won 
750.000— 
500,000— 
500,000— 
250.000-
150,000— 
150.000— 
200.000— 
500.000— 
500,000— 
400,000— 
250,000— 
250,000— 
1 250,000— 
250.000— 
250.000— 
5,150,000—wons 
Expense per year 
in won 
9.000,000— 
6,000,000— 
6,000,000-
3,000.000— 
1,800,000— 
1,800,000— 
2,400,000— 
6,000.000— 
G. 000,000— 
4,800,000— 
3.000.000— 
3.000,000 — 
3.000.000— 
3,000.000 — 
3,000,000— 
61,800,000—wons 
Place 
Pyongyang 
Sinijoo 
Haejoo 
Sariwon 
Namchun 
Nampo 
Sunchun 
Hamheung 
Chungjin 
Wonsan 
Sungjin 
Chulwon 
Najin 
Heungnam 
Hoeryeng 
Total 
LIAISON SECRET AGENTS: 
_ . 1 Expense per Personnel 
5 per. 
4 . 
5 .. 
4 . 
3 . 
4 , 
3 . 
5 , 
5 
4 
3 . 
3 . 
3 . 
3 . 
3 . 
-
57 per. 
person in won 
30,000— 
30,000— 
30,000— 
30,000— 
30,000— 
30.000— 
30.000-
30.000— 
30.000— 
30.000— 
30,000— 
30,000— 
30,000— 
30.000— 
30 .000-
450,000—wons 
Expense per 
month in won 
150,000— 
120.000— 
90.000—• 
^ 90,000—* 
90 ,000-
9 0 , 0 0 0 - • 
90 ,000-
150,000-
150,000— 
120,000— 
90,000— 
90,000— 
90,000— 
90 ,000-
90,000— 
1,590,000—wons 
Expense per year 
in won 
1,800,000—wons 
1,440.000— 
1.080.000— 
1.080,000— 
1.080.000— 
1,080,000-
1,080,000-
1,080.000— 
1,080.000— 
1,440,000— 
1,080,000— 
1,080.000— 
1,080,000— 
1,080.000— 
1.080,000-
16,920,000—wons 
• This is precisely the figure given in the original.—Ed. 
FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AT HOME 
District 
Mapo 
Yungdeungpo 
Yongsan 
West Gate 
East Gate 
Choonggoo 
Sungdong 
Sungbook 
Chongno 
In the Province: 
Inchun 
Poosan 
Pohang 
Yusoo 
Koonsan 
Choonchun 
Total 
Personnel 
3 per. 
3 .. 
3 ., 
3 ., 
3 .. 
3 .. 
3 .. 
3 .., 
3 ..'. 
5 per. 
5 .. 
5 .. 
5 „ 
5 .. 
3 ,. 
55 per. 
IN SEOUL: 
Expense per 
person in won 
15,000— 
15.000— 
15.000— 
15.000— 
15,000— 
15.000— 
15.000— 
15.000— 
15,000— 
15.000— 
15.000-
15.000— 
15.000— 
15.000— 
15.000— 
185,500—wons* 
Expense per 
month in won 
45,000— 
45.000— 
45,000— 
45,000— 
45.000— 
45.000— 
•15.000— 
45.000— 
45.000— 
75.000-
75.000-
75.000— 
75.000-
75.000— 
45.000— 
825,500—won s 
Expense per year 
in won 
580.000-
580,000-
580.000-
5SO.O00— 
5S0.000— 
580.000-
580.000-
580.000-
580.000-
900,000-
900,000-
900,000— 
900,000-
900,000— 
580.000-
10,300,000—wons 
* As in original.—Ed 
FOR UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES 
Classification 
R.H. 
R.C.K. 
N.N. 
R.U.N. 
K.I.P. 
Total 
Target 
Special Serv. 
South Korean 
Workers' Party 
Supreme People's 
Assembly 
Counter Intelligence 
Bureau 
Special Service 
• 
Expense per 
month in won 
500,000— 
200,000-
200.000-
100.000— 
300,000— 
1,300.000—wons 
llxpense per 
year in won 
6,000,000— 
2.400,000— 
2.400.000 — 
1.200.000— 
3.600,000— 
15,600,000-wons 
GRAND TOTAL: ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR MILLION AND ONE HUNDRED 
AND TWENTY THOUSAND WONS. 
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